打字猴:1.70327626e+09
1703276260 [251]Brader,2006,especially pp.96—103,pp.140—143.
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1703276262 [252]对此研究的讨论和总结,参见Darren Schreiber,“Political Cognition as Social Cognition: Are We All Political Sophisticates?” in Neuman et. al.,eds.,2007,pp.48—70。
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1703276264 [253]Brader,2006,pp.142—143.
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1703276266 [254]对施赖伯这样解释这项发现的一个批评大概是这样的,政治老手虽然并没有表现出“无心的对反射性的依赖”,但他们“处理信息的方式,更依赖于自我相关的评判而不是抽象的联系”。参见Michael L. Spezio and Ralph Adolphs,“Emotional Processing and Political Judgment: Toward Integrating Political Psychology and Decision Neuroscience”,in Neuman et. al.,eds.,2007,pp.71—95. p.78。
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1703276268 [255]G. E. Moore,Principia Ethica(1903). Edited with an introduction by Thomas Baldwin. New York: Cambridge University Press,1993.
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1703276270 [256]对感情主义的元伦理学的经典陈述,参见Alfred Jules Ayer,Language,Truth and Logic(1936). New York: Dover,1952,Ch. 6(pp.102—119);Charles L. Stevenson,Ethics and Language. New Haven,Conn.: Yale University Press,1944/1960。关于启蒙情感主义的分析元伦理学的研究一直延续到今天,而且这样研究所达到的概念上的成熟性是史蒂文森和艾耶尔所无法预见的。也许其中最杰出的研究是 Allan Gibbard,Wise Choices,Apt Feelings: A Theory of Normative Judgment. Cambridge,Mass.: Harvard University Press,1990。
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1703276272 [257]参见Kwame Anthony Appiah,Experiments in Ethics. Cambridge,Mass.: Harvard University Press,2008,especially pp.5—28。实验哲学的宣言,以及一些最近的论文,参见Joshua Knobe and Shaun Nichols,eds.,Experimental Philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press,2008。
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1703276274 [258]例见Blackburn,2000;Michael Slote,Morals from Motives. New York: Oxford University Press,2001;Shaun Nichols,Sentimental Rules: On the Natural Foundations of Moral Judgment. New York: Oxford University Press,2004;Slote,The Ethics of Care and Empathy. New York: Routledge,2007;以及Prinz,2007。
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1703276276 [259]相对比较新的,为一般读者所写的一本关于情感主义正义理论的书,参见Robert C. Solomon,A Passion for Justice: Emotion and the Origins of the Social Contract. Lanham,Md.: Rowman & Littlefield,1995。
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1703276278 [260]Walter Sinnott-Armstrong,“Framing Moral Intuitions”,in Sinnott-Armstrong,ed.,2008,Volume 2,pp.47—76,pp.50—51。类似的观点,参见Joshua D. Greene,“The Secret Joke of Kant’s Soul”,in Ibid,Volume 3,pp.35—80,p.67;Greene,“From Neural ‘Is’ to Moral ‘Ought’: What are the Moral Implications of Neuroscientific Moral Psychology?” Nature Reviews Neuroscience 4(2003),pp.848—850。值得注意的是,现在的情感主义者常常在面对描述性道德心理学的时候,带上的是休谟主义的面具。而当问题变成了这种描述性心理学对道德的规范权威性论证时,就都变成了尼采主义的普遍道德的揭露和批判者,比如,Prinz,2007。
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1703276280 [261]最初且最有名的研究是J. D. Greene,R. B. Somerville,L. E. Nystrom,J. M. Darley,J. D. Cohen. “An fMRI Study of Emotional Engagement in Moral Judgment”,Science 293(2001),pp.2105—2108。
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1703276282 [262]例见M. Koenigs,L. Young,R. Adolphs,D. Tranel,F. Cushman,M. Hanser and A. Damasio,“Damage to the Prefrontal Cortex Increases Utilitarian Moral Judgments”,Nature 446(2007),pp.908—911。
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1703276284 [263]Shaun Nichols and Joshua Knobe,“Moral Responsibility and Determinism: The Cognitive Science of Folk Intuitions”,in Knobe and Nichols,eds.,2008,pp.105—128。
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1703276286 [264]Greene(2008、2006)得出了类似的结论。
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1703276288 [265]参见Mark Timmons,“Toward a Sentimentalist Deontology”,in Sinnott-Armstron,ed.,2008,Volume 3,pp.93—104。Nichols and Knobe,2008,也提出了一个“情感能力模式”(affective competence model)在这个模式中一个判断的情感来源并不能证明其无用或错误。另一个情感主义对义务论的辩护,参见Slote,2007,ch. 3,pp.42—54。
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1703276290 [266]对“情感操纵”的恐惧确实是广泛存在的,参见Brader,2006,pp.35—38。
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1703276292 [267]参见Jürgen Habermas,The Theory of Communicative Action Volume I: Reason and the Rationalization of Society. Translated by Thomas McCarthy. Boston: Beacon Press,1981,p.295;强调部分为原文所加。
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1703276294 [268]Danielle S. Allen,Talking to Strangers: Anxieties of Citizenship Since Brown v. Board of Education. Chicago: University of Chicago Press,2004,p.55.
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1703276296 [269]Habermas,Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action. Translated by Christian Lernhardt and Sherry Weber Nicholson. Cambridge: MIT Press,1996,p.202,182。这些哈贝马斯理论中关于在审议中,认知和感情元素的引言来自Krause,“Desiring Justice: Motivation and Justification in Rawls and Habermas”,Contemporary Political Theory 4(2005),pp.363–85,especially pp.374—377。也参见Krause,2008,pp.37—47。
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1703276298 [270]参见Mark E. Warren,“The Self in Discursive Democracy”,in Stephen K. White,ed.,The Cambridge Companion to Habermas. New York: Cambridge University Press,1995,pp.167—200,p.181。
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1703276300 [271]任何关于民主审议的论文集,都给这样的立场提供了大量证据,大部分今天的审议民主支持者都持这样的观点。《民主与差异》一书的编者塞拉·本哈比就表达了其赞许之词,谈到合适的审议制度保护了决策过程不受感情偏私性影响(p.72)。约书亚·科恩则坚持认为只有在理性的论证广泛流行的时候审议才可能存在(p.100)。艾丽斯·扬批评托马斯·斯普拉根斯,认为合适的审议必须“不被非理性玷污”(p.130)。参见Seyla Benhabib,ed.,Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political. Princeton,N.J.: Princeton University Press,1996。
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1703276302 [272]Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson,Why Deliberative Democracy? Princeton,N.J.: Princeton University Press,2004,pp.50—51.
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1703276304 [273]John S. Dryzek,Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals,Critics,Contestations. New York: Oxford University Press,2000,especially pp.52—53,p.167.
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1703276306 [274]Allen,2004,especially pp.58—59,pp.140—160。另一个亚里斯多德主义的对修辞的辩护,参见Bryan Garsten,Saving Persuasion: A Defense of Rhetoric and Judgment. Cambridge,Mass.: Harvard University Press,2006。
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1703276308 [275]一个值得一提的例外,参见Krause,2008,especially pp.142—174.
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