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(260) Freedberg, “Memory in Art”, 337.
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(261) Freedberg, “Empathy, Motion and Emotion”, 27.
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(262) Freedberg, “Empathy, Motion and Emotion”, 23.
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(263) David Freedberg and Vittorio Gallese, “Motion, Emotion and Empathy in Esthetic Experience”, Trends in Cognitive Sciences , 11/5 (2007), 197—203.
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(264) Fortunato Battaglia, Sarah H. Lisanby, and David Freedberg, “Corticomotor Excitability during Observation and Imagination of a Work of Art”, Frontiers in Human Neuroscience , 5(2011), 79: 1—6．弗里德伯格关注神经科学的发展，并且清楚地意识到镜像神经元假说是有争议的：“尽管镜像神经元不能支撑目前以它为名的许多主张”，见Freedberg,“Memory in Art”, 341。
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(265) Semir Zeki, A Vision of the Brain (Oxford: Blackwell Scientific Publications, 1993); Semir Zeki, Inner Vision: An Exploration of Art and the Brain (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999);Semir Zeki, Splendors and Miseries of the Brain: Love, Creativity, and the Quest for Human Happiness (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009)．也见Whitney Davis, “Neurovisuality”, Nonsite.org , 2(12 June 2011) accessed 14 March 2014;John Oinans, Neuroarthistory: From Aristotle and Pliny to Baxandall and Zeki (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008); Journal of Neuroesthetics ; Arts and Neurosciences Review 。
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(266) 参见Sianne Ngai, Ugly Feelings (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007); Jane F. Thrailkill, Affecting Fictions: Mind, Body, and Emotion in American Literary Realism (Cambridge,MA: Harvard University Press, 2007); Barbara Johnson, Persons and Things (Cambridge, MA
:Harvard University Press, 2008); Raoul Schrott and Arthur Jacobs, Gehirn und Gedicht: Wie wir unsere Wirklichkeiten konstruieren (Munich: Hanser, 2011)。又见Andreas Lambert, Oliver Kauselmann, and Boris Kleber, Cognitive Poetics: Visualisierung von emotionalen Reaktionen auf Literatur [web installation]
accessed 14 March 2014。
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(267) William E. Connolly, Neuropolitics: Thinking, Culture, Speed (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002), 3.
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(268) Brian Massumi, “Introduction: Like a Thought”, in Massumi (ed.), A Shock to Thought
:Expression after Deleuze and Guattari (London: Routledge, 2002), xiii—xxxix, here xiii.
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(269) Brian Massumi, “Introduction: Like a Thought”, in Massumi (ed.), A Shock to Thought
:Expression after Deleuze and Guattari (London: Routledge, 2002), xv.
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(270) Seigworth, “Inventory of Shimmers”, 24，原文强调。
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(271) William E. Connolly, A World of Becoming (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2011), 150—151.
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(272) John Protevi, Political Affect: Connecting the Social and the Somatic , Posthumanities 7(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2009), 25.
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(273) Massumi, “Introduction”, xxxi，原文强调。关于马苏米对感情和情感的区分：“对于马苏米来说，情感是基本的、无意识的、非主观的或前主观的、非所指的、不受限制的和密集的；而感情是衍生的、有意识的、受限制的、有意义的，是一种可以归于一个已经构成的主体的‘内容’……或一种可以驯服并与该主体相称的‘内容’。主体被感情压倒，但他们拥有 自己的情感。”见Steven Shaviro, Post-Cinematic Affect (Winchester: Zero Books, 2009), 3，原文强调。
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(274) Connolly, World of Becoming , 23.
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(275) Connolly, World of Becoming , 24，原文强调。
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(276) Connolly, World of Becoming , 26.
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(277) 生机论者，或者更确切来说是新唯物主义的神经政治思想家简· 班纳特（Jane Bennett）思考了事物的能动性并得出了主要是政治学和生态学的结论，见Jane Bennett, Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010)；也见Andrew Barry,“ Materialist Politics: Metallurgy”, in Bruce Braun and Sarah J. Whatmore (eds.), Political Matter: Technoscience, Democracy, and Public Life (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010), 89—117; Gay Hawkins,“ Plastic Materialities”, in Braun and Whatmore (eds.), Political Matter , 119—138。
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(278) Connolly, World of Becoming , 54—55.
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(279) Connolly, World of Becoming , 90.
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(280) Connolly, World of Becoming , 145，原文强调。
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(281) Connolly, World of Becoming ., 91.
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(282) 其他的学科分支也回避了理性选择方法，因为它们缺乏情感—身体维度，见Gerd Gigerenzer Colin F. Camerer and Ernst Fehr, “When Does ‘Economic Man’ Dominate Social Behavior?”, Science , 311/5757 (2006), 47—52; G. Gigerenzer and R. Selten (eds.), Bounded Rationality: The Adaptive Toolbox (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001); Gerd Gigerenzer, Gut Feelings: The Intelligence of the Unconscious (New York: Viking, 2007)。从类似的角度探讨经济组织的社会学，见Helena Flam, Soziologie der Emotionen: Eine Einführung (Konstanz: UTB, 2002), 178, 187—188。
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(283) 在本杰明· 利贝特（Benjamin Libet）的实验中，实验对象被要求做一个小的身体动作，例如弯曲手指，并记录他们决定做这个身体动作的时间。同时用脑电图测量大脑活动。结果表明，负责运动的皮层区域（运动皮层）在做出有意识的决定和执行运动之前会“自我准备”；因此存在一个前意识的脑—体回路。这个实验被用来质疑自由意志理论和其他理论。对利贝特实验的批评见Daniel C. Dennett, Freedom Evolves (New York: Viking, 2003); Christine Zunke, Kritik der Hirnforschung: Neurophysiologie und Willensfreiheit (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2007), 110—128。
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(284) 见Leys, “The Turn to Affect”。
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