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1700089141 1　恺撒历次征战的批判性分析　无

1700089142

1700089143 2　赫尔维蒂战役

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1700089145 1.According to Beloch. Hubo, in Neue Jahrbücher fur Philologie 147（1893）：707，estimates 25，000 and seeks to justify Caesar’s own figure by eliminating a “C” from the latter’s number for the width.

1700089146

1700089147 2.Clausewitz, too, estimates in this way（10：66）. A useful comparison is provided by “The War Journal of Albrecht von Brandenburg”（“Das Kriegsbuch Albrechts v. Brandenburg”）in Jähns’s History of Warfare（Geschichte des Kriegswesens）1：521.

1700089148

1700089149 3. The trains that followed the Prussian army at Olmütz in 1758 were made up of almost 4，000 wagons, most of them drawn by 4 horses, and had a length of almost 2 days’march. General Staff Publication（Generalstabswerk）7：93.

1700089150

1700089151 4.Not by a full fourth, as is often said; the quarter of which Caesar speaks refers only to the Helvetii in the narrower sense. The allies were already across, and Caesar also does not say that the quarter was still there when he attacked, but rather, when his scouts observed it. See also Stoffel, The War between Caesar and Ariovistus（Guerre de Cesar et d’Arioviste）p.75.

1700089152

1700089153 5.If Maissiat should be right in distinguishing between the “Segusiavi” and the “Sebusiani，” placing the latter in the southern Jura, north of the Rhone, on the Ain, and thereby having Caesar not camp near Lyons but follow the Helvetii from Fort l’Ecluse through Bourg-en-Bresse, with the result that Labienus with his three legions was waiting one day’s march to the east during the battle on the Sâone, then the Helvetii would indeed have had full freedom of movement from Montmerle, where they were attacked, to take the route either directly westward or southwestward.

1700089154

1700089155 6.Las Cases, Memoirs from Saint Helena（Memorial de Sainte-Hélene）2：445.

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1700089157 7.H.Bender, in “Caesar’s Credibility on the War with Ariovistus”（“Cäsars Glaubwürdigkeit über den Krieg mit Ariovist，”）（Neue Korrespondenzblätter fur die Gelehrtenschulen Württembergs，1894），shows how very exaggerated Caesar’s account of the hegemony that Ariovistus exercised in Gaul actually is, but the fact itself that Ariovistus was master of a part of central Gaul is not to be doubted.

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1700089159 8.Caesar has this thought expressed specifically by Liscus（1.17）in the form that they would prefer to obey other Gauls rather than Romans—which presupposes that these other Gauls had first broken/the mastery of the Germans.

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1700089161 9. The fact that the Helvetii announced precisely this area as the goal of their migration has been explained very brilliantly by O. Hirschfeld in his study “Aquitania in the Roman Period”（“Aquita-nien in der römischen Zeit”）（Sitzungsberichte der Berliner Akademie，1896，p.453），where it is shown to be highly probable that the Helvetii, and perhaps also the Boii, who were accompanying them, were related to tribes already settled on the lower Garonne. In that connection Hirschfeld, too, makes the observation that such a migration was not so easy to imagine. With only one step farther along this train of thought we arrive at the hypothesis presented above in the text.

1700089162

1700089163 10. The long time they are supposed to have taken crossing the Sâone is no proof, since we cannot know to what extent Caesar exaggerated here also.

1700089164

1700089165 11.I consider it as impossible that, as is often assumed, Caesar had with him, in addition to cavalry, a considerable force of other Gallic allies, either from the province or from the Aedui or other tribes. His six legions were strong enough to oppose the Helvetii in battle, and allies whose reliability is questionable are of no use but only create problems through the difficulties they cause in the matter of rations. The auxilia of which Caesar speaks are mainly the Numid-ians, Balearics, and Cretans whom he has with him（2.7）.

1700089166

1700089167 12. The passage describing the formation has not been passed down very clearly in handwriting and has been read and corrected in a variety of ways by the different editors. All, however, have interpreted its meaning in the same way.

1700089168

1700089169 3　阿里奥维斯塔　无

1700089170

1700089171 4　征服比利其人

1700089172

1700089173 1.Dittenberger in the new edition of Kraner’s publication of Caesar.

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1700089175 2.Konrad Lehmann, Neue Jahrbücher fur das klassische Altertum 7，No.6（1901）：506，and Klio 6，No.2（1906）：237.

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1700089177 3.Strictly speaking, Caesar does not say—and Konrad Lehmann has called attention to this point—that the 306，000 men were actually on hand, but he only says that the Romans had reported to him that they knew exactly how many each tribe at their assembly had promised to provide.

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1700089179 4.Concerning the maneuver that they carried out, see p.457，above.

1700089180

1700089181 5　维钦托利

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1700089183 1.Caesar himself says（7.34）there were 10 legions, that is, the Seventh to the Fifteenth, and the First. In addition, after the siege of Alesia, the Sixth appears. In this connection, see the comment by Napoleon III（in Uebersicht，2：282）. Göler, p.333，rejects the “Sixth Legion” and names instead the “Third.” Both Meusel and Kübler, however, have correctly accepted the “VI” version（8.4）. See also Domaszewski, Neue Heidelberger Jahrbücher 4（1894）：158. In this connection, see also Chapter VII, below，first paragraph.

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1700089185 2.Bell. Gall.7.65.

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1700089187 3.After careful examination of all the various hypotheses that have been advanced concerning the location of this battle, Holmes decided（p.780）that it was impossible to arrive at a definite answer but that the most likely possibility was the concept of Gouget, who seeks to place the battlefield near Dijon, on the Ouche. Under any circumstances, the place favored by Napoleon III, some 25 miles farther toward the northeast between the Vingeanne and the Badin, south of Langres, is incorrect.

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1700089189 4.See also Bell. Civ.3.47. It is not easy to imagine how an army that numbered all together surely 100，000 souls, and probably considerably more, could have fed itself and all its horses for almost six weeks in one location in the middle of enemy territory（see also Ilerda）. Great quantities of supplies necessarily had to be brought up over long distances. How did they manage to get through the enemy areas? My concept is that supplies were already stocked in Vienne and were transported up the Saône to a point only some 45 miles overland from Alesia. Later we find the Sixth Legion joined up with the main army; perhaps this legion, escorting the supply transport, pushed its way through during the siege. It may already have started on its march when Caesar moved down toward it from the north. In the period immediately following his victory, while the Gauls were still occupied with their preparations and the assembling of their army, this legion, marching along the left bank of the Saône, was undoubtedly able to bring up the supply train with relatively little danger, and on the final stretch Caesar may have sent out troops and vehicles to meet them. But of course it is still surprising that, even if the supply train was protected to a certain extent against the main force of the Gauls by the river, the Sequani in league with the Helvetii did not attempt to intercept the supplies. After all, up to that point the whole strategy of the Gauls had been directed toward cutting off the Romans’food supplies. Could it possibly be that the Sequani, contrary to what Caesar reported, did not take part in the rebellion at all? However that may be, no army as large as the Roman one before Alesia could feed itself simply from the immediately surrounding countryside. The execution of the siege of Alesia is inconceivable without envisaging that large supply trains of food and forage made their way through successfully, and these trains must have been accompanied by troops who protected them. The reader is reminded of the difficulty of supplying rations for the German army that was besieging Metz in 1870—despite the close proximity of the German border and the availability of the railroad net . This situation is presented in my lecture “Mind and Mass in History”（“Geist und Masse in der Geschichte”），Preussische Jahrbücher 174（1912）：193.

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