打字猴:1.70291092e+09
1702910920
1702910921 [494]Arch Puddington and Tyler Roylance,“Populists and Autocrats:The Dual Threatto Global Democracy,”in Freedom in the World,2017(Washington, DC:Freedom House,2017),p.4.也可参见Anxious Dictators, Wavering Democ-racies:Global Freedom under Pressure, Freedom House’s Annual Report on Politi-cal Rights and Civil Liberties(Washington, DC:Freedom House,2016);Larry Diamond and Marc F.Plattner, eds.,Democracy in Decline?(Baltimore:JohnsHopkins University Press,2015);Larry Diamond, Marc F.Plattner, and Chris-topher Walker, eds.,Authoritarianism Goes Global:The Challenge to Democracy(Baltimore:Johns Hopkins University Press,2016)。
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1702910923 [495]关于德国为什么有资格成为自由民主国家的精彩讨论,参见Christo-pher Layne,“Shell Games, Shallow Gains, and the Democratic Peace,”International History Review 23,no.4(December 2001):803—807。也可参见Ido Oren,“The Subjectivity of the‘Democratic’Peace:Changing U.S.Percep-tions of Imperial Germany,”International Security 20,no.2(Fall 1995):147—184。在1900年的英国,18%的人口被授予议会下院的投票权,而在德国,这个数字是22%。Niall Ferguson, Pity of War:Explaining World War I(New York:Basic Books,1999),p.29.甚至迈克尔·多伊尔也承认“帝国主义的德国是一个困难的案例”。Doyle,“Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs,”part 1,p.216.
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1702910925 [496]民主和平理论家排除了这个案例,要么是因为他们认为这两个南非国家没有充分独立于英国,要么是因为南非共和国不够民主。但这两方面都是错误的。这两个国家都明确确立了独立地位,即使英国不想授予它们完全的主权,并且尽管南非共和国确实将某些群体排除在投票权之外,但当时几乎所有其他民主国家都是如此。
1702910926
1702910927 [497]卡吉尔战争是一个没有争议的案例。美西战争是一个有争议的案例;克里斯托弗·莱恩(Christopher Layne)解释了为什么它应该被视为两个民主国家互相争斗的案例。Layne,“Shell Games,”p.802.
1702910928
1702910929 [498]例如,詹姆斯·李·雷(James Lee Ray)考察了20起被认为是民主国家之间交战的案例。参见James L.Ray, Democracy and International Conflict:An Evaluation of the Democratic Peace Proposition(Columbia:University of South Carolina Press,2009),chap.3。也可参见Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace, pp.16—23;Spencer R.Weart, Never at War:Why Democracies Will Not Fight One Another(New Haven, CT:Yale University Press,1998)。一个国家是不是“所谓的”民主国家取决于一个人如何定义民主,有时会受到观察者偏见的影响。Sarah S.Bush,“The Politics of Rating Freedom:Ideological Af-finity, Private Authority, and the Freedom in the World Ratings,”Perspectives on Politics 15,no.3(September 2017):711—731;Oren,“The Subjectivity of the‘Democratic’Peace.”
1702910930
1702910931 [499]军事化的冲突是指一国对另一国威胁、展示或使用军事力量,而不是战争(战斗死亡达1 000人)。布鲁斯·拉西特认为,尽管民主国家相互之间确实在进行军事化冲突,但它们这样做的频率比至少有一个争端国是非民主国家的情况要低。Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace, pp.20—21,72—93.他也许是对的,但关键是它们确实在互相斗争,即使这些冲突的致命性还不足以构成战争。
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1702910933 [500]Ray, Democracy and International Conflict, p.42.毫不惊奇,雷试图推翻每一个可能被视为民主国家相互斗争的案例。因此,他总结了关于这些案例的主要章节:“持怀疑态度的,甚至可能只是不感兴趣的读者可能会得出这样的结论,即对于民主国家从不进行国际战争的主张,表面上的大量例外情况会损害其可信度。‘如果有那么多的烟,肯定至少会有一点火’,这是可以理解的反应。”(第124页)
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1702910935 [501]Kant, Perpetual Peace, p.14.
