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[549]这里的重点是研究自由主义对制度的看法。还有一个关于制度的单独的建构主义叙事,这不在本研究的范围内。参见John J.Mearsheimer,“The False Promise of International Institutions,”International Security 19,no.3(Win-ter 1994/1995):5—49。
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[550]Charles Lipson,“Is the Future of Collective Security Like the Past?”in Collective Security beyond the Cold War, ed.George W.Downs(Ann Arbor:U-niversity of Michigan Press,1994),p.114.
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[551]制度和机制没有区别这一事实反映在Stephen D.Krasner,“Structural Causes and Regime Consequences:Regimes as Intervening Variables,”in“Inter-national Regimes,”ed.Stephen D.Krasner, special issue, International Organi-zation 36,no.2(Spring 1982):185—205。
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[552]Robert O.Keohane, After Hegemony:Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy(Princeton, NJ:Princeton University Press,1984).
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[553]例如,参见Helga Haftendorn, Robert O.Keohane, and Celeste A.Wallander, eds.,Imperfect Unions:Security Institutions over Time and Space(New York:Oxford University Press,1999);Celeste A.Wallander, Mortal Friends, Best Enemies:German-Russian Cooperation after the Cold War(Ithaca, NY:Cornell University Press,1999);Seth Weinberger,“Institutional Signaling and the Origins of the Cold War,”Security Studies 12,no.4(Summer 2003):80—115。
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[554]例如,参见Robert Axelrod and Robert O.Keohane,“Achieving Coop-eration under Anarchy:Strategies and Institutions,”World Politics 38,no.1(Oc-tober1985):226—254;Charles Lipson,“International Cooperation in Economic and Security Affairs,”World Politics 37,no.1(October 1984):1—23;Lisa L.Martin,“Institutions and Cooperation:Sanctions during the Falkland Islands Conflict,”International Security 16,no.4(Spring 1992):143—178;Lisa L.Martin, Coercive Cooperation:Explaining Multilateral Economic Sanctions(Prin-ceton, NJ:Princeton University Press,1992);Kenneth A.Oye,“Explaining Cooperation under Anarchy:Hypotheses and Strategies,”World Politics 38,no.1(October 1985):1—24;Arthur A.Stein, Why Nations Cooperate:Circumstance and Choice in International Relations(Ithaca, NY:Cornell University Press,1990)。
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[555]参见Haftendorn, Keohane, and Wallander, Imperfect Unions;Krasner,“Structural Causes and Regime Consequences,”p.192;Robert Jervis,“Security Regimes,”in Krasner,“International Regimes,”special issue, International Or-ganization, pp.357—378;Wallander, Mortal Friends, Best Enemies, pp.5,20,22。
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[556]Lipson,“International Cooperation in Economic and Security Affairs,”pp.2,12.也可参见Axelrod and Keohane,“Achieving Cooperation under Anar-chy,”pp.232—233;Keohane, After Hegemony, pp.39—41。
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[557]Lipson,“International Cooperation in Economic and Security Affairs,”p.18.
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[558]Keohane, After Hegemony, pp.6—7.
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[559]G.John Ikenberry, After Victory:Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars(Princeton, NJ:Princeton University Press,2001).也可参见G.John Ikenberry, Liberal Leviathan:The Origins, Cri-sis, and Transformation of the American World Order(Princeton, NJ:Princeton University Press,2012)。
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[560]Ikenberry, After Victory, p.xiii;Keohane, After Hegemony, p.16.
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[561]Haftendorn, Keohane, and Wallander, Imperfect Unions, p.1.他们在结论中提出了适度的主张:“这本书认为制度理论可以阐明安全问题”(第326页)。沃兰德(Wallander)专注于德俄关系,他在《不共戴天的朋友,最为交好的敌人》(Mortal Friends, Best Enemies)一书中总结:“权力和利益仍然是德国和俄罗斯安全计算的核心”第6页。
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[562]合作的另一个主要障碍是相对收益的考虑,我在此没有提到,主要是因为篇幅限制。我对此问题的看法参见Mearsheimer,“The False Promise of International Institutions,”pp.9—26。
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[563]我们谈论的是自我约束,几乎每个自由主义者都知道,自我约束在一个国家内部是行不通的,这也解释了为什么需要一个有强制力的国家。那么,为什么会有人期望它在国际层次上发挥作用呢?
