1700101351 24.A report of the government of the electoral march of 1811 states：“In earlier times, as filler replacements, only such a moderate number of natives was required that only those subjects who were completely dispensable were enlisted, and that was determined by the civil authorities.”

1700101352

1700101353 25.Studies in Brandenburg-Prussian History（Forschungen zur Brandenburgisch-Preussischen Geschichte），7：308.

1700101354

1700101355 26.Ranke, Werke，27：230.

1700101356

1700101357 27.Jähns，2：914.

1700101358

1700101359 28.Excerpted from Tactical Training（Taktische Schulung），p.687.

1700101360

1700101361 29.von Osten-Sacken, Prussia’s Army from Its Beginnings to the Present（Preussens Heer von seinen Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart），1911，1：173.

1700101362

1700101363 30.These numbers are estimated for the regiment that was named “Thüna” in 1784 and “Winnig” in 1806. Ollech，“Life of Reiher”（“Leben Reihers”），Militär-Wochenblatt，1859，p.11. Kunhardt von Schmidt, Militär-Wochenblatt，1909，col.3771. The latter correctly assumes that, in view of the uniformity throughout the army, these lists give a picture not only of the individual troop unit but of the entire infantry of the period. Similar age relationships already existed in 1704. Schrötter, p.453.

1700101364

1700101365 31.M. Lehmann, p.278.

1700101366

1700101367 32.Basta（Book I, Chap.6—consequently, long before the Thirty Years’War）was already complaining about the start of the practice of filling the captains’positions only with aristocrats, even when they were completely inexperienced, so that no private soldier any longer had the hope of moving up, except in very exceptional cases. According to Löwe, Organization of Wallenstein’s Army（Organisation des Wallensteinschen Heeres），p.86，most of the colonels and generals in the Thirty Years’War were nobles, but among the lower officers there were still quite a number of former privates. G. Droysen，“Contributions to the History of the Military System During the Period of the Thirty Years’War”（“Beiträge zur Geschichte des Militärwesens während der Epoche des 30jährigen Krieges”），Zeitschrift für Kulturgeschichte, Vol.4，1875，emphasizes strongly, in opposition to Gansauge, that there was not yet any officer corps at that time.

1700101368

1700101369 33.Schrötter, Brandenburgisch-Preussische Forschungen, Vol.27.

1700101370

1700101371 34.Treated very clearly by Richard M. Meyer，“The Military Titles”（“Die militärischen Titel”）in the Zeitschrift für deutsche Wortforschung, Vol.12，Book 3（1910），p.145.

1700101372

1700101373 The 1726 regulation of Frederick William I shows a great similarity to a Spanish regulation. Jähns，2：1577，believes that it goes back directly to the Spanish. Erben, in the Mitteilungen des kaiserlichen und königlichen Heeresmuseums，1（1902）：3，seems to refute that. I hesitate to make any definitive judgment.

1700101374

1700101375 35.Schmoller in the Historische Zeitschrift，30：61.

1700101376

1700101377 36.Observations on the Art of War（Betrachtungen über die Kriegskunst），section 13.

1700101378

1700101379 37.G.Droysen，“Beiträge，”Zeitschrift für deutsche Kulturgeschichte, new series，4（1875）：592.

1700101380

1700101381 38.“Report of the Ambassador Valory of 1748.”Ed. Koser, Brandenburgisch-Preussische Forschungen，7（1894）：299. Valory stresses the marching in step of the Prussians so strongly that we may doubt whether the French had it.

1700101382

1700101383 39.Daniels，“Ferdinand von Braunschweig，”Preussische Jahrbücher, Vols.77，78，79，80，82.

1700101384

1700101385 40.According to Frederick’s so-called Military Testament, there are supposed to have been 110，000 natives and 80，000 foreigners in 1780，but the numbers are not entirely certain, since natives who were not from the regimental canton were also counted as foreigners.

1700101386

1700101387 41.The Militia Gallica by Wallhausen（French Military Service; translation of a book by Montgommery），p.44，precisely states how broad was the power of punishment of each position. The colonel was allowed to strike and kill with the sword, even officers. The sergeant-major had similar authority, but he could also strike with the staff, that is, with his measuring stick. Nobody was to feel insulted by this. The captain was allowed to strike with the flat of his sword. The lieutenants and sergeants could do likewise on the march or in the trenches, but in garrison only against their direct subordinates. The ensign was allowed to do this only when substituting for the lieutenant or captain. The sergeant（in contradiction to the foregoing！）could strike only on the march, in battle, on guard duty, and in the trenches, with the shaft of the halberd, and not with the sword, if a soldier left his post, but not in garrison or for other reasons.

1700101388

1700101389 42.Daniels, Preussische Jahrbücher，82：270.

1700101390

1700101391 43.According to the estimates of the General Staff Work. That was, therefore, at the moment Frederick started the war. Ranke，3：148 cites a memorandum, according to which Frederick William I, on his death, had left behind 83，484 men, including 72，000 men in the field army; other statements show up to 89，000 men. According to Schrötter, the Prussian army on 2 January 1705，when it had been strongly reinforced with the assistance of the subsidies of the sea powers, already amounted to 47，031，and with the militia 67，000 men, that is, almost 4 percent of the population.

1700101392

1700101393 44.Preussische Jahrbücher，142：300.

1700101394

1700101395 4　操练与18世纪的战术变化

1700101396

1700101397 1.Rüstow, Geschichte der Infanterie，2：42 ff.

1700101398

1700101399 2.Jany, p.108.

1700101400

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