1700100870

1700100871 20.Such a convention “de bonne guerre”（“of good war”）was signed by Gonzago and Brissac in 1553. Hardy, Histoire de la tactique française, p.463. Men-at-arms and private soldiers “will suddenly be released，” without having to pay, after they have been “dévalisés”—that is, disarmed and relieved of their possessions.

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1700100873 21.Kriegskunst zu Fuss, pp.16，22. Jähns，2：1018.

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1700100875 5　战例介绍

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1700100877 1.Hobohm，2：518.

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1700100879 2.This battle is thoroughly treated by Rüstow in History of the Infantry（Geschichte der Infanterie），by Jähns in Manual of a History of Warfare（Handbuch einer Geschichte des Kriegswesens），and by Ranke, History of the Romanic and Germanic Peoples（Geschichte der romanischen und germanischen Völker），Werke，33：25. All these accounts, which differ significantly from one another, need serious correcting. Rüstow based his work too exclusively on Guicciardini, while Ranke and Jähns used as their principal source Coccinius, who can hardly be compared to the better sources. The standard study, based on the sources, is the Berlin dissertation by Erich Siedersleben（1907）. Published by Georg Nauck. His principal sources are a letter written by Fabricius Colonna, who commanded the knights on the Spanish side（printed in Marino Sanuto, Diarii，14：176. Venice，1886），and a report from the Florentine ambassador, Pandolfini, who was present at the battle in the French headquarters（printed in Desjardins, Négociations diplomatiques de la France avec la Toscane，2：581.Paris，1861）.

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1700100881 3.According to Colonna’s letter.

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1700100883 4.The Italian survey map indicates that the ditch still exists today but does not extend as close to the Ronco as it did, according to our sources, at the time of the battle in 1512.

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1700100885 5.I include the 400 lances that were in position at the Ronco bridge under Alègre and intervened in the battle.

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1700100887 6.The artillery maneuver is not completely clear, since we cannot assume, as Guicciardini recounts, that Este drove completely into the right flank of the enemy, and the cannon certainly did not have enough range to shoot along the entire enemy front. Perhaps another inspection of the battlefield would clarify this point.

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1700100889 7.This battle is treated in two valuable monographs that appeared in quick succession: Novara and Dijon. Apogee and Decline of the Swiss Great Power in the Sixteenth Century（Novara und Dijon. Höhepunkt und Verfall der schweizerischen Grossmacht im 16. Jahrhundert），by Doctor of Philosophy E. Gagliardi. Zurich，1907. Published by Leemann Brothers and Co.“The Battle of Novara”（“Die Schlacht bei Novara”），by Georg Fischer. Berlin dissertation，1908. Published by Georg Nauck.

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1700100891 8.Gagliardi and Fischer arrange the individual elements of the battle very differently, indeed even contradicting one another, since Fischer places on the right flank what Gagliardi seems to report for the left flank. I agree with Fischer. Nevertheless, when Fischer assigns only 1，000 men to the north square of the Swiss，2，000 to the center square, and 7，000 to the south square, I do not say that that is impossible, but I do not consider it as certain. If the Swiss had good information on the enemy and knew that the lansquenets were in the southern part of the camp but that there was no favorable terrain there for horsemen, they may well have made the northerly and central columns of infantry very weak, assigning in return the horsemen to the former and the cannon to the latter. But they may have given these two units only missions calling for demonstrations, while assigning the actual attack exclusively to the third square and giving it seven-tenths of the entire infantry. But we may believe such fine points only if we have direct and reliable sources concerning them.Consequently, although I agree essentially with Fischer, I have expressed myself more carefully and with more restraint and have avoided giving specific numbers for the various troop units.

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1700100893 9.The sources speak of 400 Swiss halberdiers who reportedly first drove off the harquebusiers of the lansquenets and then attacked the main body in the flank. Gagliardi（p.162）considers them to be a unit that arrived by chance, while Fischer（p.138）considers this a detachment that was sent out intentionally. I suspect that these were men who welled out on one side when the main bodies clashed.

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1700100895 10.This battle is studied in an exemplary way by Otto Haintz in the dissertation “From Novara to La Motta”（“Von Novara bis La Motta”）. Berlin，1912.

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1700100897 11.This polarity is developed excellently by Gagliardi, Novara und Dijon, p.327.

