1700096694 9.Heermann, p.52，Note 2.

1700096695

1700096696 10.Furthermore, the character of this letter as an official document is not absolutely certain. Hagenmeier, Studies in German History（Forschung zur deutschen Geschichte），13：400，believed he could show that Raimund himself was the author of the letter. The difference in the figures for the army strengths would not stand in the way of this interpretation. These numbers are only very vague estimates, which the same man can have stated very differently at various times, after speaking with various people.

1700096697

1700096698 11.According to the ltinerarium Regis Ricardi（Itinerary of King Richard），VI, paras.21-24. Edited by Stubbs in the Rerum Britannicarum medii aevi Scriptores（Writers of British History of the Middle Ages），p.415. Oman, History of War, p.316.

1700096699

1700096700 12.Of course, we could base a conclusion on the worthlessness of the foot troops on the express testimony of Raimund of Agiles, who says that, when the knights moved out before Antioch for the battle by the lake（9 February 1098），the foot troops were left behind in front of the beleaguered city.“Dicebant enim, quod multi de exercitu nostro imbelles et pavidi, si viderent Turcorum multitudinem, timoris potius quam audaciae exempla monstrarent.”（“They said in fact that many of our army, cowardly and afraid if they saw a crowd of Turks, presented examples of fear rather than boldness.”）But these kinds of statements are not objective evidence. Furthermore, some of the foot troops did move out with the knights（according to the Gesta），and that same day the rest of them successfully repulsed a sortie of the besieged forces.

1700096701

1700096702 13.Köhler, p.156. Oman, p.477.

1700096703

1700096704 14.Morris, p.256. Oman, p.561.

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1700096706 15.Köhler，2：206-207. On the basis of the Regensburg Annals, M.G. SS.，17.418.

1700096707

1700096708 16.Köhler，2：210.

1700096709

1700096710 第四篇　中世纪晚期

1700096711

1700096712 1　中世纪晚期的研究路径　无

1700096713

1700096714 2　方阵会战、城市军队与征召民兵

1700096715

1700096716 1.Spiegel historiaal, IV, Chap.33：

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1700096718 Then he（Artois）wanted to surrender to them

1700096719

1700096720 And so he said: …

1700096721

1700096722 The Flemish shouted: We do not know you.

1700096723

1700096724 The count called out in French:

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1700096726 I am the count of Artois.

1700096727

1700096728 They（the Flemish）said: Here is no nobleman

1700096729

1700096730 Who can understand you.

1700096731

1700096732 2.Oman, from whom I have also taken the terrain conditions, gives on p.570 a very clear and tactically correct presentation, but I cannot accept it, since the sources on which we must depend seem to me very unreliable. The principal source is a heroic poem by Archdeacon John Barbour of Aberdeen, The Bruce, or the Book of Robert de Broyss, King of Scots, written between 1375 and 1377，and consequently not until almost two generations after the battle. There is another poem written sooner after the event but not offering much information. The author was the Carmelite monk Baston, who accompanied King Edward in order to celebrate his deeds but who, when he became a prisoner of the Scottish king after the defeat, was then obliged to celebrate the battle on that king’s behalf.（Lappenberg-Pauli, Geschichte von England，4：243）. The English sources, Geoffroy Baker of Swinbroke（died between 1358 and 1360）and the Chronicle of Lanercost, of which this part was probably the work of a Franciscan monk of Carlisle, contain only meager information.

1700096733

1700096734 3.The reason why the French knights in the center dismounted is not given directly in any source, but we may interpret the words used by the Monk of Saint Denis as we have done. He says: “The horses themselves were removed from the view of the combatants, so that each one, losing any hope of escaping the danger by fleeing, would show more courage.”

1700096735

1700096736 4.We can conclude from the sequence of the battle itself that this was the sense of the French formation. That this epoch was capable of such a tactical idea is shown in the report on the battle of Othée（1408），by Monstrelet, where the questionable maneuver is described with exact clarity: “When that other dismounted company, much larger … intends to invade your land and fight you, those on horseback, experienced in battle and in good order, will move up quickly and attempt from the rear to separate you and break up your formation, while the others are assaulting you from the front.”

1700096737

1700096738 5.There are available quite exhaustive writings on this subject: Mojean, City Military Arrangements in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries（Städtische Kriegseinrichtungen im XIV.und XV. Jahrhundert），Program of the Gymnasium of Stralsund，1876. Von der Nahmer, The Military Organizations of the German Cities in the Second Half of the Fourteenth Century（Die Wehrverfassungen der deutschen Städte in der 2. Hälfte des 14. Jahrhunderts），Marburg dissertation，1888. Mendheim, The Mercenary System of the Free Cities, especially Nuremberg（Das reichsstädtische, besonders Nürnberger, Söldnerwesen），Leipzig dissertation，1889. Baltzer, From the History of the Danzig Military System（Aus der Geschichte des Danziger Kriegswesens），Program of the Danzig Gymnasium，1893.G. Liebe, The Military System of the City of Erfurt（Das Kriegswesen der Stadt Erfurt），1896.P. Sander, The Municipal Economy of Nuremberg（Die reichsstädtische Haushaltung Nürnbergs），1902，in which the second section of Part II treats the military organization in detail.

1700096739

1700096740 6.Froissart, Tome IV, p.270：“… that he no longer wished to wage war with men other than nobles and that it was a complete loss and a hindrance to lead into battle the men from the communities, for in the hand-to-hand combat those men melt like snow in the sun. This had happened at the battle of Crécy, at Blanquetagne, at Caen, and in every place where these men had been led. And so he did not want to have any more of them except the crossbowmen from the fortified cities and the good towns. As to their gold and their silver, he wanted much of both to pay the expenses and the compensation of the nobles, but that was all. The common men had only to stay at home to protect their wives and children, carry on their business and their trade, and that should be sufficient for them. It was up to the nobles alone to practice the profession of arms that they had learned and in which they had been trained since childhood.”（Extracted from Luce’s citation in Bertran du Guesclin，1：156）.

1700096741

1700096742 “What do we want with help from these shopkeepers?”Jean de Beaumont reportedly said in 1415，when the city of Paris offered reinforcements. Religieux de St. Denys, Book 35，Chap.5.

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