1700089190

1700089191 5.According to the manuscripts, Labienus carried out his sortie with 39 or 40 cohorts. As has long been recognized, this number is too large; it is impossible that more than one-third of the entire force of heavy infantry could have been available at one spot for a sortie. For this reason it has been conjectured that “XL” should read “XI，” and the more recent editors, Meusel as well as Kübler, have placed “XI” in the text. If this number were definite, we could conclude from it that the Gallic assault columns cannot have been as strong as Caesar reports; but since this number is based only on conjecture, we cannot go any further in evaluating it.

1700089192

1700089193 6.Veith, p.177，recounts that Vercingetorix spared neither time nor effort in continuously training his army according to the Roman pattern. Not only does Caesar make no mention of this, but also this report is based on a false concept of the nature of the training. Closely associated with training is a discipline that cannot be improvised, even by means of the most extreme strictness, but which can only be developed very gradually, through habit and tradition. What Caesar says（7.4）is that Vercingetorix assembled and dealt with his army with the most extreme severity and cruelty and（7.29-30）that he forced them, against their custom, to fortify their camp in the Roman manner.

1700089194

1700089195 6　罗马针对蛮族的战法

1700089196

1700089197 1. The description by Diodorus, in 5.28 ff.，is also colorful, to be sure, but it is nevertheless of no significance for us.

1700089198

1700089199 2.Theodor Reinach, Mithridates Eupator, trans, by Goetz, pp.355 and 358.

1700089200

1700089201 7　内战记：意大利与西班牙

1700089202

1700089203 1.See also pp.495 and 499 above. Even if these numbers have not been directly handed down to us in the sources, I believe that one can still give them with certainty. Domaszewski, in his valuable essay “The Armies of the Civil Wars in the Years 49 to 42 B.C.”（“Die Heere der Bügerkriege in den Jahren 49 bis 42 v. Chr.”），Neue Heidelberger Jahrbücher, Vol.4，1894，has pointed out that Caesar had 11 legions at the outbreak of the civil war. Since, however, only 10 are mentioned in the campaign against Vercingetorix and 11 in the following winter quarters, but Caesar had given up 2 legions, he could really only have had 9 remaining. Domaszewski explains the difference by saying that Caesar, as soon as he saw the conflict coming on, immediately formed 2 new legions as replacements for those he had given up. But it seems to me that there is a still better explanation. In the year 52 B.C, in addition to the above-mentioned 10 legions, Caesar also had 22 cohorts that were defending the province（7.65）and that had been levied in the province itself, so that they were not all composed of Roman citizens. The Fifth Legion, Alauda, was such a legion of noncitizens. According to Suetonius（Caesar, Chapter 24），Caesar had already formed it during the Gallic War and not, as Domaszewski believes, as late as the year 50 B.C. There is nothing more natural than for us to assume that it belonged to those 22 cohorts of the year 52 B.C.，and the same for the Sixth Legion, although of course Suetonius speaks of only one such barbarian legion. If we consider, however, that the Sixth Legion now appears in the Commentaries for the first time; that, as Napoleon III has already remarked, it arrived before Alesia as part of the main army; that Caesar cannot possibly have still had a veteran legion in Cisalpine Gaul at that time; that nothing would be more natural than for Caesar, after he had defeated Vercingetorix and the province was no longer in need of protection, to order up to his main force a part of the garrison there, in preparation for the decisive battle—under these circumstances we can hardly reach any other conclusion than that this legion was also a part of those 22 cohorts “praesidia ex ipsa coacta provincia”（“the garrisons drawn from the province itself）.

1700089204

1700089205 In opposition to this it could be argued that in the Bellum Alexandrinum, Chapter 69，it is said that the Sixth Legion had been reduced to 1，000 men as a result of hardships and battle losses（“crebritate bellorum”[“the frequency of the wars”]）and that it was deactivated in 45 B. C.as a veteran legion. Even if it was not formed, however, until the winter of 53-52 B.C.（but perhaps also earlier），it had still participated in the battles in defense of the province, the battle against the relief of Alesia, and later the entire civil war and therefore had at least six years of intensive battle experience behind it when it followed Caesar from Egypt against Phar-naces. In a footnote on his page 171 Domaszewski, even on the assumption that the Fifth, Alauda, Legion was not formed until 50 B.C.，cites it as a veteran legion in 48 B.C.

