1700101458

1700101459 28.It was their observation and follow-up of this work in all its details that led the General Staff astray in placing the beginning of the oblique battle formation in this decade and limiting it to the cohesive infantry front. But even in the writings of the General Staff itself this limitation is not strictly adhered to, and the work thereby becomes involved in inner contradictions, in contradictions with King Frederick, and in contradictions with a document written personally by the chief of the Historical Section, von Taysen.

1700101460

1700101461 29.Tempelhof describes the approach march as follows：

1700101462

1700101463 There was no more beautiful sight. The heads of the columns were constantly abreast of one another and separated from one another by the distance necessary for the deployment; the platoons maintained their intervals as exactly as if they were marching in a review.”

1700101464

1700101465 30.As a reason for the echeloned attack, he states that, as a result of this formation, no special command was needed for the left wing to move into the battle. The interval of the individual battalions from one another amounted to fifty paces—that is, not even 1 minute’s march. The forward point of the right wing had a distance of 1，000 paces from the tail of the left wing, or no more than 10 to 15 minutes of marching time.

1700101466

1700101467 That it was not the echelons that brought victory was also recognized by Dietrich von Bülow（Jähns，3：2139）. Major Jochim，“The Military Testament of the Great King”（“Das militärische Testament des Grossen Königs”），supplement to the Militär-Wochenblatt, Vol.7，1914，claims, contrary to the General Staff Work, p.26，that the echelons were formed not by battalions but by brigades（five battalions）. He regards the oblique battle formation not as a combat formation at all, but rather as a movement formation, and he decisively rejects the traditional exaggerated estimate of its value. For him, the oblique battle formation was only an “expedient for the open plain with no cover.”According to the “Dispositions for the Battle of Zorndorf，” as printed in the Military Testament of Count Henckel Donnersmarck（Militärischer Nachlass des Grafen Henckel Donnersmarck），2：78，every two battalions together formed one echelon.

1700101468

1700101469 31.Letter of 8 August 1745. Generalstabswerk，“Wars of Frederick the Great”（“Kriege Friedrichs des Grossen”），1：24.

1700101470

1700101471 32.Kurt Schmidt，“The Activity of the Prussian Free Battalions in the First Two Campaigns of the Seven Years’War”（“Die Tätigkeit der preussischen Freibataillone in den beiden ersten Feldzügen des siebenjährigen Krieges”），Berlin dissertation，1911. Erwin Dette, op.cit.，p.78 ff. On Hardt’s successes in 1759，see Generalstabswerk，10：124.

1700101472

1700101473 33.Militär-Wochenblatt，62（1895）：1602；73（1899）：1832. The French ambassador Valory wrote in his report for 1748 concerning the Prussian cavalry at the time of the death of Frederick William I, Brandenburgisch-Preussische Forschungen，7：308：

1700101474

1700101475 The horses are accustomed to the fire, and the rider dismounts from his horse, leaving the bridle on his neck, and he places himself at the head of the squadron in order to fire by rank of platoons and of battalions like the infantryman, and no horse moves from his place. I have seen entire half-squadrons double their ranks fleeing from the horses’heels.

1700101476

1700101477 34.von Canitz, Information and Observations on the Fates of the Mounted Forces（Nachrichte und Betrachtungen über die Schicksale der Reiterei），p.7.

1700101478

1700101479 35.According to Desbrière and Sautai, Organisation et tactique des trois armes, Paris，1906.

1700101480

1700101481 36.Writings（Schriften），2：176.

1700101482

1700101483 37.Kavalleristische Monatshefte，1908，p.908，“On the Details and Results of Mounted Clashes”（“Ueber Verlauf and Ergebnis von Reiterzusammenstössen”）.

1700101484

1700101485 5　战略

1700101486

1700101487 1.It will be worth the trouble to note that, hand in hand with the new period of strategy, there also appeared the use of an aid that became increasingly important with the passage of time, the use of maps.Jovius relates that before the battle of Marignano in 1515 there were laid out for the Swiss leaders in the castle of Milan parchment sheets on which were drawn the roads and adjoining areas.“Membranae in medium prolatae, quibus mensurae itinerum et regionis situs pictura describebantur, ut agreste ingenio homines certius deliberata cognoscerent.”（“Parchments were published, on which the distances of the routes and a picture of the structure of the region were drawn, so that even men with untrained ability might know the plans more definitely.”）It is noteworthy that in this way attempts were made to assist the peasants’lack of education.

1700101488

1700101489 2.Jähns，2：1151.

1700101490

1700101491 3.“He who has the last piece of bread and the last crown is victorious.”Gaspard（Jean）de Saulx-Tavannes, Mémoires, Ed. Buchon，1836.p.226. Mendoza, p.11：“Consequently, it is customarily said that the last crown or penny holds the victory.”

1700101492

1700101493 When Frederick planned to begin the war in 1756，he estimated that each campaign would cost him 5 million talers and that Prussia together with Saxony, which he planned to conquer, could afford that. The expenses increased, however, to 15 million talers annually, and he had to request English subsidies. Maria Theresa waged war essentially with French subsidies, but in 1761 she had used up her resources so completely that even during the continuing war she reduced the army and discharged troops for reasons of economy.

1700101494

1700101495 4.These passages are to be found in “Frederick the Great’s Ideas on War”（“Friedrichs des Grossen Anschauungen vom Kriege”），Vol.27 of the Kriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschriften, p.268.

1700101496

1700101497 5.Jochim，“The Military Testament of the Great King”（“Das militärische Testament des Grossen Königs”），supplement to the Militär-Wochenblatt，1914，pp.269，278.

1700101498

1700101499 6.Lenz, Historische Zeitschrift，49：458.

1700101500

1700101501 7.Schmalkaldic War（Schmalkaldischer Krieg），German edition，1853，p.90.

1700101502

1700101503 8.Even before the start of the Schmalkaldic War, the Venetian ambassador reported that the emperor would not fight any battle. In this connection he noted:“… Protestants do not have captains … the German nation alone is not suitable to do battle on its own with determination, and the emperor will avoid that but will probe and encircle the enemy army with his light cavalry, and with the Italian infantry（which is experienced in the business of war）he will attempt to drive them back, wear them out, and annihilate them.”Bern.Navagero, Report from Germany of July 1546（Relation aus Deutschland vom Juli 1546），Ed. Albèri, Series 1，1：362.

1700101504

1700101505 9.Viktor Löwe, The Organization and Administration of Wallenstein’s Armies（Die Organisation und Verwaltung der Wallensteinschen Heere），1895. Reviewed by Schrötter in Schmollers Jahrbücher，1895，Vol.19，Book 4，p.327. Konze，“The Strengths etc.of Wallenstein’s Army in 1633”（“Die Stärke usw der Wallensteinschen Armee im Jahre 1633”），Bonn dissertation，1906. Hoeniger，“The Armies of the Thirty Years’War”（“Die Armeen des 30jährigen Krieges”），supplement to the Militär-Wochenblatt，1914，Vol.7，claims that at the climax of the war, when Gustavus Adolphus and Wallenstein stood facing one another, on both sides together there was a total of between 260，000 and 280，000 men under arms. That estimate is certainly somewhat high. Hoeniger gave too high a strength to the armies, especially at Nuremberg.

1700101506

1700101507 10.According to Deuticke, Schlacht bei Lützen, p.52.

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