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39.The newest study, based on the Generalstabswerk, is the article by Laubert in the Brandenburgisch-Preussische Forschungen，25（1913）：91.
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40.The Generalstabswerk estimates the strength of the combined Russians and Austrians in the battle as 79，000，while Koser estimates only between 68，000 and 69，000 men，16，000 of whom were irregulars. The Generalstabswerk gives Frederick 49，900 men, of whom the troops who covered the bridges and garrisoned Frankfurt were estimated as some 7，000 men.Koser’s statement（2：25），to the effect that 53，121 men were counted at the crossing of the Oder, contradicts p.37，where only 49，000 men are given. The origin of this error has already been discovered by Laubert, Die Schlacht bei Kunersdorf, p.52.
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41.This argumentation appears again and again in Masslowski, Der Siebenjährige Krieg nach russischer Darstellung（translated by Drygalski）.
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42.Clausewitz claimed to find this lack of caution so extreme that it was “hardly possible to explain it, to say nothing of excusing it.” The explanation is found in the study by Ludwig Mollwo, Marburg dissertation，1893. It is to be found in the concept of the “unassailable position，” so characteristic of that period. The king assumed as certain that the Austrians were about to evacuate Saxony and that they would not attack. But Daun recognized his advantage, summoned up his courage, attacked Finck, and overpowered him with his large superiority, and that all the more easily since the Prussian troops consisted partially of captured Russians who had come over to their service and impressed Saxons.
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43.In the Brandenburgisch-Preussische Forschungen，2（1889）：263，Herrmann published a letter from Gaudy to Prince Henry, dated 11 December 1760，in which he says that “unfortunate cannon shots” were the cause of the premature attack. He says that the cavalry and artillery were also not yet in place.
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44.Daniels, Preussische Jahrbücher，78：137.
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45.Arneth，6：259.
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46.On 30 June Tschernyscheff’s Russian corps joined forces with the Prussians, and on 1 July the advance of the combined armies began. On 18 July came the news of the abdication of Czar Peter.During this time Frederick could have fought a battle with considerable superiority, if he had planned for it. But he planned to do so only in case the Austrians would have been obliged to detach a part of their army against the Turks.
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7 战略家腓特烈
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1.This is very clearly described by General von Caemmerer in Defense and Weapons（Wehr und Waffen），2：101.
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2.When the True Advice（Frundsberg）requires “10，000 foot soldiers，1，500 saddle horses, and appropriate field pieces” against a powerful enemy, that, too, has the flavor of a “normal army.”
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3.Susane, Histoire de l’infanterie française，1：106.
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4.Collected Writings（Gesammelte Schriften），1：327，364.
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5.Essai général de Tactique，2：41，Ed.of 1772.
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6.Jähns，3：2861.
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7.Bülow, Spirit of the Newer Military System（Geist des neueren Kriegssystems），p.209.
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8.In the General-Prinzipien（1748）in the article on the campaign plans. In the “Réflexions sur la tactique”（1758），Oeuvres，28：155. To Prince Henry, dated 8 March 1760，15 November 1760，21 April 1761，24 May 1761，15 June 1761. In the introduction to the History of the Seven Years’War（Geschichte des Siebenjährigen Krieges）.
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Marlborough wrote in a similar way to his friend Godolphin after his victory at Oudenarde, saying that if it had not been absolutely necessary, he would have avoided exposing himself to the dangerous chances of a battle. Coxe, Marlborough, Life and Letters.
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9.For example, on 15 and 16 August 1761，where, with considerable superiority, he could have attacked a Russian corps. Bernhardi, Friedrich der Grosse als Feldherr，2：358 ff.，describes the situation very clearly and finds the explanation only in a kind of mood, that is, that the king had determined to fight the Austrians, and not the Russians in an open battle.
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10.Guibert, Essai général de tactique，1：33：“Everywhere that the king of Prussia could maneuver, he had successes. Almost everywhere that he was forced to do battle, he was beaten—events that prove to what extent his troops were superior in tactics, even if they were not in courage.”
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第四篇 国民军时代
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1 革命与入侵
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1.Contributions to the Art of War（Beyträge zur Kriegskunst），Vol.II, foreword.
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2.General Lloyd’s Treatise on the General Principles of the Art of War（Des H. General von Lloyds Abhandlung über die allgemeinen Grundsätze der Kriegskunst），German edition, p.18.
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3.Frederick wrote to Fouqué in 1758：“Cannon fire and musket fire upward from a lower position have no effect, and to attack the enemy with firing from below means fighting against weapons with sticks; it is impossible.”
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