1702910936
1702910937 [502]例如,参见Donald Kagan,“World War I, World War II, World War III,”Commentary, March 1987,pp.21—40。
1702910938
1702910939 [503]Chaim Kaufmann,“Threat Inflation and the Failure of the Marketplace of Ideas:The Selling of the Iraq War,”International Security 29,no.1(Summer 2004):5—48;Walter Lippmann, Public Opinion(New York:Harcourt, Brace,1922);John J.Mearsheimer, Why Leaders Lie:The Truth about Lying in Inter-national Politics(New York:Oxford University Press,2012);John M.Schuessler, Deceit on the Road to War:Presidents, Politics, and American De-mocracy(Ithaca, NY:Cornell University Press,2015);Marc Trachtenberg, The Craft of International History:A Guide to Method(Princeton, NJ:Princeton Uni-versity Press,2006),chap.4.
1702910940
1702910941 [504]例如,民族主义情绪在推动英国统治精英在1853年加入克里米亚战争中发挥了关键作用,尽管他们不愿意这样做。参见Gavin B.Henderson,“The Foreign Policy of Lord Palmerston,”History 22,no.88(March 1938):335—344;Kingsley Martin, The Triumph of Lord Palmerston:A Study of Public Opinion in England before the Crimean War(London:Allen&Unwin,1924),chap.2;Norman Rich, Why the Crimean War?A Cautionary Tale(Hanover, NH:University Press of New England,1985),pp.4,10。奥斯汀·卡森(Aus-tin Carson)指出,战争中的国家有时会巧妙地合作,将正在进行的战争的各个方面向公众隐藏起来,因为担心民众发现它们会助长民族主义情绪,从而导致不必要的升级。Carson,“Facing Off and Saving Face:Covert Intervention and Escalation Management in the Korean War,”International Organization 71,no.1(January 2016):103—131.关于民族主义和战争的紧密联系,参见Andreas Wimmer, Waves of War:Nationalism, State Formation, and Ethnic Exclusion in the Modern World(New York:Cambridge University Press,2013)。
1702910942
1702910943 [505]Jeff Carter and Glenn Palmer,“Regime Type and Interstate War Finance,”Foreign Policy Analysis 12,no.4(October 2016):695—719;Jonathan D.Caverley, Democratic Militarism:Voting, Wealth, and War(New York:Cambridge University Press,2014);Gustavo A.Flores-Macias and Sarah E.Kreps,“Borrowing Support for War:The Effect of War Finance on Public Atti-tudes toward Conflict,”Journal of Conflict Resolution 61,no.5(May 2017):997—1020;Matthew Fuhrmann and Michael C.Horowitz,“Droning On:Explai-ning the Proliferation of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles,”International Organization 71,no.2(April 2017):397—418;Benjamin A.Valentino, Paul K.Huth, and Sarah E.Croco,“Bear Any Burden?How Democracies Minimize the Costs of War,”Journal of Politics 72,no.2(April 2010):528—544;Rosella Cappella Zielinski, How States Pay for Wars(Ithaca, NY:Cornell University Press,2016).
1702910944
1702910945 [506]关于观众成本的代表作包括James D.Fearon,“Domestic Political Au-diences and the Escalation of International Disputes,”American Political Science Review 88,no.3(September 1994):577—592;James D.Fearon,“Signaling Foreign Policy Interests:Tying Hands versus Sinking Costs,”Journal of Conflict Resolution 41,no.1(February 1997):68—90;Kenneth Schultz, Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy(New York:Cambridge University Press,2001)。也可参见Matthew Baum,“Going Private:Public Opinion, Presidential Rhetoric, and the Domestic Politics of Audience Costs in U.S.Foreign Policy Crises,”Internation-al Studies Quarterly 48,no.5(October 2004):603—631;Charles Lipson, Relia-ble Partners:How Democracies Have Made a Separate Peace(Princeton, NJ:Princeton University Press,2003);Alastair Smith,“International Crises and Do-mestic Politics,”American Political Science Review 92,no.3(September 1998):623—638。
1702910946
