1700101301 1.The Netherlander Le Hon（Hondius）wrote concerning Wallhausen（Jähns，2：1039）：

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1700101303 Wallhausen has made a large book of the drills of a regiment which do not occur among us and were also not used by the Prince of Orange … which are nothing more than fantasies that one puts on paper and which cannot be applied by any officer or soldier, indeed not by the author himself, who, like Icarus, wants to fly so high that he must fall down from above, who thinks that by putting figures on paper they must be heard by many people.

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1700101305 The Frenchman Bardin called Wallhausen’s Kriegskunst zu Fuss “an illegible confused mixture, from which there is nothing to be learned”（Jähns，2：1042）.

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1700101307 2.In his defense let it be noted that even a soldier like Montecuccoli wrote something similar：“If one wishes to form a unit of lancers, not for the attack but for defense, one can give it a square formation, facing toward all four sides.”Round or spherical formations were also recommended. Writings（Schriften），1：352.

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1700101309 3.L. Plathner，“Count John of Nassau and the First Military School”（“Graf Johann von Nassau und die erste Kriegsschule”），Berlin dissertation，1913.

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1700101311 4.Around 1559 Count Reinhart Solms wrote a military encyclopedia, which Jähns，1：510，calls “Military Government”（“Kriegsregierung”），in which he emphatically rejects the idea of the militia, since the men would run away when the situation became serious. Lazarus Schwendi was in favor of the militia（Jähns, p.539）. General von Klitzing drew up a report for Duke Georg of Braunschweig-Lüneburg in which he stated that, according to his experience, militiamen could not stand up to recruited troops. He recommended mixing recruited soldiers and those who were levied. Von dem Decken, Duke George of Braunschweig-Lüneburg（Herzog Georg von Braunschweig-Lüneburg），2：189.

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1700101313 5.The militia was only used with success once in a secondary role; when the duke moved into Bohemia in 1620，he used the militia to protect his country against the Union. Krebs, Battle on the White Mountain（Schlacht am weissen Berge），p.32.

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1700101315 6.When the burgomaster of Augsburg in 1544 forced all the citizens to procure weapons and participate in daily drills, the entire city rose up against this procedure and said it was nonsense, an unnecessary waste of time and money, since, in view of the importance of Augsburg’s industries, this purpose could better and more cheaply be accomplished with paid mercenaries. Schmoller, Tübinger Zeitschrift，16：486.

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1700101317 7.Jany, The Beginnings of the Old Army（Die Anfänge der alten Armee），p.2.

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1700101319 8.Jany，1：10. Krollmann, The Defense Work in the Kingdom of Prussia（Das Defensionswerk im Königreich Preussen），1909.

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1700101321 9.Meynert, History of the Military and of Army Organizations in Europe（Geschichte des Kriegswesens und der Heerverfassungen in Europa），2：99.

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1700101323 10.In June 1625 the total cost of deliveries in Hesse taken by the billeted troops of the League since 1623 only in the cities and the villages subject to the princes（and not the villages of the nobility），without counting robberies and destruction, was estimated as 3，318，000 imperial talers. This was much more than ten times the amount approved by the Estates three years earlier for the landgrave, but with which the country had not been able to be defended. M. Ritter, German History（Deutsche Geschichte），3：260. Gindely estimates the total contributions raised by Wallenstein in his first period of command as between 200 and 210 million talers. The city of Halle alone showed that from December 1625 to September 1627 it had paid 430，274 guilders.

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1700101325 11.Droysen, Prussian Politics（Preussische Politik），3：1，49.

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1700101327 12.von Bonin，“The War Council of the Electorate of Brandenburg，1630-41”（“Der kurbrandenburgische Kriegsrat，1630-1641”），Brandenburgisch-Preussische Forschungen，1913，p.51 ff.

