1700085300 25.Jany, Documentary Contributions and Studies on the History of the Prussian Army（Urkundliche Beiträge und Forschungen zur Geschichte des preussischen Heeres），published by the Great General Staff，3（1901）：35.

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1700085302 26.The opposite concept was represented principally by Albert Naudé，whose arguments have been thoroughly refuted by me in the Preussische Jahrbücher，73：151；74：570（1893）. See in this connection the article by Gustav Roloff in the Deutsche Heereszeitung, Nos.42 and 43，1894.

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1700085304 27.Credit for having clarified these conditions goes to Dietrich Goslich，“Die Schlacht bei Kollin，”Berlin dissertation，1911. See also the review in the Deutsche Literaturzeitung of 1 May 1915，No.18. See also Jahrbücher für Armee und Marine, March 1912，p.336. If in this article the author, Jany, jokingly refers to Frederick’s concern for his depot as the loss of “flour sacks，” which could not be compared with the gains from a battle, he misunderstands a basic principle of the Prussian military system and Frederick’s strategy. For Napoleon, the proposal not to fight at Kollin but to allow Daun to approach still closer was simple and natural. Nothing is more characteristic of Frederick than that from the start he rejected this idea because of his concern for his rations. This point is developed very well by Goslich and misunderstood by Jany.

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1700085306 More recently, there has appeared an Austrian account of the battle by von Hoen, Vienna（1911），which confirms Goslich’s conclusions from the Austrian sources and adds some very interesting new points. A critical review of this work that presents an excellent picture has been given by Otto Herrmann in the Brandenburgisch-Preussische Forschungen，16（1913）：145.

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1700085308 28.Gerber, Die Schlacht bei Leuthen, Berlin，1901，has the right concept. The Generalstabswerk is off base in many respects.

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1700085310 29.Arneth，5：172.

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1700085312 30.Masslowski, The Seven Years’War from the Russian Viewpoint（Der siebenjährige Krieg nach russischer Darstellung），pp.175，180.

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1700085314 31.The considerations that Frederick mentions in his General-Prinzipien（1748）to the effect that it was generally more advantageous for him to attack Moravia rather than Bohemia, are based on the assumption that Saxony was not in his possession. This point is explained excellently in the study by Otto Herrmann in the Jahrbücher für Armee und Marine, Vol.121. The Generalstabswerk, in the volume devoted to the year 1758，also abandons the concept that is still represented in the first volumes. Its discussions are filled out in a very valuable way in an article by Otto Herrmann in the Historische Vierteljahres-Schrift，1912，Vol.1. Later, the king stated that the invasion of Moravia was particularly advantageous, also under the assumption that he had possession of Saxony. Such considerations naturally have no theoretical significance. They are geographical and topographical studies that are made by every strategy in all periods, and necessarily so. In particular, the fact that Vienna was threatened more strongly from Moravia than from Bohemia is not a consideration of the strategy of annihilation, for example, but of the strategy of attrition, for the former does not plan to threaten the enemy capital but to conquer it.

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1700085316 32.When Frederick was in Moravia, he had 55，000 men there, some 17，000 in Silesia，22，000 in Saxony, and 22，000 under Dohna, as well as several thousand sick. The normal statement that he was almost as strong as in 1757 is therefore not correct.

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1700085318 33.The Generalstabswerk reports this withdrawal twice. On page 92 the Prussians moved back before Daun’s approach march. On page 106 they were called back because the king planned to lift the siege.

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1700085320 34.Retzow，1：293.

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1700085322 35.Unpublished Reports（Ungedruckte Nachrichten），2：367. Bernhardt 1：243，has the credit for calling attention to this unique report from the diary of a junior officer. But when he adds，“No one knew how to go about requisitions，” he is unfair to the resourcefulness and intelligence of Frederick and his officers.

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1700085324 36.Retzow, p.294，does say expressly，“The losses in men, cannon, munitions, and rations were considerable，” but we must nevertheless take into account on the other hand that Frederick had taken much of the provisions for his army from enemy territory. In Bohemia contributions were even forced. Ungedruckte Nachrichten，2：367.

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1700085326 37.Generalstabswerk，7：232.

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1700085328 38.Arneth，5：388.

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1700085330 39.The newest study, based on the Generalstabswerk, is the article by Laubert in the Brandenburgisch-Preussische Forschungen，25（1913）：91.

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1700085332 40.The Generalstabswerk estimates the strength of the combined Russians and Austrians in the battle as 79，000，while Koser estimates only between 68，000 and 69，000 men，16，000 of whom were irregulars. The Generalstabswerk gives Frederick 49，900 men, of whom the troops who covered the bridges and garrisoned Frankfurt were estimated as some 7，000 men.Koser’s statement（2：25），to the effect that 53，121 men were counted at the crossing of the Oder, contradicts p.37，where only 49，000 men are given. The origin of this error has already been discovered by Laubert, Die Schlacht bei Kunersdorf, p.52.

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1700085334 41.This argumentation appears again and again in Masslowski, Der Siebenjährige Krieg nach russischer Darstellung（translated by Drygalski）.

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1700085336 42.Clausewitz claimed to find this lack of caution so extreme that it was “hardly possible to explain it, to say nothing of excusing it.” The explanation is found in the study by Ludwig Mollwo, Marburg dissertation，1893. It is to be found in the concept of the “unassailable position，” so characteristic of that period. The king assumed as certain that the Austrians were about to evacuate Saxony and that they would not attack. But Daun recognized his advantage, summoned up his courage, attacked Finck, and overpowered him with his large superiority, and that all the more easily since the Prussian troops consisted partially of captured Russians who had come over to their service and impressed Saxons.

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1700085338 43.In the Brandenburgisch-Preussische Forschungen，2（1889）：263，Herrmann published a letter from Gaudy to Prince Henry, dated 11 December 1760，in which he says that “unfortunate cannon shots” were the cause of the premature attack. He says that the cavalry and artillery were also not yet in place.

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1700085340 44.Daniels, Preussische Jahrbücher，78：137.

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1700085342 45.Arneth，6：259.

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1700085344 46.On 30 June Tschernyscheff’s Russian corps joined forces with the Prussians, and on 1 July the advance of the combined armies began. On 18 July came the news of the abdication of Czar Peter.During this time Frederick could have fought a battle with considerable superiority, if he had planned for it. But he planned to do so only in case the Austrians would have been obliged to detach a part of their army against the Turks.

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1700085346 7　战略家腓特烈

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1700085348 1.This is very clearly described by General von Caemmerer in Defense and Weapons（Wehr und Waffen），2：101.

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