1702910947 [507]关于观众成本的主要批评包括Alexander B.Downes and Todd S.Sech-ser,“The Illusion of Democratic Credibility,”International Organization 66,no.3(July 2012):457—489;Jack Snyder and Erica D.Borghard,“The Cost of Emp-ty Threats:A Penny, Not a Pound,”American Political Science Review 105,no.3(August 2011):437—456;Marc Trachtenberg,“Audience Costs:An Historical Analysis,”Security Studies 21,no.1(January 2012):3—42。也可参见Bronw-yn Lewis,“Nixon, Vietnam, and Audience Costs,”H-Diplo/ISSF Forum, no.3(November 7,2014),pp.42—69;Marc Trachtenberg,“Kennedy, Vietnam, and Audience Costs,”H-Diplo/ISSF Forum, no.3(November 7,2014),pp.6—42。
1702910948
1702910949 [508]我讨论了民主和平的三种主要的制度解释。塞巴斯蒂安·罗萨托指出了另外三个值得一提的解释,尽管没有一个能提供令人信服的因果叙事。第一,民主国家的领导人被认为比威权国家的领导人更谨慎,因为前者对公众更负责,因此如果他们输掉一场战争,将承受更大的代价。罗萨托利用海因·戈曼斯(Hein Goemans)和其他人的研究成果表明,当两种领导人使自己的国家卷入一场失败的战争时,他们付出的代价大致相同。第二,反战利益集团在民主国家的领导人致力于战争的道路上设置了重大障碍。然而,几乎没有证据表明,反战集团比亲战集团更有可能影响自由民主国家的决策者。另外,威权领导人有强烈的动机不发动战争,因为他们通常代表人口的一小部分,而参战通常会释放力量,赋予其他部分人口(如果不是大多数人口)权力,所有这些都可能威胁威权领导人的统治。第三,民主国家被认为不能发动突然袭击,因为他们的决策过程是如此透明。正如罗萨托所指出的,1956年的苏伊士运河战争表明了这一点并非真的:三个民主国家(英国、法国和以色列)计划对埃及发动协调一致的攻击,这不仅让埃及感到意外,也让美国感到意外。而且,大多数战争并不是以突然袭击开始的。Sebastian Rosato,“The Flawed Logic of Democratic Peace Theory,”American Political Science Review 97,no.4(No-vember 2003):585—602.
1702910950
1702910951 [509]约翰·欧文写道:“我发现,民主结构几乎与阻止国家开战一样有可能驱使国家开战。”Owen,“How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace,”p.91.也可参见Bruce Russett, Controlling the Sword:The Democratic Governance of National Security(Cambridge, MA:Harvard University Press,1990),p.124。
1702910952
1702910953 [510]Russett, Controlling the Sword, p.124.也可参见William J.Dixon,“Democracy and Peaceful Settlement of International Settlement,”American Po-litical Science Review 88,no.1(March 1994):14—32;Zeev Maoz and Bruce Russett,“Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace,1946—1986,”American Political Science Review 87,no.3(September 1993):624—638;Rus-sett, Grasping the Democratic Peace;Weart, Never at War。
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1702910955 [511]Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace, p.33.
1702910956
1702910957 [512]Doyle,“Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs,”part 1,p.213.
1702910958
1702910959 [513]Doyle,“Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs,”part 1,p.213.
1702910960
1702910961 [514]Owen,“How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace,”p.89.
1702910962
1702910963 [515]Stephen Van Evera,“American Intervention in the Third World:Less Would Be Better,”Security Studies 1,no.1(August 1991):1—24.
1702910964
1702910965 [516]John B.Judis,“Clueless in Gaza:New Evidence That Bush Under-mined a Two-State Solution,”New Republic, February 18,2013;David Rose,“The Gaza Bombshell,”Vanity Fair, March 3,2008;Graham Usher,“The Democratic Resistance:Hamas, Fatah, and the Palestinian Elections,”Journal of Palestine Studies 35,no.3(Spring 2006):20—36.
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1702910967 [517]Rosato,“The Flawed Logic of Democratic Peace Theory,”p.591.罗萨托指出,美国政府在世界各地进行秘密干预的一个原因是,它试图对自己的公众隐瞒这种干预。林赛·奥罗克提出了同样的观点,Lindsey O’Rourke, Covert Regime Change:America’s Secret Cold War(Ithaca, NY:Cornell Univer-sity Press,2018)。
1702910968
1702910969 [518]Christopher Layne,“Kant or Cant:The Myth of the Democratic Peace,”International Security 19,no.2(Fall 1994):5—49.
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