1700085100 1.Rüstow, Geschichte der Infanterie，2：42 ff.

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1700085102 2.Jany, p.108.

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1700085104 3.Pastenacci, Battle of Enzheim（Schlacht bei Enzheim）.

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1700085106 4.In the battles of Klissow（1702）and Fraustadt（1706），the Saxon infantry tried unsuccessfully to protect itself against the Swedes with chevaux-de-frise.

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1700085108 5.According to Würdinger, Military History of Bavaria（Kriegsgeschichte von Bayern），2：349，such an “awl spear” appears in a Passau armory register of 1488.

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1700085110 6.According to sources cited by Firth in Cromwell’s Army, p.87，a light musket with a flintlock was already in widespread use as a hunting weapon by the German peasants at the start of the seventeenth century. In 1626 with these muskets the peasants completely wiped out imperial regiments that Christian of Braunschweig had defeated.

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1700085112 7.At this point I wish to assemble a number of data concerning the technical improvements of the firearm, without claiming accuracy for each individual date. From this listing, however, we gain an overall view as to how gradually such a development occurs, step by step.

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1700085114 Of significance in the references is the work by Thierbach in the Zeitschrift für historische Waffenkunde, Vol.II，“On the Development of the Bayonet”（“Ueber die Entwicklung des Bajonetts”）and also Vol.III.

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1700085116 Second half of the sixteenth century: paper cartridges for horsemen. 1608：loading in 95 tempo.1653：paper cartridges initially without the ball. Spak, in the Festschrift für Thierbach, claims to prove that muskets without forks were given to the regiments for the first time in 1655.1670：introduction of cartridges in the Brandenburg infantry.1684：flintlock muskets introduced in Austria.1688：the bayonet reportedly invented by Vauban.1690：introduction of paper cartridges in France（Jähns，2：1236）.1698：Leopold von Dessau adopts the iron ramrod in his regiment.1699：bayonet with cross-arm.1703：final abandonment of the pikes by the French.1708：abandonment of the pikes by the Netherlanders, according to Coxe, Life of Marlborough（Leben Marlboroughs），4：303.1718：the iron ramrod adopted in the whole Prussian army from this year on.1721：abandonment of pikes by the Russians.1733：loading with bayonets fixed in Prussia（Jähns，3：2498）.1744（or possibly 1742）：the iron ramrod in Austria.1745：the iron ramrod in France. The Well Drilled Prussian Soldier（Der wohl exerzierte Preussische Soldat），by Johann Conrad Müller，“Free Ensign and Citizen of the Town of Schaffhausen，”1759，states on p.18 that shortly before the current campaign Frederick had had new stocks placed on all the muskets and had the foremost ring for the ramrod made in funnel form so that the rod could be brought more securely into place. The author also states that the grips described by him could not be done with the wooden ramrod.1773: replacement of the conical ramrod in Prussia by the cylindrical rod.

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1700085118 Thierbach states that in tests which Napoleon had made in 1811，every seventh shot was a misfire; according to Schmidt, Hand Firearms（Handfeuerwaffe），p.38，of every 100 shots，20 were misfires and 10 were ignition failures. In tests that were conducted by the French government in 1829 with the same flintlock musket, there was only one misfire for every fifteen shots.

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1700085120 8.The standard study is the article “The Tactical Training of the Prussian Army by King Frederick the Great during the Period of Peace from 1745 to 1756”（“Die taktische Schulung der preussischen Armee durch König Friedrich den Grossen während der Friedenszeit 1745 bis 1756”）in the Kriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschriften, published by the Great General Staff, Vol.28/30，1900.

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1700085122 9.Taktische Schulung, p.663.

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1700085124 10.Jähns, p.2105.

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1700085126 11.Berenhorst, Observations on the Art of War, Its Progress, Its Contradictions, and Its Reliability（Betrachtungen über die Kriegskunst，über ihre Fortschritte, ihre Widersprüche und ihre Zuverlässigkeit），1797，pp.239-240.

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1700085128 12.Taktische Schulung, p.665.

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1700085130 13.The prince of Ligne reports that on a single occasion in his many campaigns, in the engagement at Mons（1757），he heard bayonets striking against one another. Berenhorst states that in military history there is not a single properly confirmed example that the rifles of opposing sides had crossed one another and there had been hand-to-hand fighting. Emperor William I also paid no attention to the use of the bayonet in the training of soldiers, since he believed it had no practical value.

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1700085132 14.Scharnhorst，3：273，states that many tests had shown that the firing against a line of cavalry resulted in 403 hits of 1，000 shots at 100 paces，149 hits at 300 paces, and 65 hits at 400 paces. In the case of a platoon well drilled in aiming, there were considerably more hits at the greater distances, up to twice as many. At 400 paces “the effect was hardly to be taken into consideration.”Against infantry, of course, the effect was considerably smaller. For more on this subject, see Taktische Schulung, p.431. In Firth, Cromwell’s Army, p.89，the range of the muskets of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries is given as 600 paces, according to the evidence of several confirming sources, and it is not impossible that this range was greater than that of the musket of the eighteenth century.

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1700085134 15.Austria. Regulations of 1759（Regulament von 1759）. Jähns, p.2035.

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1700085136 16.In agreement with Taktische Schulung, p.446.

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1700085138 17.General Staff, Military History Monographs（Kriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschriften），27：380.

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1700085140 18.“Dispositions for the Battle of Zorndorf”（“Disposition für Schlacht bei Zorndorf”），Militärischer Nachlass des Grafen Henckel，2：79.“On the wing that is supposed to attack, there will be three echelons. If a battalion in the first echelon is broken up or repulsed, the battalion of the second echelon standing directly behind it is to move immediately into the first echelon, and one from the third echelon must replace it in the second echelon so that the battalion that is broken up and repulsed must form again in good order and advance with the others.”

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1700085142 19.Montecuccoli, Schriften，2：350. The Austrian Military Field Regulations of 1759 state 500 paces（Jähns，3：2035）. The Regulations for the Royal Prussian Infantry（Reglement vor die Königliche Preussische Infanterie）of 1726 in Title XX, Article 1，“… that one cannot shoot that far with any musket ball.”

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1700085144 20.The General Staff Work and the two monographs 27 and 28/30 added very valuable new material on this subject, but in the end they stray into a description of the oblique battle order that is much too narrow. It has been rejected by Lieutenant Colonel Schnackenburg in the Jahrbücher für Armee und Marine, Vol.116，Book 2，1900. The basis for the correct concept had already been found by Otto Herrmann in the Brandenburg-Prussian Studies（Brandenburgisch-Preussische Forschungen），5（1892）：459，and the entire problem was solved once and for all in the exemplary study of Rudolf Keibel, outstanding in its source critique, completeness, and reasoning, which appeared in the Brandenburgisch-Preussische Forschungen，14（1901）：95. A final effort by Jany to defend the concept of the General Staff in the Hohenzollern-Jahrbuch，1911，has been refuted by O. Herrmann in the Brandenburgisch-Preussische Forschungen，27（1914）：555.

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1700085146 21.Montecuccoli，2：581，also calls Nieuport, Breitenfeld, and Alterheim wing battles. Breitenfeld did indeed become a wing battle, although it was not planned that way.

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1700085148 22.Jähns，1：520，522.

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