1700100820

1700100821 3　长枪方阵战术

1700100822

1700100823 1.We might be reminded of the battle of Sellasia, but the sources for that battle are much too uncertain. See Vol.I, p.241.

1700100824

1700100825 2.The Spanish theoreticians of the school of Alba—Valdes, Eguiluz, and Lechuga—favored a shallower formation for the infantry（Jähns，1：729 ff.）. At any rate, they preferred the square by space to the square of men, but they also favored an even shallower formation, going as far as a ratio of 1：7. Valdes gives as an example that Alba once formed his 1，200 spearmen, three terzios，60 men wide and 20 men deep.

1700100826

1700100827 Mendoza gives no positive prescription but simply mentions that they had both wider formations and deeper formations. In the Institution de la discipline militaire au Royaume de France, Lyon，1559，p.73，the space square, which has twice as many files as ranks, is prescribed.

1700100828

1700100829 3.The Italian Giovacchino da Coniano, who was a sergeant major in the English service against France in the 1540s, sketched and described a series of thirty-two battle formations. There were supposed to have been even more.（Comment by the editor at the end of the document: “It was entitled Dell’Ordinanze overo battaglie del capitan Giovacchino da Conjano, printed in Book III of the work Delia Fortificatione delle città di Girolamo Maggi e Jacomo Castriotto. Venice，1583，115 ff.）The whole work was already assembled in 1564.（See Maurice I.D. Cockle, A Bibliography of English Military Books Up to 1642 and of Contemporary Foreign Works. London，1900，pp.141，200.）Although the somewhat boastful soldier refers again and again to practical testing of his formations in the face of the enemy, we can probably not lend him too much credence. The accomplishments on the English side before Boulogne at that time did not evoke much respect elsewhere in the world. Nevertheless, it is interesting that the sergeant major was already sketching very shallow formations, with the justification that he had experienced how much better it was to have more weapons in the front line in action simultaneously（Fol.119-720）.

1700100830

1700100831 4　佣兵军队的内部建制

1700100832

1700100833 1.The standard document for this subject is the careful and worthwhile study by Wilhelm Erben，“Origin and Development of the German Articles of War”（“Ursprung und Entwicklung der deutschen Kriegsartikel”），in the Festgabe für Theodor Sickel, Mitteilungen des Instituts für’ostreichische Geschichtsforschung, supplementary Vol.VI，1900，with a few later additions by the same author. Closely linked with this work is the equally excellent book by Burkhard von Bonin, Bases of the Legal System in the German Army at the Beginning of the Modern Era（to 1600）（Grundzüge der Rechtsverfassung in dem deutschen Heere zu Beginn der Neuzeit[bis 1600]）. Weimar，1904. Also very important and providing good orientation by its comprehensiveness is the work by Wilhelm Beck, The Oldest Letters of Articles for the German Infantry（Die ältesten Artikelbriefe für das deutsche Fussvolk），1908. See Erben’s review in the Historische Zeitschrift，102：368.

1700100834

1700100835 2.“Weibel”（Feldwebel: first sergeant）is related to the word “weben”（“to weave”）and means the servant who moves quickly here and there, running back and forth. The Feldwebel was initially assigned by the colonel as responsible for lining up the whole regiment and only later gradually became a functionary for the company. The “Gemeinweibel，” who are supposed by some scholars to have been elected by the troops in order to present their possible complaints to the captain, seem to me somewhat questionable. On this point, see Bonin, p.50，and Erben, p.14.

1700100836

1700100837 3.Bonin, p.170，cites a few passages that indicate that the first sergeant was not to strike with his fist or with staffs, but with the shaft of his halberd. The captain and the lieutenant were supposed “to strike in their command duties with short sticks，” but “not without great reason therefor.”

1700100838

1700100839 4.Bonin, p.21.

1700100840

1700100841 5.Georg Paetel, The Organization of the Hessian Army under Philip the Magnanimous（Die Organisation des hessischen Heeres unter Philipp dem Grossmütigen），1897.

1700100842

1700100843 6.26.Discours. Observations militaires, Ed.1587，p.750.

1700100844

1700100845 7.Paetel, p.231.

1700100846

1700100847 8.Saxon Articles of War of 1546（Sächsische Kriegsartikel von 1546）. Published in the Militär-Wochenblatt, No.157，1909，by G. Berbig.

1700100848

1700100849 9.Eidgenössische Abschiede，3.1.599.

1700100850

1700100851 10.When the wars of religion started in 1562，the soldiers on both sides initially conducted themselves very properly. Among the Huguenots no swearing was heard, and no gambling or prostitutes were to be seen. The population was not bothered. But Coligny said at that time to de la Noue: “That will not last two months.” He was completely right. Furthermore, on occasion he took stringent steps and had robbers hanged. De la Noue, Discours 26，Observations militaires, Ed.1587，pp.681-686.

1700100852

1700100853 11.De la Noue treats these fraternal groups thoroughly. Discours 16，Ed.1587，p.352 ff.

1700100854

1700100855 12.Jähns，2：924.

1700100856

1700100857 13.S.C. Gigon, La troisième guerre de religion. Jarnac-Moncontour（1568-1569），p.376.

1700100858

1700100859 14.The Art of Dismounted War（Kriegskunst zu Fuss），pp.20-21.

1700100860

1700100861 15.For example, Georg von Lüneburg had no fewer than 1，200 Poles in his service in 1636.

1700100862

1700100863 16.Archives Oranien-Nassau，2d Series，2：275.

1700100864

1700100865 17.Archives, p.10.

1700100866

1700100867 18.Chemnitz, Swedish War（Schwedischer Krieg），Part IV, Book 2，p.141.

1700100868

1700100869 19.Pufendorf, B.19，Ed.1688，2：320. Apparently from Chemnitz.

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