1700088709 6.In Polyaenus 2.2.3，there is a description of how Clearch led the Greeks into the attack at Cunaxa: “He led the phalanx at the march to a point opposite the troops, astonishing the barbarians with their good order. And when he was almost within range of the missiles, he gave orders for the men to run, so that they would not be hit by the missiles.”* And similarly Diodorus. The fact that this description is not at odds with that of Xenophon, according to which the phalanx spontaneously broke into a run, is effectively presented by G. Friedrich, Neue Jahrbücher fur Philologie 151：26. Paul Reichard, writing in Deutsche Rundschau 12（September 1890）：426，reports that Stanley claimed in his book to have shot far.beyond 200 meters with an African bow. Reichard goes on to say that that was, at the least, an exaggeration. He himself had once engaged in a contest with Watusis, the best bowmen of East Africa, in which the strongest one had shot only 120 meters, or 160 paces, while he, Reichard, had shot seven paces farther. In like manner, Lieutenant Morgen once reported, in a lecture about Cameroons, that the arrow shot from a bow reached in certain conditions a distance of 150 to 180 paces. Nevertheless, the Asiatic bows, according to the research of Luschan（“On the ancient bow” [Uber den an-tiken Bogen，”] Festschrift für Benndorf，1898，and in the Verhandlungen der Berliner anthropologischen Gesellschaft, Session of 18 February 1899），were much better than the African ones, and the very best ones, the making of which required many years, shot an unbelievably long distance. Strabo，14.1.23，reports that Mithri-dates shot an arrow from the roof of the temple of Ephesus and decreed that the free area of the temple, which up to that point extended a stadium, would extend thenceforth to the range of this shot, which, as Strabo says, went a little farther. At any rate, Mith-ridates had the best bow and was an excellent marksman, and if he did not considerably exceed a stadium in distant—that is, high-angle—shooting, then a low-trajectory shot certainly did not exceed 200 to 240 paces. A recently published epigram from Olbin praises the archer Anaxagoras for having been able to shoot 280 Master, or 521.6 meters（Literarisches Centralblatt[1901]，Column 887）. Naturally, for a large army only a performance of lesser quality comes into consideration. Vegetius estimates 600 feet; Jähns, History of the Development of Ancient Offensive Weapons（Entwicklungsgeschichte der alten Trutzwaffen），p.281，“up to 250 paces for low-trajectory shooting，400 for high-angle shooting.”More modern investigation by Paul Reimer，“The Bow”（“Der Pfeilbogen”），Prometheus, No.944，20 November 1907.

1700088710

1700088711 6　温泉关会战

1700088712

1700088713 1.Because of the most recent enlargement of armies, this thesis must be modified. With the gigantic masses of the standing armies that are now available, even long mountain ranges can be so closely occupied that they cannot easily be penetrated. In this way we succeeded for a long time in the winter of 1914-1915 in holding the Carpathians against the Russians.

1700088714

1700088715 2.Livy 36.30.

1700088716

1700088717 3.Diodorus，2.6，from Ctesias.

1700088718

1700088719 4.Plutarch, Themistocles, Chapter 7.

1700088720

1700088721 7　阿提米西安海战

1700088722

1700088723 1.Plato, Menexenus 11. Aristophanes, Lysistrata, verse 1250. Later they also placed on the foothill a victory monument whose inscription has come down to us through Plutarch.

1700088724

1700088725 2.Concerning the construction of the triremes, see Hauck Zeitschrift des Vereins deutscher Ingenieure，1895；A. Tenne（engineer），Warships in the Days of the Ancient Greeks and Romans（Kriegschiffe zu den Zeiten der alten Griechen und Römer），1916. Review by Voigt, Die Literarische Zeitung，29（1917）：932.

1700088726

1700088727 3.It is perhaps well to recall that not only large land armies but also large fleets are hard to maneuver. The complete fleet with which the Athenians moved to Sicily in 415 B.C.was 134 triremes and 2 penteremes strong, and had in addition 131 cargo ships and a number of volunteer trading vessels. This fleet did not sail as a single squadron, but was divided into three divisions，“so that they might not, by sailing together, be wanting water and ports and provisions when they landed, and so that they might, in other matters, be more orderly and easy to control, being assigned to a commander according to set divisions”*（Thucydides 6.42）.

1700088728

1700088729 8　萨拉米斯海战

1700088730

1700088731 1.Berlin dissertation，1914.R. Trenkel, publisher.

1700088732

1700088733 2.By the nature of Herodotus’account, it is naturally not impossible that a large portion of the overall account has been lost without leaving any trace. Nevertheless, it is very unusual that we hear nothing at all about why the large Persian army, during the fourteen days it camped in Attica before the battle, did not also occupy Megara, which, after all, lay in front of the isthmus and its wall. A logical explanation would be that the Spartiates, with the army of the Peloponnesians, to the extent that they were not digging in on the isthmus, were occupying the passes leading from Attica to Megara and that Xerxes, unlike his action at Thermopylae—precisely because of his experience at Thermopylae—did not attack because he wanted to do away with the fleet first. Under those circumstances, it is all the more likely that a part of the Greek fleet could have been on the beach at Megara. It is, of course, obvious that this construction is in direct contradiction to the historical narrative.

1700088734

1700088735 3.All kinds of conclusions have been proposed as a result of the fact that Xerxes returned by land, while sending his children home with the fleet. For such details, however, so many varied reasons are imaginable that there is little purpose in going deeply into the matter.

1700088736

1700088737 9　普拉提亚会战

1700088738

1700088739 1.Herodotus 9.32.

1700088740

1700088741 2.Berlin dissertation，1907.

1700088742

1700088743 第二篇　鼎盛时期的希腊军队

1700088744

1700088745 1　伯罗奔尼撒战争之前的希腊战术

1700088746

1700088747 1.Not until the Peloponnesian War did the Spartans create cavalry and archer units, in order to defend their land against the Athenians, who would quickly attack from the sea, now here and now there.（Thucydides 4.55.）

1700088748

1700088749 2.See Bauer, Section 52.

1700088750

1700088751 3.Wernicke, in Hermes 26（1891）：51，states the opinion that the Athenian citizens who served as “bowmen”* had come from the poorer classes.

1700088752

1700088753 4.Xenophon, Hellenica 1.2.1. Thrasylus is sent out with a fleet and equips five thousand of his sailors as peltasts.

1700088754

1700088755 2　伯利克里战略

1700088756

1700088757 1.Athens lost 4，450 hoplites and citizen-cavalrymen; in addition, on each trireme at least a few Athenian citizens as officers. The entire expedition, with all its logistical support, can be estimated at 60，000 men.

1700088758

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