1700097155 18.Panigarola，10 June. Gingins，2：242.

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1700097157 19.Panigarola，13 June. Gingins，2：258. Panigarola’s statements that Charles had his camp fortified are confirmed and clarified by the illustrations in Schilling’s Chronik（one of which is reproduced in Ochsenbein’s Urkundenbuch and in the treatment by Colonel Meister）and by the battle song by Zoller（printed in Ochsenbein, p.494）. There it reads as follows:

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1700097159 He inclosed his army all around

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1700097161 As he desired, from lake to higher ground.

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1700097163 A stream he dammed to make it swell.

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1700097165 The work continued night and day，

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1700097167 And soon Count Romont’s camp completed lay.

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1700097169 Great trees he caused his men to fell.

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1700097171 Who has ever seen works so fine

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1700097173 Accomplished in but two weeks’time?

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1700097175 20.Panigarola，12 June，13 June.

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1700097177 21.On 16 June the duke had the following report written to the municipal council of Dijon:

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1700097179 Last night we were awake and on foot with the intention of marching with our whole army out toward our enemies, who are at a distance from us of two short leagues and who, as had been reported to us, had joined forces and assembled in order to move closer to us and fight, and we await them from hour to hour.

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1700097181 （Ochsenbein, p. 280）.

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1700097183 Wattelet, p. 29 ff.and notes 88 and 89，relates that to an idea of moving out against the Swiss. But it is apparent that only the idea of accepting battle on the Grünhag is meant. Wattelet has inadvertently interpreted the same report twice, on the sixteenth and the nineteenth. And his interpretation in Note 85，of Panigarola’s report of the eighteenth, to the effect that Charles intended to attack the Swiss near Gümmenen on the nineteenth, I consider to be incorrect. The words “dar la bataglia”（to give battle）refer to a planned attack on Murten, as Gingins has already interpreted it in his translation.

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1700097185 22.A number of scholars, especially Wattelet（see below），have disputed the fact that the Swiss formed the usual three units of foot soldiers at Murten. Schilling’s positive statement on the point, however, cannot possibly be invalidated by the fact that a few sources speak only of two units, and least of all because Panigarola saw only two units or because only two units are mentioned in Schilling’s later account of the battle. The third unit did not enter the fight itself but simply stormed into the camp on the heels of the other two, and there the formations broke up. Even if we did not have Schilling’s testimony, it would be completely incomprehensible that the Swiss should have abandoned the normal formation in three units precisely here, with such a large army. They could not know in advance whether the entire Burgundian army was not in position at the palisade and whether there would develop a flanking counterattack from one side or another, defending against which would then have been the mission of the rear guard.

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1700097187 23.Herter’s command position is definitely proven by the two mutually independent statements of Knebel and Etterlin. Schilling’s silence on this point, as it occurred, may not be considered as counterproof. Of itself, it is not particularly important, since the top commander in such an army was not necessarily the general charged with the mission and the responsibility of strategic direction. In this case, the entire war council was the final authority; Herter had only to take care of the technical execution. This situation needs to be noted only because of the analogy to the mutual relationships of the Greek cantons in the Persian wars: in both cases, the great work succeeds only through constant surmounting of the strongest internal tensions, the reflection of which can also be detected throughout the sources.

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1700097189 Along with Dändliker，3d ed.，p.842，1，too, prefer to accept as certain that Waldmann was the leader of the main body.

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1700097191 24.Report of 8 July. Gingins，2：345.

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1700097193 25.Edlibach, p.157.

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1700097195 26.Baseler Chroniken，3：26.

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1700097197 27.Schilling wrote that, after the Grünhag was taken，“and all the formations were broken from that moment on.”The editors believe that this statement is unlikely，“or is it supposed to be the same maneuver that is indicated in the Lurlebatlied（one of the songs composed about this battle and recorded by Schilling）as’the point which spread out’”?Such is no doubt the case, except that it is not a question of a “maneuver，” but of the natural breaking up of a closed formation in the course of and following such an assault.

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1700097199 28.The reports in the Jahrzeitbuch von Schwyz in the Anzeiger für Schweizerische Geschichte，1895，p.160，are probably worthless.

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1700097201 29.In Ochsenbein, Urkunden, pp.339，341.

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1700097203 30.Two special studies have been devoted to the battle of Nancy: one by Robert Schoeber（Erlangen dissertation，1891）and one by Max Laux（Rostock dissertation，1895，Süssenguth Press, Berlin）. Laux’s work has a useful plan of the battle, a comprehensive basis in the sources, and corrects a number of the errors of his predecessors, but it is not without its own errors and oversights.

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