1700089206

1700089207 （Added in the second edition.）Gröbe（Festschrift fur Otto Hirschfeld，1903，reprinted in the 2d ed, of Drumann’s Römische Geschichte，3：702），in a study concerning Caesar’s legions, likewise came to the conclusion that the Fifth Legion had been formed from the cohorts that had been mentioned as being in the province in 52 B.C. But he fixes the organization of this unit as not occurring until 51 B.C. The Sixth Legion that participated in the civil war was supposedly not formed until 50 B.C, after the older Sixth Legion had been transferred to Pompey（and was designated as the First Legion in his army）.

1700089208

1700089209 The 8 cohorts that I assume to have been in Cisalpine Gaul are not considered by Gröbe.Consequently, he gives Caesar only 10 legions in the year 52 B.C. The difference, however, is smaller than it appears, since it is only a question of whether legions were formed from the 22 cohorts somewhat earlier or later and whether the 8 cohorts in Cisalpine Gaul were already in existence in 52 B.C. Cicero’s letter to Atticus in December 50 B.C.，cited by Gröbe, seems to point to the formation of a considerable number of new units in 50 B.C.：（7.7.6）“Imbecillo resistendum fuit et id erat facile; nunc legiones XI, equitatus tantus, quantum volet, Transpa-dani.”（“Resistance was weak, and the task was easy; now there were 11 legions and as much cavalry as he might wish, levied from the region north of the Po.”）But there is not really anything to be learned from this passage, since under any circumstances Caesar had had in 52 B.C.，in addition to his 10 legions, the 22 cohorts.

1700089210

1700089211 2. The cited dates are in accordance with Stoffel’s calculations, based on the estimates of the astronomer Leverrier, which were requested by Napoleon III. According to Ideler, Mommsen, Matzat, Soltau, and Unger, the events occurred some three weeks earlier.

1700089212

1700089213 3.When Caesar moved out on the following day and initially took the route back toward Ilerda, the Pompeian soldiers naturally believed that a lack of provisions was forcing the enemy to retire. This does not contradict the sentence above, however.

1700089214

1700089215 8　希腊战役

1700089216

1700089217 1.Perhaps even a few more.Gröbe, in Drumann’s Roman History（Römische Geschichte），2d ed.，3：710.

1700089218

1700089219 2.28 November 49 B.C, according to Stoffel；5 November, according to Mommsen.

1700089220

1700089221 3.These observations and the confirmation of these points had already been made by a commission sent out by Napoleon III in 1861 in a work published by L. Heuzay, Julius Caesar’s Military Operations, studied on the Terrain by the Macedonian Commission（Les operations militaires de Jules Cesar，étudiees sur le terrain par la mission de Macédoine）（Paris，1886），which was confirmed by Stoffel in Life of Caesar（Vie de Cesar）1：138.

1700089222

1700089223 4.Domaszewski, in Armies of the Civil Wars（Heere der Bürgerkriege）pp.171-172，considers it impossible for legions to have come from Italy to Illyria, since the Pompeians controlled the sea. This reason is not convincing, since the land route was open.

1700089224

1700089225 5.Up to the present this point has probably not been sufficiently emphasized. Ranke, in his World History（Weltgeschichte），even states the opinion that we have descriptions of the battle of Pharsalus that stem from supporters of the Senate and of Pompey. Such is the case only to the extent that Livy wrote from the Pompeian point of view and Lucanus, particularly, presented the civil war with this bias. But these two were already significantly dependent on written sources, and since, despite their bias, they have practically nothing that does not go back to either Caesar or Pollio, that is a sure proof that a truly Pompeian original source containing unique information either did not exist or had already disappeared at that time. Lucanus apparently did do his best to find such a source but it is downright astonishing how little of a positive nature his work contains which would not be known from other sources. Plathner, in On the Credibility of the History of the Civil War（Zur Glaubwürdigkeit der Geschichte des Bürgerkrieges）（Bernburg Pro-gramm，1882），has compiled these points very well and has shown that Lucanus used Livy as a source. And so the two of them were able to express their sympathy for Pompey’s cause only through the material handed down from the enemy side.

1700089226

1700089227 6.Appian and Dio Cassius write of important defeats suffered, in turn, by these detached corps. These reports probably have to stem from Asinius Pollio, but if they were true, there would have had to be in some way or other more significant consequences. We must therefore prefer Caesar’s report; Pollio must have been taken in by the exaggerated accounts of persons who took part in those battles.

1700089228

1700089229 7.Plutarch, Caesar, Chapter 43.

1700089230

1700089231 8.That is the sense of Bell. Civ.84.2 and 85.1.

1700089232

1700089233 9　法萨卢斯会战　无

1700089234

1700089235 10　内战末期诸战役　无

1700089236

1700089237 11　战　象

1700089238

1700089239 1.Polybius 3.14.

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