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11.For the train and rations among the Swiss, see Elgger, Military System of the Swiss（Kriegswesen der Schweizer），p.117 ff.
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12.Jähns, pp.502，505.
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13.Jähns, p.521.
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14.Knaake, Contributions to the History of Emperor Charles V（Beiträge zur Geschichte Kaiser Karls V.），Stendal，1864，p.11.
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15.Spont, Revue des questions d’histoire，22（1899）：63.
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16.See also Rudolf Schmidt, Schlacht bei Wittstock, p.49. Letter of Field Marshal Hatzfeld. Also p.57.
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17.Daniels, Preussische Jahrbücher，78：487. In 1757，when Cumberland’s army was marauding because of a shortage of rations, he ordered that the high provost was to have hanged without ceremony every soldier caught in the act. A priest accompanied him as he rode about, in order to comfort the poor sinners before they went to hell. Daniels, Preussische Jahrbücher，77：478.
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18.Montecuccoli, Writings（Schriften），2：122，states that in 1648 the Swedes held nine fortresses in Silesia. They had won them very easily, since they were not occupied, and they had then developed the insignificant older works. For this reason Montecuccoli advises that one should demolish all the old, unimportant fortresses and hold only a few really good fortresses, or have only open cities. He anticipates garrisons of only 100 to 500 men, except for Prague, which was to have 1，500. On page 135 he explains how the many fortresses were detrimental to the Spaniards in the Netherlands because they could not satisfactorily occupy and feed all of them, whereas they were useful for the Netherlanders because they were naturally strong positions and the inhabitants themselves provided the necessary defenders.
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19.Printed in the Preussische Jahrbücher，153（1913）：423.
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20.Henckel, Military Testament（Militärischer Nachlass），2：79.
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21.This is excellently described in the Kriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschriften，27：364. On 23 December 1757 Colonel Marainville reported of Frederick’s tactics
:“… he does not follow up his advantages. When he wins battles, he limits himself almost always to possession of the battlefield.”Quoted in Stuhr, Research and Clarifications of the History of the Seven Years’War（Forschungen und Erläuterungen zur Geschichte des 7jährigen Krieges），1：387.
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22.This, too, is excellently described in the Kriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschriften，27：353.
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23.Details on winter quarters or winter campaigns in Frederick’s General-Prinzipien, Articles 27 and 28.
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24.Here, too, as we have already seen above in the quotation from Höpfner（p.279），is a reason for the oblique battle formation.
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25.Archives of Orange-Nassau，2d Series，2：378.
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26.Quoted in Krebs, Battle on the White Mountain（Schlacht am weissen Berge），p.12.
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27.The Campaigns of Prince Eugene（Die Feldzüge des Prinzen Eugen），1：1：587.
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28.According to the citation in Kriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschriften，27：385.
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29.Letter to Louis XV dated 12 July 1744. Letter to the prince of Prussia forwarding the General-Prinzipien.
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6 战略概述及战例介绍
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1.All the previous descriptions of this campaign and of the battle have been significantly corrected by the careful study with its critical analysis of the sources by Rudolf Israel，“The Campaign of 1704 in South Germany”（“Der Feldzug von 1704 in Süddeutschland”），Berlin dissertation，1913.
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2.Of course, Tallart intended to attack the allies as soon as they had crossed through the mist moving across his front, and he also made a few movements toward attacking in the battle. But in view of the formation of his troops, especially the unusually strong occupation of Blindheim and the lack of a reserve, we can still say that the battle was planned as a purely defensive action.
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3.The battle was first completely explained in its strategic as well as tactical sequence by Georg Schmoller，“The Campaign of 1706 in Italy”（“Der Feldzug von 1706 in Italien”），Berlin dissertation，1909.
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4.Schmoller, pp.35-36，“The Hussars in front of the two Echelons of Cavalry.”
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5.Franz Mühlhoff，“The Genesis of the Battle of Oudenarde”（“Die Genesis der Schlacht bei Oudenaarde”），Berlin dissertation，1914.
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