1700085120 8.The standard study is the article “The Tactical Training of the Prussian Army by King Frederick the Great during the Period of Peace from 1745 to 1756”（“Die taktische Schulung der preussischen Armee durch König Friedrich den Grossen während der Friedenszeit 1745 bis 1756”）in the Kriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschriften, published by the Great General Staff, Vol.28/30，1900.

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1700085122 9.Taktische Schulung, p.663.

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1700085124 10.Jähns, p.2105.

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1700085126 11.Berenhorst, Observations on the Art of War, Its Progress, Its Contradictions, and Its Reliability（Betrachtungen über die Kriegskunst，über ihre Fortschritte, ihre Widersprüche und ihre Zuverlässigkeit），1797，pp.239-240.

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1700085128 12.Taktische Schulung, p.665.

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1700085130 13.The prince of Ligne reports that on a single occasion in his many campaigns, in the engagement at Mons（1757），he heard bayonets striking against one another. Berenhorst states that in military history there is not a single properly confirmed example that the rifles of opposing sides had crossed one another and there had been hand-to-hand fighting. Emperor William I also paid no attention to the use of the bayonet in the training of soldiers, since he believed it had no practical value.

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1700085132 14.Scharnhorst，3：273，states that many tests had shown that the firing against a line of cavalry resulted in 403 hits of 1，000 shots at 100 paces，149 hits at 300 paces, and 65 hits at 400 paces. In the case of a platoon well drilled in aiming, there were considerably more hits at the greater distances, up to twice as many. At 400 paces “the effect was hardly to be taken into consideration.”Against infantry, of course, the effect was considerably smaller. For more on this subject, see Taktische Schulung, p.431. In Firth, Cromwell’s Army, p.89，the range of the muskets of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries is given as 600 paces, according to the evidence of several confirming sources, and it is not impossible that this range was greater than that of the musket of the eighteenth century.

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1700085134 15.Austria. Regulations of 1759（Regulament von 1759）. Jähns, p.2035.

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1700085136 16.In agreement with Taktische Schulung, p.446.

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1700085138 17.General Staff, Military History Monographs（Kriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschriften），27：380.

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1700085140 18.“Dispositions for the Battle of Zorndorf”（“Disposition für Schlacht bei Zorndorf”），Militärischer Nachlass des Grafen Henckel，2：79.“On the wing that is supposed to attack, there will be three echelons. If a battalion in the first echelon is broken up or repulsed, the battalion of the second echelon standing directly behind it is to move immediately into the first echelon, and one from the third echelon must replace it in the second echelon so that the battalion that is broken up and repulsed must form again in good order and advance with the others.”

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1700085142 19.Montecuccoli, Schriften，2：350. The Austrian Military Field Regulations of 1759 state 500 paces（Jähns，3：2035）. The Regulations for the Royal Prussian Infantry（Reglement vor die Königliche Preussische Infanterie）of 1726 in Title XX, Article 1，“… that one cannot shoot that far with any musket ball.”

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1700085144 20.The General Staff Work and the two monographs 27 and 28/30 added very valuable new material on this subject, but in the end they stray into a description of the oblique battle order that is much too narrow. It has been rejected by Lieutenant Colonel Schnackenburg in the Jahrbücher für Armee und Marine, Vol.116，Book 2，1900. The basis for the correct concept had already been found by Otto Herrmann in the Brandenburg-Prussian Studies（Brandenburgisch-Preussische Forschungen），5（1892）：459，and the entire problem was solved once and for all in the exemplary study of Rudolf Keibel, outstanding in its source critique, completeness, and reasoning, which appeared in the Brandenburgisch-Preussische Forschungen，14（1901）：95. A final effort by Jany to defend the concept of the General Staff in the Hohenzollern-Jahrbuch，1911，has been refuted by O. Herrmann in the Brandenburgisch-Preussische Forschungen，27（1914）：555.

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1700085146 21.Montecuccoli，2：581，also calls Nieuport, Breitenfeld, and Alterheim wing battles. Breitenfeld did indeed become a wing battle, although it was not planned that way.

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1700085148 22.Jähns，1：520，522.

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1700085150 23.The details are to be found in Herrmann, p.464.

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1700085152 24.Clausewitz（“Seven Years’War”），Work，10：56，writes：“According to the prejudices and the arrangements of that period，40，000 or 50，000 men could not fight in any other way than by forming in advance in a cohesive battle formation.”The reproach which is felt in the word “prejudices” seems unjustified; it was a result dictated by the nature of things. Because the lines were so extremely thin, they had to be unbroken. Every interval would have offered an extremely dangerous point for a penetration.

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1700085154 25.According to Jähns，2：1521.

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1700085156 26.Frederick himself, in his General-Prinzipien（Article XXII, No.7），describes “my oblique order of battle” in this manner：

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1700085158 One refuses the enemy one wing and reinforces the one that is to attack; with the latter you direct all your efforts against a wing of the enemy that you take in the flank; an army of 100，000 men, if taken in the flank, can be beaten by 30，000 men, for the affair is then quickly decided.

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1700085160 27.Even the continuous line of the infantry was by no means maintained rigidly by the king; rather, he freed himself in keeping with the circumstances. This point is proven by O.Herrmann for the battles of Prague and Kollin, Brandenburgisch-Preussische Forschungen，26：499 and note on p.513.

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1700085162 28.It was their observation and follow-up of this work in all its details that led the General Staff astray in placing the beginning of the oblique battle formation in this decade and limiting it to the cohesive infantry front. But even in the writings of the General Staff itself this limitation is not strictly adhered to, and the work thereby becomes involved in inner contradictions, in contradictions with King Frederick, and in contradictions with a document written personally by the chief of the Historical Section, von Taysen.

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1700085164 29.Tempelhof describes the approach march as follows：

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1700085166 There was no more beautiful sight. The heads of the columns were constantly abreast of one another and separated from one another by the distance necessary for the deployment; the platoons maintained their intervals as exactly as if they were marching in a review.”

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1700085168 30.As a reason for the echeloned attack, he states that, as a result of this formation, no special command was needed for the left wing to move into the battle. The interval of the individual battalions from one another amounted to fifty paces—that is, not even 1 minute’s march. The forward point of the right wing had a distance of 1，000 paces from the tail of the left wing, or no more than 10 to 15 minutes of marching time.

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