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1700101329 13.Researchers are not yet completely in agreement on the content and the nature of the reduction of 1641 and of the strength until 1656. J.G. Droysen’s concept that it was principally a question in 1641 of a relief from the double obligation to the emperor and the prince elector and that the young ruler simultaneously broke the opposition of the colonels and the Estates in order to create the unified army thenceforth obligated only to the prince has now been generally dropped. Meinardus，“Minutes and Accounts of the Brandenburg Privy Council”（“Protokolle und Relationen des Brandenburgischen Geheimen Rats”），introduction to the first and second volumes. Article，“Schwarzenberg” in the Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie. Article in the Preussische Jahrbücher, Vol.86，by Schrötter，“The Brandenburg-Prussian Army Organization Under the Great Elector”（“Die brandenburgisch-preussische Heeresverfassung unter dem Grossen Kurfürsten”），1892. Brake，“The Reduction of the Brandenburg-Prussian Army in the Summer of 1641”（“Die Reduktion des brandenburgisch-preussischen Heeres im Sommer 1641”），Bonn dissertation，1898. In this connection see also Meinardus, Historische Zeitschrift，81：556，82：370. Jany，“Die Anfänge der alten Armee.”Urkundliche Beiträge zur Geschichte des preussischen Heeres（Documentary Contributions to the History of the Prussian Army），Vol.1，1901.

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1700101331 14.Ferdinand Hirsch，“The Army of the Great Elector”（“Die Armee des Grossen Kurfürsten”），Historische Zeitschrift，53（1885）：231.

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1700101333 15.This important observation is made by B.von Bonin in the Archives for Military Law（Archiv für Militärrecht），1911，p.262.

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1700101335 16.See the article “The Prussian District President”（“Der preussische Landrat”）in my Historical and Political Essays（Historische und politische Aufsätze），where the difference between the Prussian, English, and French administrative systems is discussed.

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1700101337 17.Ritter，“Wallenstein’s System of Contributions”（“Das Kontributionssystem Wallensteins”），Historische Zeitschrift，90：193. In Wallenstein’s army administration, which attempted to assure that, despite all their contributions, the burghers and peasants could tolerate them quite well, Ranke has already recognized the “trait of the national prince” in the great condottiere.

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1700101339 18.von Schrötter，“The Bringing of the Prussian Army to Strength Under the First King”（“Die Ergänzung des preussischen Heeres unter dem ersten Könige”），Brandenburgisch-preussische Forschungen，1910，p.413.

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1700101341 19.Schrötter, Brandenburgisch-preussische Forschungen，23：463.

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1700101343 20.As an analogy to the way the old “Land Defense” was carried over into the standing army, let us note a negotiation between the emperor and the Lower Austrian Estates in 1639. The Estates wanted to establish the principle that the land defense could only be used within the territorial borders. The emperor demanded that every twentieth man be provided and proposed for consideration “whether these men could better be used by assigning them to a special corps or whether they should be incorporated as fillers in the old regiments.”According to Meynert, Geschichte des Kriegswesens，3：10.

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1700101345 21.The standard study is Max Lehmann’s “Recruitment, Service Obligation, and System of Leaves in the Army of Frederick William I”（“Werbung, Wehrpflicht und Beurlaubung im Heere Friedrich Wilhelms I.”），Historische Zeitschrift, Vol.67，1891. A very clear insight of the structure of the Prussian army in the eighteenth century, based word for word on the sources, is given in the work of Erwin Dette, Frederick the Great and His Army（Friedrich der Grosse und sein Heer），Göttingen, Vanderhoeck und Ruprecht，1915. I have taken several characteristic observations verbatim from this excellent work.

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1700101347 22.It is all the more remarkable when, according to Schrötter, p.466，at the death of Frederick I there already existed a levy system along controlled lines, with exemption of those with special possessions, that was quite similar to the situation created by the “canton regulation.”It appears that the purely arbitrary aspect of the levying by the officers was completely consonant with the forceful character of Frederick William I.

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1700101349 23.Courbière, History of the Brandenburg-Prussian Military Organization（Geschichte der Brandenburgisch-Preussischen Heeresverfassung），p.119. When reference is made on p.120 to men of 3 inches and under 3 inches, this seems to me to stem from a writing error. As the smallest height, which was waived only under conditions of a complete scarcity of manpower, as in the last year of the Seven Years’War, we can regard 5 feet，5 inches（1.70 meters）. See Grünhagen, Silesia under Frederick the Great（Schlesien unter Friedrich dem Grossen），1：405. Reimann, History of the Prussian Nation（Geschichte des preussischen Staates），1：154，claims that even in garrison regiments men could not be less than 5 feet，3 inches tall. According to Koser, Friedrich der Grosse，1：538，Frederick required in the older regiments men of 5 feet，8 inches in the front rank and 5 feet，6 inches in the second rank. For the newer regiments, these requirements were 5 feet，7 inches and 5 feet，5 inches, respectively.

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