打字猴:1.70320243e+09
1703202430 [85] 张燕宇:《集团利益和制度非中性》,《改革》,1994.2。
1703202431
1703202432 [86] 柯武刚、史漫飞:《制度经济学:社会秩序与公共政策》,商务印书馆,2000:93~94。
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1703202434 [87] 奥尔森:《集体行动的逻辑》,上海三联书店、上海人民出版社,1995:70。
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1703202436 [88] 奥尔森:《集体行动的逻辑》,上海三联书店、上海人民出版社,1995:29。遗憾的是,陈郁等翻译成了“因此在抱有共同利益的小集团中,存在着少数‘剥削’多数的令人吃惊的倾向”。从数量上来说刚好相反,因为“(提供的集体物品数量)小的成员”数量大而“(提供最大数量的集体物品)大的成员”数量小。原文为“The largest member,the member who would on his own provide the largest amount of the collective good,bears a disproportionate share of the burden of providing the collective good.The smaller member by definition gets a smaller fraction of the benefit of any amount of the collective good he provides than a larger member,and therefore has less incentive to provide additional amounts of the collective good.Once a smaller member has the amount of the collective good he gets free from the largest member,he has more than he would have purchased for himself,and has no incentive to obtain any of the collective good at his own expense.In small groups with common interests there is accordingly a surprising tendency for the ‘exploitation’ of the great by the small.” Mancur Olson.A Theory of Groups and Organizations:Public Goods and the Theory of Groups.Harvard University Press.Cambridge.Massachusetts.London.England.1965.35。蒋文能(《搭便车、集体行动与国家兴衰:奥尔森集体行动理论述评》,《学术论坛》,2009.11)没有发现是翻译上造成的问题,而继续着“被众多学者以集团大小的区分缺乏严密性为由来加以批判”。
1703202437
1703202438 [89] J.M.布坎南、R.E.瓦格纳:《赤字中的民主:凯恩斯勋爵的政治遗产》,北京经济学院出版社,1988。
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1703202440 [90] 张曙光:《制度·主体·行为》,中国财政经济出版社,1999:135~137。
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1703202442 [91] A.A.斯密德:《财产、权力和公共选择:对法和经济学的进一步思考》,上海三联书店、上海人民出版社,1999:27~28。
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1703202444 [92] D.C.诺思:《经济史中的结构与变迁》,上海三联书店、上海人民出版社,1994:62~62。
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1703202446 [93] A.A.斯密德:《财产、权力和公共选择:对法和经济学的进一步思考》,上海三联书店、上海人民出版社,1999:13。
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1703202448 [94] 汪丁丁、罗卫东、叶航:《人类合作秩序的起源与演化》,《社会科学战线》,2005.4。
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1703202450 [95] 奥尔森:《集体行动的逻辑》,上海三联书店、上海人民出版社,1995:18。
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1703202452 [96] 汪丁丁、罗卫东、叶航:《人类合作秩序的起源与演化》,《社会科学战线》,2005.4。
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1703202454 [97] B.Samuel,G.Herbert,The Evolution of strong Reciprocity:Cooperation in Heterogeneous Populations,Theoretical Population Biology.2004.65.
1703202455
1703202456 [98] 奥尔森:《集体行动的逻辑》,上海三联书店、上海人民出版社,1995:2。
1703202457
1703202458 [99] D.C.诺思:《经济史中的结构与变迁》,上海三联书店、上海人民出版社,1994:18、19。
1703202459
1703202460 [100] 奥尔森:《集体行动的逻辑》,上海三联书店、上海人民出版社,1995:3、4、29。
1703202461
1703202462 [101] 夏勇:《人权概念起源》,中国政法大学出版社,1992:22。
1703202463
1703202464 [102] D.C.诺思:《经济史中的结构与变迁》,上海三联书店、上海人民出版社,1994:89。
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1703202466 [103] S.N.S.Cheung,The Structure of a Contract and Theory of a Non-Exclusive Resource.Journal of Low and Economics.XIII.1970.
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1703202468 [104] 夏勇:《人权概念起源》,中国政法大学出版社,1992:19。
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1703202470 [105] S.M.Parlman,An Optimum Diet Model,Coast Variability,and Hunter-Gatherer Behavior.Advance in Archaeological Method and Theory,1980.3:257-310.
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1703202472 [106] 潘纪一:《人口生态学》,复旦大学出版社,1988,53~54。
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1703202474 [107] R.L.Bettinger,Explanation/Predictive Models of Hunter-Gatherer Adaptation.Advance in Archaeological Method and Theory,1980.3:P189-255.但L.S.斯塔夫里阿诺思(《远古以来的人类生命线》,中国社会科学出版社,1992:51)的估算,原始狩猎采集时期每平方英里大约能养活1人即每平方公里0.4人。
1703202475
1703202476 [108] R.W.Firth.Primitive Polynesian Economy.London:Routledge &.Kegan Paul,1939.
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1703202478 [109] D.C.诺思:《经济史中的结构与变迁》,上海三联书店、上海人民出版社,1994:93,90,94。
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