1700085070 32.Basta（Book I, Chap.6—consequently, long before the Thirty Years’War）was already complaining about the start of the practice of filling the captains’positions only with aristocrats, even when they were completely inexperienced, so that no private soldier any longer had the hope of moving up, except in very exceptional cases. According to Löwe, Organization of Wallenstein’s Army（Organisation des Wallensteinschen Heeres），p.86，most of the colonels and generals in the Thirty Years’War were nobles, but among the lower officers there were still quite a number of former privates. G. Droysen，“Contributions to the History of the Military System During the Period of the Thirty Years’War”（“Beiträge zur Geschichte des Militärwesens während der Epoche des 30jährigen Krieges”），Zeitschrift für Kulturgeschichte, Vol.4，1875，emphasizes strongly, in opposition to Gansauge, that there was not yet any officer corps at that time.

1700085071

1700085072 33.Schrötter, Brandenburgisch-Preussische Forschungen, Vol.27.

1700085073

1700085074 34.Treated very clearly by Richard M. Meyer，“The Military Titles”（“Die militärischen Titel”）in the Zeitschrift für deutsche Wortforschung, Vol.12，Book 3（1910），p.145.

1700085075

1700085076 The 1726 regulation of Frederick William I shows a great similarity to a Spanish regulation. Jähns，2：1577，believes that it goes back directly to the Spanish. Erben, in the Mitteilungen des kaiserlichen und königlichen Heeresmuseums，1（1902）：3，seems to refute that. I hesitate to make any definitive judgment.

1700085077

1700085078 35.Schmoller in the Historische Zeitschrift，30：61.

1700085079

1700085080 36.Observations on the Art of War（Betrachtungen über die Kriegskunst），section 13.

1700085081

1700085082 37.G.Droysen，“Beiträge，”Zeitschrift für deutsche Kulturgeschichte, new series，4（1875）：592.

1700085083

1700085084 38.“Report of the Ambassador Valory of 1748.”Ed. Koser, Brandenburgisch-Preussische Forschungen，7（1894）：299. Valory stresses the marching in step of the Prussians so strongly that we may doubt whether the French had it.

1700085085

1700085086 39.Daniels，“Ferdinand von Braunschweig，”Preussische Jahrbücher, Vols.77，78，79，80，82.

1700085087

1700085088 40.According to Frederick’s so-called Military Testament, there are supposed to have been 110，000 natives and 80，000 foreigners in 1780，but the numbers are not entirely certain, since natives who were not from the regimental canton were also counted as foreigners.

1700085089

1700085090 41.The Militia Gallica by Wallhausen（French Military Service; translation of a book by Montgommery），p.44，precisely states how broad was the power of punishment of each position. The colonel was allowed to strike and kill with the sword, even officers. The sergeant-major had similar authority, but he could also strike with the staff, that is, with his measuring stick. Nobody was to feel insulted by this. The captain was allowed to strike with the flat of his sword. The lieutenants and sergeants could do likewise on the march or in the trenches, but in garrison only against their direct subordinates. The ensign was allowed to do this only when substituting for the lieutenant or captain. The sergeant（in contradiction to the foregoing！）could strike only on the march, in battle, on guard duty, and in the trenches, with the shaft of the halberd, and not with the sword, if a soldier left his post, but not in garrison or for other reasons.

1700085091

1700085092 42.Daniels, Preussische Jahrbücher，82：270.

1700085093

1700085094 43.According to the estimates of the General Staff Work. That was, therefore, at the moment Frederick started the war. Ranke，3：148 cites a memorandum, according to which Frederick William I, on his death, had left behind 83，484 men, including 72，000 men in the field army; other statements show up to 89，000 men. According to Schrötter, the Prussian army on 2 January 1705，when it had been strongly reinforced with the assistance of the subsidies of the sea powers, already amounted to 47，031，and with the militia 67，000 men, that is, almost 4 percent of the population.

1700085095

1700085096 44.Preussische Jahrbücher，142：300.

1700085097

1700085098 4　操练与18世纪的战术变化

1700085099

1700085100 1.Rüstow, Geschichte der Infanterie，2：42 ff.

1700085101

1700085102 2.Jany, p.108.

1700085103

1700085104 3.Pastenacci, Battle of Enzheim（Schlacht bei Enzheim）.

1700085105

1700085106 4.In the battles of Klissow（1702）and Fraustadt（1706），the Saxon infantry tried unsuccessfully to protect itself against the Swedes with chevaux-de-frise.

1700085107

1700085108 5.According to Würdinger, Military History of Bavaria（Kriegsgeschichte von Bayern），2：349，such an “awl spear” appears in a Passau armory register of 1488.

1700085109

1700085110 6.According to sources cited by Firth in Cromwell’s Army, p.87，a light musket with a flintlock was already in widespread use as a hunting weapon by the German peasants at the start of the seventeenth century. In 1626 with these muskets the peasants completely wiped out imperial regiments that Christian of Braunschweig had defeated.

1700085111

1700085112 7.At this point I wish to assemble a number of data concerning the technical improvements of the firearm, without claiming accuracy for each individual date. From this listing, however, we gain an overall view as to how gradually such a development occurs, step by step.

1700085113

1700085114 Of significance in the references is the work by Thierbach in the Zeitschrift für historische Waffenkunde, Vol.II，“On the Development of the Bayonet”（“Ueber die Entwicklung des Bajonetts”）and also Vol.III.

1700085115

1700085116 Second half of the sixteenth century: paper cartridges for horsemen. 1608：loading in 95 tempo.1653：paper cartridges initially without the ball. Spak, in the Festschrift für Thierbach, claims to prove that muskets without forks were given to the regiments for the first time in 1655.1670：introduction of cartridges in the Brandenburg infantry.1684：flintlock muskets introduced in Austria.1688：the bayonet reportedly invented by Vauban.1690：introduction of paper cartridges in France（Jähns，2：1236）.1698：Leopold von Dessau adopts the iron ramrod in his regiment.1699：bayonet with cross-arm.1703：final abandonment of the pikes by the French.1708：abandonment of the pikes by the Netherlanders, according to Coxe, Life of Marlborough（Leben Marlboroughs），4：303.1718：the iron ramrod adopted in the whole Prussian army from this year on.1721：abandonment of pikes by the Russians.1733：loading with bayonets fixed in Prussia（Jähns，3：2498）.1744（or possibly 1742）：the iron ramrod in Austria.1745：the iron ramrod in France. The Well Drilled Prussian Soldier（Der wohl exerzierte Preussische Soldat），by Johann Conrad Müller，“Free Ensign and Citizen of the Town of Schaffhausen，”1759，states on p.18 that shortly before the current campaign Frederick had had new stocks placed on all the muskets and had the foremost ring for the ramrod made in funnel form so that the rod could be brought more securely into place. The author also states that the grips described by him could not be done with the wooden ramrod.1773: replacement of the conical ramrod in Prussia by the cylindrical rod.

1700085117

1700085118 Thierbach states that in tests which Napoleon had made in 1811，every seventh shot was a misfire; according to Schmidt, Hand Firearms（Handfeuerwaffe），p.38，of every 100 shots，20 were misfires and 10 were ignition failures. In tests that were conducted by the French government in 1829 with the same flintlock musket, there was only one misfire for every fifteen shots.

1700085119

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