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36.Observations on the Art of War(Betrachtungen über die Kriegskunst),section 13.
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37.G.Droysen,“Beiträge,”Zeitschrift für deutsche Kulturgeschichte, new series,4(1875):592.
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38.“Report of the Ambassador Valory of 1748.”Ed. Koser, Brandenburgisch-Preussische Forschungen,7(1894):299. Valory stresses the marching in step of the Prussians so strongly that we may doubt whether the French had it.
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39.Daniels,“Ferdinand von Braunschweig,”Preussische Jahrbücher, Vols.77,78,79,80,82.
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40.According to Frederick’s so-called Military Testament, there are supposed to have been 110,000 natives and 80,000 foreigners in 1780,but the numbers are not entirely certain, since natives who were not from the regimental canton were also counted as foreigners.
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41.The Militia Gallica by Wallhausen(French Military Service; translation of a book by Montgommery),p.44,precisely states how broad was the power of punishment of each position. The colonel was allowed to strike and kill with the sword, even officers. The sergeant-major had similar authority, but he could also strike with the staff, that is, with his measuring stick. Nobody was to feel insulted by this. The captain was allowed to strike with the flat of his sword. The lieutenants and sergeants could do likewise on the march or in the trenches, but in garrison only against their direct subordinates. The ensign was allowed to do this only when substituting for the lieutenant or captain. The sergeant(in contradiction to the foregoing!)could strike only on the march, in battle, on guard duty, and in the trenches, with the shaft of the halberd, and not with the sword, if a soldier left his post, but not in garrison or for other reasons.
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42.Daniels, Preussische Jahrbücher,82:270.
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43.According to the estimates of the General Staff Work. That was, therefore, at the moment Frederick started the war. Ranke,3:148 cites a memorandum, according to which Frederick William I, on his death, had left behind 83,484 men, including 72,000 men in the field army; other statements show up to 89,000 men. According to Schrötter, the Prussian army on 2 January 1705,when it had been strongly reinforced with the assistance of the subsidies of the sea powers, already amounted to 47,031,and with the militia 67,000 men, that is, almost 4 percent of the population.
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44.Preussische Jahrbücher,142:300.
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4 操练与18世纪的战术变化
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1.Rüstow, Geschichte der Infanterie,2:42 ff.
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2.Jany, p.108.
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3.Pastenacci, Battle of Enzheim(Schlacht bei Enzheim).
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4.In the battles of Klissow(1702)and Fraustadt(1706),the Saxon infantry tried unsuccessfully to protect itself against the Swedes with chevaux-de-frise.
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5.According to Würdinger, Military History of Bavaria(Kriegsgeschichte von Bayern),2:349,such an “awl spear” appears in a Passau armory register of 1488.
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6.According to sources cited by Firth in Cromwell’s Army, p.87,a light musket with a flintlock was already in widespread use as a hunting weapon by the German peasants at the start of the seventeenth century. In 1626 with these muskets the peasants completely wiped out imperial regiments that Christian of Braunschweig had defeated.
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7.At this point I wish to assemble a number of data concerning the technical improvements of the firearm, without claiming accuracy for each individual date. From this listing, however, we gain an overall view as to how gradually such a development occurs, step by step.
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Of significance in the references is the work by Thierbach in the Zeitschrift für historische Waffenkunde, Vol.II,“On the Development of the Bayonet”(“Ueber die Entwicklung des Bajonetts”)and also Vol.III.
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Second half of the sixteenth century: paper cartridges for horsemen. 1608:loading in 95 tempo.1653:paper cartridges initially without the ball. Spak, in the Festschrift für Thierbach, claims to prove that muskets without forks were given to the regiments for the first time in 1655.1670:introduction of cartridges in the Brandenburg infantry.1684:flintlock muskets introduced in Austria.1688:the bayonet reportedly invented by Vauban.1690:introduction of paper cartridges in France(Jähns,2:1236).1698:Leopold von Dessau adopts the iron ramrod in his regiment.1699:bayonet with cross-arm.1703:final abandonment of the pikes by the French.1708:abandonment of the pikes by the Netherlanders, according to Coxe, Life of Marlborough(Leben Marlboroughs),4:303.1718:the iron ramrod adopted in the whole Prussian army from this year on.1721:abandonment of pikes by the Russians.1733:loading with bayonets fixed in Prussia(Jähns,3:2498).1744(or possibly 1742):the iron ramrod in Austria.1745:the iron ramrod in France. The Well Drilled Prussian Soldier(Der wohl exerzierte Preussische Soldat),by Johann Conrad Müller,“Free Ensign and Citizen of the Town of Schaffhausen,”1759,states on p.18 that shortly before the current campaign Frederick had had new stocks placed on all the muskets and had the foremost ring for the ramrod made in funnel form so that the rod could be brought more securely into place. The author also states that the grips described by him could not be done with the wooden ramrod.1773: replacement of the conical ramrod in Prussia by the cylindrical rod.
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Thierbach states that in tests which Napoleon had made in 1811,every seventh shot was a misfire; according to Schmidt, Hand Firearms(Handfeuerwaffe),p.38,of every 100 shots,20 were misfires and 10 were ignition failures. In tests that were conducted by the French government in 1829 with the same flintlock musket, there was only one misfire for every fifteen shots.
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8.The standard study is the article “The Tactical Training of the Prussian Army by King Frederick the Great during the Period of Peace from 1745 to 1756”(“Die taktische Schulung der preussischen Armee durch König Friedrich den Grossen während der Friedenszeit 1745 bis 1756”)in the Kriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschriften, published by the Great General Staff, Vol.28/30,1900.
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9.Taktische Schulung, p.663.
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10.Jähns, p.2105.
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11.Berenhorst, Observations on the Art of War, Its Progress, Its Contradictions, and Its Reliability(Betrachtungen über die Kriegskunst,über ihre Fortschritte, ihre Widersprüche und ihre Zuverlässigkeit),1797,pp.239-240.
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12.Taktische Schulung, p.665.
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