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[564]其他案例包括格林纳达(1983年)、巴拿马(1989年)和利比亚(2011年)。
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[565]Jan-Werner Muller,“Rule-Breaking,”London Review of Books, August 27,2015;Sebastian Rosato,“Europe’s Troubles:Power Politics and the State of the European Project,”International Security 35,no.4(Spring 2011):72—77.
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[566]以下这篇文献清楚地表达了这一点,参见Lipson,“International Coop-eration in Economic and Security Affairs,”especially pp.12—18。本段中后续的引用来自以上文献。也可参见Axelrod and Keohane,“Achieving Coopera-tion under Anarchy,”pp.232—233。
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[567]约翰·罗尔斯和迈克尔·沃尔泽等学者都意识到自由主义理论中蕴含着十字军的冲动,并不遗余力地反对为了使世界变得更好而使用武力。参见Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars:A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations(New York:Basic Books,2007);John Rawls, The Law of Peoples:With“The Idea of Public Reason Revisited”(Cambridge, MA:Harvard Universi-ty Press,1999)。对沃尔泽观点的讨论指出,通过发动战争在世界范围内传播自由民主与正义战争理论是相矛盾的,正义战争理论涉及的是将进攻性战争排除在外,除非是在高度限制性的情况下,这些情况不包括促进民主。然而,在实践中,对于强大的自由民主国家而言,为了使世界变得更好而抵制使用武力的冲动是特别困难的。
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[568]E.H.Carr, The Twenty Years’Crisis:An Introduction to the Study of In-ternational Relations,2nd ed.(London:Macmillan,1962);Robert Gilpin,“Nobody Loves a Political Realist,”Security Studies 5,no.3(Spring 1996):3—26;John J.Mearsheimer,“E.H.Carr vs.Idealism:The Battle Rages On,”In-ternational Relations 19,no.2(June 2005):139—152;Mearsheimer,“The Mo-res Isms the Better,”International Relations 19,no.3(September 2005):354—359.
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[569]Valerie Morkevicˇius,“Power and Order:The Shared Logics of Realism and Just War Theory,”International Studies Quarterly 59,no.1(March 2015):11.也可参见Valerie Morkevicˇius, Realist Ethics:Just War Traditions as Power Politics(New York:Cambridge University Press,2018)。
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[570]Charles L.Glaser,“Realists as Optimists:Cooperation as Self-Help,”In-ternational Security 19,no.3(Winter 1994/95):50—90.也可参见Charles L.Glaser, Rational Theory of International Politics:The Logic of Competition and Cooperation(Princeton, NJ:Princeton University Press,2010)。
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[571]Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire:Domestic Politics and International Ambi-tion(Ithaca, NY:Cornell University Press,1993);Stephen Van Evera, Causes of War:Power and the Roots of Conflict(Ithaca, NY:Cornell University Press,1999);Kenneth N.Waltz, Theory of International Politics(Reading, MA:Ad-dison-Wesley,1979).
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[572]Sebastian Rosato and John Schuessler,“A Realist Foreign Policy for the United States,”Perspectives on Politics 9,no.4(December 2011):812.他们还写道:“现实主义正如我们想象的那样,它提供了无战争的安全可能(p.804)。”
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[573]这段中的引用出自Marc Trachtenberg,“The Question of Realism:An Historian’s View,”Security Studies 13,no.1(Fall 2003):159—160,167,194。也可参见Michael C.Desch,“It’s Kind to Be Cruel:The Humanity of American Realism,”Review of International Studies 29,no.3(July 2003):415—426。
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