1700101020

1700101021 37.Rabutin, Commentaires, Ed. Buchon, p.573，as an eyewitness.

1700101022

1700101023 38.Aloise Contarini, Relazione diFrancia, February 1572，Ed. Albèri, Series I, Vol.IV, pp.232-233.

1700101024

1700101025 39.Ed. Buchon, pp.202-203.

1700101026

1700101027 40.“The formation of the French is with a broad front and weak rear, because everybody wants to take position in the front rank; but the Flemish, increasing the files and enlarging the body, make it stronger and more secure.”Report of Michel Suriano, made on his return from his ambassadorship to Philip II in 1559（Relation de Michel Suriano, faite au retour de son Ambassade auprès de Philippe II en 1559）（In Gachard, Relations des ambassadeurs vénitiens sur Charles-Quint et Philippe II, Brussels，1856，p.116）. Popelinière, Histoire des troubles, Livre 9（edition of 1572，p.309）：“The reître, because he fights in a completely different way than the French …”

1700101028

1700101029 41.And the worst is that, in the past, they fought in a single line（en haye）. These regiments marching in battle formation are separated from one another by the foot troops, the artillery, or other units, and they cannot conveniently be drawn together to form a large unit when the occasion calls for it. And while they might still be in open country, if they should close together, if by chance the king’s lieutenant should not be there to command them, each of them wanting to show his worth, without considering that body of troops—or, so to speak, the mountain of enemies—that is coming to attack them, neither the fear the soldiers can have, who seeing themselves weak and outnumbered, run off, seeking not only to win, but to survive if they face up to these troops where they have a four to one superiority, united, pressed together, and in quantity, as it is said.

1700101030

1700101031 They were to make the companies 80 to 100 men strong, composed of compatriots who were all known to one another, in order to foster cohesiveness. The companies were to be formed in regiments of about 500 men（“hommes d’armes”）.

1700101032

1700101033 Cavalry in single line（en haye）is useless; squadrons composed of 400 riders are the best; squadrons of 1，500 and 2，000，as is prescribed for the reîtres, would defeat them if they were dealing only with these 400；and if there were 1，200 in three units, charging one after the other, I would consider them to have the advantage. So many men in close formation only create confusion, and only a fourth of them fight. This large number of soldiers in a squadron is useful for the reîtres, because three-fourths of their men are nothing but villeins. The first troops that charge against these large bodies throw them into disorder, principally striking them on the flank. And even if the body can hold off the first attackers, the second and third squadrons sweep them away and break them up, charging from one end to the other and passing through; after the first two ranks are penetrated, there is little danger from the rest. He who has the larger number of squadrons of 300 and 400 must win the victory. Gaspard de Saulx-Tavannes, Mémoires, Ed. Buchon，1836，p.328 ff.

1700101034

1700101035 42.I find a similar argument in a Venetian account of 1596：

1700101036

1700101037 The reîtres were easily broken up by the lances of the light cavalry.Formerly, when each rank had made its wheel, the reîtres customarily tightened their whole formation and awaited the assault, facing the lances that were coming toward them, and then, widening their formation, they would let them enter among them and would handle them roughly with their pistols and their arms. But now the lances no longer come all together in squadrons but, divided into diverse and small detachments, they assault the squadrons of reîtres from all sides and harass them and throw them back and run through them from one side to the other and break them up with great facility. Tommaseco Contarini, Relazione di Germania，1596. In Relazione degli Ambasc. Veneti.，Ed. Albèri, Series I，6：235.

1700101038

1700101039 43.It was a question in ancient times and among those of the present time whether it was better to go into combat at a trot or to await the enemy in place; it seems that the momentum and the gallop increase the power of the men and horses to mow down the squadrons but it also gives much more opportunity to those who have no desire to be involved in this charge to halt, hold their mounts in place, and separate themselves from the charge, such as new soldiers and those the captain does not trust. It seems that it would be better to have them wait in formation and firmly fixed in place or at least not to take up the trot or gallop before a distance of twenty paces from the enemy, because then those who would fall out would be recognized, and the cowards would be too ashamed to leave their position at the moment of encountering the enemy, being the more easily seen and recognized by their captains, who would force them to be courageous in spite of themselves. Jean Gaspard de Saulx-Tavannes, Mémoires, Ed. Buchon，1836，p.116.

1700101040

1700101041 44.French ordinance of 16 October 1568.“It is likewise ordered that the companies of each regiment of cavalry will march together and in the formation that they are to maintain while fighting, in order that each man will be accustomed to holding his position.”Nothing further was prescribed. H. Choppin, Les Origines de la Cavalerie française, Paris and Nancy，1905，p.22.

1700101042

1700101043 45.Quite similar descriptions and observations are found in the History of the Civil Wars in France（Storia delle guerre civili di Francia），by the Italian Davila, and in the Art of War，“The Difference between Launders and Pistolers，”1590，by the Englishman Roger Williams. They are quoted by C. H. Firth in Cromwell’s Army, p.129.

1700101044

1700101045 46.In the Commentaires, Vol.XI, Chaps.11，12，Ed. Lonmier-Guillaume，2：214-222.

1700101046

1700101047 47.In his History of the Netherlands War（Geschichte des Niederländischen Krieges），Mendoza reports expressly in his account of the battle on the Mooker Heide that the “horsemen” on the Spanish side had awaited the attack of the enemy squadrons in place—as a result of which, to be sure, they were defeated. It was only a counterattack by another Spanish cavalry unit that threw back the Gueux.

1700101048

1700101049 48.Historia, Book 44. Ed.1578，p.560.

1700101050

1700101051 2　射手数量的增加与步兵战术的完善

1700101052

1700101053 1.Rüstow, Geschichte der Infanterie，1：242 f.，349. Jähns，1：724，726，731. Hobohm，2：472. Pätel, The Organization of the Hessian Army under Philip the Magnanimous（Die Organisation des hessischen Heeres unter Philipp dem Grossmütigen）. Philip gave the marksmen one guilder more per month than the spearmen; nevertheless, they did not reach half the strength.

1700101054

1700101055 2.Jähns，1：726.

1700101056

1700101057 3.Relazione di Vincenzo Quirini, December 1507（Relazione degli ambassadore Veneti[Eugen Albèri, Series I，6：21]）.

1700101058

1700101059 4.Clonard-Brix, p.57.

1700101060

1700101061 5.Book XV, Basel，1578，1：315.

1700101062

1700101063 6.Truthful Description of the Other Campaign in Austria against the Turks … in the Past Year 1532. Described in Detail. And now Prepared in Print for the First Time in this Year of 1539. Reprinted in J.U.D. Goebel, Contributions to the National History of Europe under Emperor Charles V（Beiträge zur Staatsgeschichte von Europa unter Kaiser Karl V.），Lemgo，1767，p.326. Further information on the caracole is to be found in Hobohm，2：394，405-407，468，483，508.

1700101064

1700101065 7.Rabutin, Commentaires, Ed. Buchon, p.530.

1700101066

1700101067 8.Quoted in Rüstow，1：264.

1700101068

1700101069 9.Discourse XVIII, Paradoxe 2，p.384.

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