1700085280 15.This point has been strongly confirmed in detail by Hans Kania，“The Conduct of Prince Leopold before the Battle of Kesselsdorf”（“Das Verhalten des Fürsten Leopold vor der Schlacht bei Kesselsdorf”），Berlin dissertation，1901.

1700085281

1700085282 16.Iwan Jowanowitsch，“Why Did Frederick the Great not Participate in the Battle of Kesselsdorf?”（“Warum hat Friedrich der Grosse an der Schlacht bei Kesselsdorf nicht teilgenommen?”），Berlin dissertation，1901.

1700085283

1700085284 17.Hobohm，“Torstensson as Predecessor of Frederick the Great in the Struggle Against Austria”（“Torstensson als Vorgänger Friedrichs des Grossen im Kampf gegen Oesterreich”），Preussische Jahrbücher，153：423 ff.

1700085285

1700085286 18.Monograph by Paul Gantzer in the Mitteilungen des Vereins der Geschichte der Deutschen in Böhmen, Vol.43（1905）.

1700085287

1700085288 19.Clausewitz, Werke，9：6.

1700085289

1700085290 20.Hobohm, p.436.

1700085291

1700085292 21.Sarauw, The Campaigns of Charles XII（Die Feldzüge Karls XII.），1881，p.192.

1700085293

1700085294 22.Franz Quandt，“Die Schlacht bei Lobositz，”Berlin dissertation，1909. The Generalstabswerk still does not present things correctly.

1700085295

1700085296 23.Karl Grawe，“The Development of the Prussian Campaign Plan in the Spring of 1757”（“Die Entwicklung des preussischen Feldzugsplanes im Frühjahr 1757”），Berlin dissertation，1903. This work, which in other respects develops the sequence correctly, makes the mistake of simply naming Leitmeritz as a march objective in the king’s order to Schwerin of 3 April, whereas both Melnik and, on 17 April, Reudnitz are named.

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1700085298 24.That has already been proved in an outstanding way by Caemmerer, Frederick the Great’s Campaign Plan for the Year 1757（Friedrichs des Grossen Feldzugsplan für das Jahr 1757），1883，which, in other respects, challenges my concept.

1700085299

1700085300 25.Jany, Documentary Contributions and Studies on the History of the Prussian Army（Urkundliche Beiträge und Forschungen zur Geschichte des preussischen Heeres），published by the Great General Staff，3（1901）：35.

1700085301

1700085302 26.The opposite concept was represented principally by Albert Naudé，whose arguments have been thoroughly refuted by me in the Preussische Jahrbücher，73：151；74：570（1893）. See in this connection the article by Gustav Roloff in the Deutsche Heereszeitung, Nos.42 and 43，1894.

1700085303

1700085304 27.Credit for having clarified these conditions goes to Dietrich Goslich，“Die Schlacht bei Kollin，”Berlin dissertation，1911. See also the review in the Deutsche Literaturzeitung of 1 May 1915，No.18. See also Jahrbücher für Armee und Marine, March 1912，p.336. If in this article the author, Jany, jokingly refers to Frederick’s concern for his depot as the loss of “flour sacks，” which could not be compared with the gains from a battle, he misunderstands a basic principle of the Prussian military system and Frederick’s strategy. For Napoleon, the proposal not to fight at Kollin but to allow Daun to approach still closer was simple and natural. Nothing is more characteristic of Frederick than that from the start he rejected this idea because of his concern for his rations. This point is developed very well by Goslich and misunderstood by Jany.

1700085305

1700085306 More recently, there has appeared an Austrian account of the battle by von Hoen, Vienna（1911），which confirms Goslich’s conclusions from the Austrian sources and adds some very interesting new points. A critical review of this work that presents an excellent picture has been given by Otto Herrmann in the Brandenburgisch-Preussische Forschungen，16（1913）：145.

1700085307

1700085308 28.Gerber, Die Schlacht bei Leuthen, Berlin，1901，has the right concept. The Generalstabswerk is off base in many respects.

1700085309

1700085310 29.Arneth，5：172.

1700085311

1700085312 30.Masslowski, The Seven Years’War from the Russian Viewpoint（Der siebenjährige Krieg nach russischer Darstellung），pp.175，180.

1700085313

1700085314 31.The considerations that Frederick mentions in his General-Prinzipien（1748）to the effect that it was generally more advantageous for him to attack Moravia rather than Bohemia, are based on the assumption that Saxony was not in his possession. This point is explained excellently in the study by Otto Herrmann in the Jahrbücher für Armee und Marine, Vol.121. The Generalstabswerk, in the volume devoted to the year 1758，also abandons the concept that is still represented in the first volumes. Its discussions are filled out in a very valuable way in an article by Otto Herrmann in the Historische Vierteljahres-Schrift，1912，Vol.1. Later, the king stated that the invasion of Moravia was particularly advantageous, also under the assumption that he had possession of Saxony. Such considerations naturally have no theoretical significance. They are geographical and topographical studies that are made by every strategy in all periods, and necessarily so. In particular, the fact that Vienna was threatened more strongly from Moravia than from Bohemia is not a consideration of the strategy of annihilation, for example, but of the strategy of attrition, for the former does not plan to threaten the enemy capital but to conquer it.

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1700085316 32.When Frederick was in Moravia, he had 55，000 men there, some 17，000 in Silesia，22，000 in Saxony, and 22，000 under Dohna, as well as several thousand sick. The normal statement that he was almost as strong as in 1757 is therefore not correct.

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1700085318 33.The Generalstabswerk reports this withdrawal twice. On page 92 the Prussians moved back before Daun’s approach march. On page 106 they were called back because the king planned to lift the siege.

1700085319

1700085320 34.Retzow，1：293.

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1700085322 35.Unpublished Reports（Ungedruckte Nachrichten），2：367. Bernhardt 1：243，has the credit for calling attention to this unique report from the diary of a junior officer. But when he adds，“No one knew how to go about requisitions，” he is unfair to the resourcefulness and intelligence of Frederick and his officers.

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1700085324 36.Retzow, p.294，does say expressly，“The losses in men, cannon, munitions, and rations were considerable，” but we must nevertheless take into account on the other hand that Frederick had taken much of the provisions for his army from enemy territory. In Bohemia contributions were even forced. Ungedruckte Nachrichten，2：367.

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1700085326 37.Generalstabswerk，7：232.

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1700085328 38.Arneth，5：388.

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