1700101070

1700101071 10.Jovius, Life of Pescara（Le vite …），Venice，1581，p.213.

1700101072

1700101073 11.1 September 1546. Avila, German edition, p.39.

1700101074

1700101075 12.There are also reports of mixed combat of marksmen and horsemen（Rüstow，1：314，from Monluc），but these can only have been exceptional cases that had no further development.

1700101076

1700101077 13.Jovius in 1535 before Goleta：“duas sclopetariorum manus, quas manicas vocabant, quod cornuum instar …”（“two bands of sclopetarii, which they call sleeves because they are like wings”）. Book 34，Edition of 1578，p.392. In 1542 before Ofen, the Italian infantry of Alessandro Vitelli “promoto hastatorum agmine et utrinque sclopettariis in cornua expansis Barbaras invadunt”（“After the column of the pikemen had been moved forward and on both sides the sclopetarii had been extended on the wings, they attacked the barbarians”）. Jovius, Histories, Book 42，p.518.

1700101078

1700101079 14.As we have already seen on p.94 above, Rüstow called this formation the “Hungarian order，” which he based on the Vienna parade of 1532. But that was only a schematic representation without practical significance. The expression is not derived from the sources any more than is the “Spanish brigade.” Wallhausen speaks not of a “Hungarian order，” but only of a “Hungarian installation，” that is, an administrative arrangement rather than a tactical one. In his Art of Dismounted Warfare（Kriegskunst zu Fuss），Book I, Chap.6，p.110，he says that in Hungary no formation other than the square was used. Jähns，1：711，calls it fatal that there had been acceptance of the procedure advocated by the Italian Tartaglia calling for placing the marksmen in the outer ranks of the square rather than as wings resting on the squares of spearmen, as had already been recommended by Seldeneck in 1480. This criticism seems to me to fail to recognize the principal point. While it is true that the formation of marksmen in wings offered the advantage of better sequence of fire and also a reasonably sure protection, nevertheless, when the attacking horsemen approached, the marksmen always had to find protection either among or inside of the spearmen.

1700101080

1700101081 15.As an example of how little we can depend on isolated reports, even when they appear to be well founded, let us note that Jorga, History of the Ottoman Empire（Geschichte des osmanischen Reiches），3：295，tells of a defeat of the Turks in 1593 in which “the janissaries were destroyed by the new cavalry of the West, the heavy horsemen clad in iron on armored horses, and by the harquebusiers.”A Turkish source and a Polish one are cited as a basis. Consequently, the writers had heard of the “new cavalry of the West，” but they had not understood in what respect it was new, and so they describe it as the ancient knights. If we were not informed from other sources, it would be absolutely impossible to recognize what is correct in this exaggerated description. This is a counterpart to the transposition of Winkelried into a knightly battle. A similar situation is to be found in the same work on p.314.

1700101082

1700101083 16.1608. Archives of Oranien-Nassau，2d Series，2：389.

1700101084

1700101085 17.Institution de la discipline militaire au Royaume de France, Lyons，1559，p.96 ff. The author himself is opposed to the reduced units and believes that, since there are marksmen and horsemen in the intervals, the cannon would find their target in any case. In his opinion, one should seek to prevent the second shot by skirmishing marksmen and horsemen.

1700101086

1700101087 18.Rüstow treated these formations very thoroughly in his Geschichte der Infanterie. I do not consider it necessary to go into that in detail, since we find nothing of this kind in the real battles.

1700101088

1700101089 19.The extent to which the “terzio” was an administrative or a tactical unit and designation requires further research.

1700101090

1700101091 20.Lipsius, de militia Romana（On Roman Military Service），5：20，Opera，1613，2：460. De la Noue, Discourse XVIII，2d Paradoxe. Ed.1587，p.377 ff.

1700101092

1700101093 3　奥兰治领主莫里斯

1700101094

1700101095 1.On the military library of Maurice of Orange, see Carl Neumann, Rembrandt，1：95.

1700101096

1700101097 2.Journal of Anthony Duyck（Journaal van Anthonis Duyck），fiscal advocate of the Council of State（1591-1602）. Published under commission of the War Department, with introduction and notes by Ludwig Mulder, captain of infantry，3 volumes，1862-1866，s’Gravenhage and Arnhem. Duyck’s office was that of a chief of the war chancellery of the Council of State and of the highest juridical official for the army（Mulder, preface, p.LXXXVI）. He was normally present with the army and kept a daily account of events. To judge from an examination of his journal, he was so excellently informed on the thoughts of Maurice as to be possible only through direct verbal contact. In many passages we may consider the journal to be Maurice’s legacy to posterity. Gustav Roloff，“Maurice of Orange and the Founding of the Modern Army”（“Moritz von Oranien und die Begründung des modernen Heeres”），Preussische Jahrbücher, Vol.111，1903.

1700101098

1700101099 3.Jähns，1：869 f.

1700101100

1700101101 4.Jähns，1：472，705，says that in 1521 Delia Valle recommended the parade march in step; Lodrono did likewise（Jähns，1：724）. See also Hobohm，2：407. In a report on the battle of Ceresole by Bernardo Spina, published by Stallwitz as a supplement to his document on that battle（Berlin dissertation，1911，p.54），it is stated that the Spanish general del Guasto had the recruits drilled immediately before the battle. It is also reported that the French guards had conducted drills.

1700101102

1700101103 5.Jähns，1：735.

1700101104

1700101105 6.Dilich, Kriegsbuch，1607，p.254，discusses the steps taken to maintain the formation on the march. Among them he says “that in marching, an even and steady step is to be maintained” and “that the drummers maintain a correct beat as if the soldier had to dance by it.”

1700101106

1700101107 7.In March 1591 this proportion was 1：0.47. Mulder, preface to Duyck’s Journal，1：51 ff.，1862. He arrives at this number by taking the average of a large number of individual figures in the documents，figures that cannot be confirmed.

1700101108

1700101109 8.According to the sketches by John of Nassau, two ranks of musketeers were drawn up forward of the front of the “double-pay men，” that is, the pikemen. Plathner，“Graf Johann von Nassau，”Berlin dissertation，1913，p.57.

1700101110

1700101111 9.Dilich, Kriegsbuch，1607，p.290，is not very clear as to what is supposed to happen when a formation of pikemen and marksmen is attacked by mounted men or pikemen. They should either retire behind the pikemen or into the mass of them.

1700101112

1700101113 10.Stuttgart Manuscript of 1612. Jähns，2：924. John of Nassau states that Maurice never allowed his system of march and battle formation to be changed, once it had been established, so that merely by drum and trumpet signals each man could take his place. Plathner, p.58.

1700101114

1700101115 11.Plathner, p.57.

1700101116

1700101117 12.A letter from Sandolin to Lipsius, dated 16 July 1595. Cited in Jähns，2：880. Duke Henri Rohan reported later in his document（cited in Jähns，2：951）that Maurice had found that the armament with shields was better but had not been able to have his opinion accepted, since, of course, he was not the sovereign. See Hobohm，2：452.

1700101118

1700101119 13.Mulder, Van Duyck’s Journal，1：636 ff. From 9 August to 26 October 1595. Similarly in 1598. Reyd, Niederländische Geschichte, Vol.XV, Ed.1626，p.569. In the same year the brother of William Louis, John of Nassau, reported from Groningen to their father on drills in the garrisons. Archives of Oranien-Nassau，2d Series，2：403. Wallhausen, Kriegskunst zu Fuss, p.23，reproaches those who say:“What is drilling? When one is fighting for the enemy, one does not drill long.”

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