1700085050 22.It is all the more remarkable when, according to Schrötter, p.466，at the death of Frederick I there already existed a levy system along controlled lines, with exemption of those with special possessions, that was quite similar to the situation created by the “canton regulation.”It appears that the purely arbitrary aspect of the levying by the officers was completely consonant with the forceful character of Frederick William I.

1700085051

1700085052 23.Courbière, History of the Brandenburg-Prussian Military Organization（Geschichte der Brandenburgisch-Preussischen Heeresverfassung），p.119. When reference is made on p.120 to men of 3 inches and under 3 inches, this seems to me to stem from a writing error. As the smallest height, which was waived only under conditions of a complete scarcity of manpower, as in the last year of the Seven Years’War, we can regard 5 feet，5 inches（1.70 meters）. See Grünhagen, Silesia under Frederick the Great（Schlesien unter Friedrich dem Grossen），1：405. Reimann, History of the Prussian Nation（Geschichte des preussischen Staates），1：154，claims that even in garrison regiments men could not be less than 5 feet，3 inches tall. According to Koser, Friedrich der Grosse，1：538，Frederick required in the older regiments men of 5 feet，8 inches in the front rank and 5 feet，6 inches in the second rank. For the newer regiments, these requirements were 5 feet，7 inches and 5 feet，5 inches, respectively.

1700085053

1700085054 24.A report of the government of the electoral march of 1811 states：“In earlier times, as filler replacements, only such a moderate number of natives was required that only those subjects who were completely dispensable were enlisted, and that was determined by the civil authorities.”

1700085055

1700085056 25.Studies in Brandenburg-Prussian History（Forschungen zur Brandenburgisch-Preussischen Geschichte），7：308.

1700085057

1700085058 26.Ranke, Werke，27：230.

1700085059

1700085060 27.Jähns，2：914.

1700085061

1700085062 28.Excerpted from Tactical Training（Taktische Schulung），p.687.

1700085063

1700085064 29.von Osten-Sacken, Prussia’s Army from Its Beginnings to the Present（Preussens Heer von seinen Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart），1911，1：173.

1700085065

1700085066 30.These numbers are estimated for the regiment that was named “Thüna” in 1784 and “Winnig” in 1806. Ollech，“Life of Reiher”（“Leben Reihers”），Militär-Wochenblatt，1859，p.11. Kunhardt von Schmidt, Militär-Wochenblatt，1909，col.3771. The latter correctly assumes that, in view of the uniformity throughout the army, these lists give a picture not only of the individual troop unit but of the entire infantry of the period. Similar age relationships already existed in 1704. Schrötter, p.453.

1700085067

1700085068 31.M. Lehmann, p.278.

1700085069

1700085070 32.Basta（Book I, Chap.6—consequently, long before the Thirty Years’War）was already complaining about the start of the practice of filling the captains’positions only with aristocrats, even when they were completely inexperienced, so that no private soldier any longer had the hope of moving up, except in very exceptional cases. According to Löwe, Organization of Wallenstein’s Army（Organisation des Wallensteinschen Heeres），p.86，most of the colonels and generals in the Thirty Years’War were nobles, but among the lower officers there were still quite a number of former privates. G. Droysen，“Contributions to the History of the Military System During the Period of the Thirty Years’War”（“Beiträge zur Geschichte des Militärwesens während der Epoche des 30jährigen Krieges”），Zeitschrift für Kulturgeschichte, Vol.4，1875，emphasizes strongly, in opposition to Gansauge, that there was not yet any officer corps at that time.

1700085071

1700085072 33.Schrötter, Brandenburgisch-Preussische Forschungen, Vol.27.

1700085073

1700085074 34.Treated very clearly by Richard M. Meyer，“The Military Titles”（“Die militärischen Titel”）in the Zeitschrift für deutsche Wortforschung, Vol.12，Book 3（1910），p.145.

1700085075

1700085076 The 1726 regulation of Frederick William I shows a great similarity to a Spanish regulation. Jähns，2：1577，believes that it goes back directly to the Spanish. Erben, in the Mitteilungen des kaiserlichen und königlichen Heeresmuseums，1（1902）：3，seems to refute that. I hesitate to make any definitive judgment.

1700085077

1700085078 35.Schmoller in the Historische Zeitschrift，30：61.

1700085079

1700085080 36.Observations on the Art of War（Betrachtungen über die Kriegskunst），section 13.

1700085081

1700085082 37.G.Droysen，“Beiträge，”Zeitschrift für deutsche Kulturgeschichte, new series，4（1875）：592.

1700085083

1700085084 38.“Report of the Ambassador Valory of 1748.”Ed. Koser, Brandenburgisch-Preussische Forschungen，7（1894）：299. Valory stresses the marching in step of the Prussians so strongly that we may doubt whether the French had it.

1700085085

1700085086 39.Daniels，“Ferdinand von Braunschweig，”Preussische Jahrbücher, Vols.77，78，79，80，82.

1700085087

1700085088 40.According to Frederick’s so-called Military Testament, there are supposed to have been 110，000 natives and 80，000 foreigners in 1780，but the numbers are not entirely certain, since natives who were not from the regimental canton were also counted as foreigners.

1700085089

1700085090 41.The Militia Gallica by Wallhausen（French Military Service; translation of a book by Montgommery），p.44，precisely states how broad was the power of punishment of each position. The colonel was allowed to strike and kill with the sword, even officers. The sergeant-major had similar authority, but he could also strike with the staff, that is, with his measuring stick. Nobody was to feel insulted by this. The captain was allowed to strike with the flat of his sword. The lieutenants and sergeants could do likewise on the march or in the trenches, but in garrison only against their direct subordinates. The ensign was allowed to do this only when substituting for the lieutenant or captain. The sergeant（in contradiction to the foregoing！）could strike only on the march, in battle, on guard duty, and in the trenches, with the shaft of the halberd, and not with the sword, if a soldier left his post, but not in garrison or for other reasons.

1700085091

1700085092 42.Daniels, Preussische Jahrbücher，82：270.

1700085093

1700085094 43.According to the estimates of the General Staff Work. That was, therefore, at the moment Frederick started the war. Ranke，3：148 cites a memorandum, according to which Frederick William I, on his death, had left behind 83，484 men, including 72，000 men in the field army; other statements show up to 89，000 men. According to Schrötter, the Prussian army on 2 January 1705，when it had been strongly reinforced with the assistance of the subsidies of the sea powers, already amounted to 47，031，and with the militia 67，000 men, that is, almost 4 percent of the population.

1700085095

1700085096 44.Preussische Jahrbücher，142：300.

1700085097

1700085098 4　操练与18世纪的战术变化

1700085099

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