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1700100899 12.The monograph by Heinrich Harkensee（Göttingen dissertation，1909），while also contributing to the research in detail, did not arrive at tactically correct concepts of the overall battle. The corrections that need to be made are apparent when this work is compared with the account above. In particular, Harkensee attributes too much credibility to the exaggerations in the figures for the French strength. Hadank’s review in the Deutsche Literaturzeitung, No.26，1910，concentrates too much on details and unjustly raises the accusation that the author did not understand the strategic situation. He may, however, be correct in his reckoning of the French strength as 30，000. He also justifiably defends the report that the Gascons had large shields that could be placed on the ground as a base. Such shields（pavesen）were used by the marksmen. He refers to a miniature showing crossbowmen with large shields of this kind in front of them. Hewett, Ancient Armour and Weapons，3：543（Supplement）.

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1700100901 13.On page 36 above there is a quote that praises the Swiss artillery. The facts do not justify this.

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1700100903 14.“The Battle of Bicocca”（“Die Schlacht bei Bicocca”），by Paul Kopitsch. Berlin dissertation，1909. Published by E. Ebering.

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1700100905 15.In Guicciardini the account reads：“They wanted to return home, but in order to show the whole world that it was not because of fear, they first wanted to defeat the enemy.”It is possible that this statement was made, but if they had been victorious, the Swiss would no doubt still have remained, and so they no doubt intended in the bottom of their hearts to do so from the start.

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1700100907 16.The standard monograph is the Berlin dissertation by Reinhard Thom（1907），which, as a result of precise source analysis, corrects many individual errors in earlier accounts. A few additional sources mentioned in the review of this monograph in the Deutsche Literaturzeitung, No.8，1909，are not of concern to us.

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1700100909 17.The report by the ambassador from Siena specifically gives this as the reason for the carelessness of the French.

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1700100911 18.Berlin dissertation by Karl Stallwitz，1911. Review by Hadank in the Deutsche Literaturzeitung, No.16，1912.

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1700100913 6　马基雅维利

1700100914

1700100915 1.Guillaume, p.165.

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1700100917 2.E. Fueter, in a review of Hobohm’s work in the Historische Zeitschrift，113：578，while recognizing the high value of the work, nevertheless takes exception in detail to many points, charges the author with a lack of methodological schooling and even insufficient knowledge of warfare and of the Italian language. I have checked on these accusations and have compared them with a handwritten countercritique by Hobohm. The result is that the reproach falls back on the critic. Even if all the details that he criticizes were real errors, in comparison with the stupendous scholarship and the critical perceptiveness with which Hobohm sweeps aside mountains of misjudgments appearing in the sources and constructs positive new knowledge, those errors would have very little significance. But my study shows that of all the objections and corrections made by Fueter, not even a single one—really not a single one—is justified. It is not that Hobohm’s understanding of Italian is insufficient, but rather that Fueter did not know the differences between modern Italian and the Italian of the sixteenth century. It is not Hobohm who introduces erroneous material concerning the warfare of that time but Fueter. Let us give but three examples: Machiavelli recommends that in the selection of corporals for the militia it should be taken into consideration that they are acceptable to the other conscripts（“scripti”）. Fueter is not familiar with this principle and this language. He claims he is bringing sense into this prescription by translating conscripts（“scripti”）with the word “instructions” and says that Hobohm, because of what is actually his correct translation of the passage, is unknowledgeable. Furthermore, Machiavelli recruited his militia exclusively from the peasants of the subjected countryside, and not from the burghers. Fueter read Hobohm’s book so hastily that he attributed to these peasants the attitudes of the “Florentine merchant nation.”

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1700100919 A third feature of Machiavelli’s militia system was the fact that Florence did its best, even though not always with success, to prevent its subjects from going off as mercenaries, whereas in Switzerland and Germany that was officially permitted and often even more or less organized. Fueter had such little understanding of these opposite attitudes, which are explained by Hobohm in a very interesting and thorough manner, that he believes Machiavelli borrowed the official regulations for sending men off for mercenary service from the Swiss military system, and he attempts to correct Hobohm in this matter with strong emphasis. And thus it continues point by point, and I can only regret that the Historische Zeitschrift has misled its readers on such a basic work.

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