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[336]孟德斯鸠也有相反的陈述,公民可以是自由的,而政体是不自由的:儒雅的专制政体在一定时间内有这种可能。
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[337]《论法的精神》XII.4中破坏宗教、风俗和安宁的罪名,与I.1中上帝、哲学家和立法者的法律相符。列入第四款的安全是孟德斯鸠的贡献。
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[338]见《论法的精神》V. 16有关君主政体和专制政体的“权力转移”的讨论。安全作为一项原则是“君主政体的”,因为它保留的权力要多于它的权力;它保持自己的尊严,不受言论或思想的侵犯(XII.11,12)。
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[339]见Manent,Montesquieu’s Philosophy of Liberalism,pp.133—136。
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[340]Machiavelli,Discourses on Livy,I.4—8;Mansfield,Machiavelli’s New Modes and Orders,ad loc.
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[341]Athanasios Moulakis,“Leonardo Bruni’s Constitution of Florence”, Rinascimento XXVI (1986),153.
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九 执行权的共和化
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[342]Max Farrand,ed.,The Records of the Federal Convertion of 1787,4 vols.,rev. ed. (New Haven,CT:Yale University Press,1966),I.66,II.35;Ruth and Stephen Grant,“The Madisonian Presidency,” in J. Bessette and J. Tulis,eds.,The Presidency in the Constitutional Order (Baton Rouge,LA:Louisana State University Press,1981),pp.31,60n. 参见Jeffrey L. Sedgwick,“James Madison and the Problem of Executive Character”, Polity,XXI (1988),pp.11—13。
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[343]一位历史学家对该问题的详细讨论,见Jack N. Rakove,“The Great Compromise:Ideas,Interests and the Politics of Constitution-Making”, The William and Mary Quarterly,XLIV (1987),424—427。
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[344]William T. Hutchinson et al.,eds.,The Papers of James Madison (Chicago and Charlottesville,VA:University of Chicago Press and University of Virginia Press,1962— ),X.208—209;Farrand,Records,I.138—139. 有关这种困境的文献见Philip B. Kurland and Ralph Lerner,The Founders’ Constitution,5 vols. (Chicago:University of Chicago Press,1987),I.147—183,250—251,301—335;III.486—534; Ralph Ketcham,Presidents Above Party (Chapel Hill,NC:University of North Carolina Press,1984),pp.5—8。
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[345]迟至1787年8月24日,制宪会议才就国会选举总统一事进行表决。Farrand,Records I.21,64—69;II.500—503,572—575.
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[346]另见汉密尔顿在制宪会议的评论,Farrand,Records,I.289,310;Harold G. Syrett,ed.,The Papers of Alexander Hamilton,26 vols. (New York:Columbia University Press,1962),IV.186。
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[347]Charles C. Thach,Jr.,The Creation of the Presidency,1775—1789 (rev. ed.,Baltimore:Johns Hopkins University Press,1969),chs.1—3;Gordon S. Wood,The Creation of the American Republic,1776—1787 (Chapel Hill,NC:Univeristy of North Carolina Press,1969),pp.134—143,432—436;Forrest McDonald,Novus Ordo Seclorum;The Intellectual Origins of the Constitution (Lawrence,KS:University Press of Kansas,1985),pp.86,176—183.
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[348]1786年12月14日杰伊致杰斐逊函,见The Correspondence and Public Papers of John Jay,Hugh Johnston ed.,4 vols.(New York:G. P. Putnam,1890—1893),III.223。另见1787年3月19日麦迪逊致杰斐逊函,Papers IX.319—321;以及Federalist 64。这里我要感谢塔可夫。麦迪逊对弗吉尼亚宪法中的软弱的执行官,也持严厉批评的态度;见他致华莱士函,Papers,VIII.352:“我们的执行部门是一部坏宪法中最坏的成分。”Papers VIII.352。
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[349]见Murray Dry,“Anti-Federalism in the Federalist”, in Charles R. Kesler,ed.,Saving the Revolution (New York:Free Press,1987),p.55。
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[350]Gerald Stourzh,Alexander Hamilton and the Idea of Republican Government (Stanford,CA:Stanford University Press,1970),p.96;Gwyn,Meaning of the Separation of Powers,p.22.
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[351]参见Thach,Creation of the Presidency,pp.18,27,52—54;他无视共和理论和美国共和主义对这一创设的作用。因此,他虽然强调这个过程及其结果的美国特性,对它作为一项成就却估计不足。
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[352]这种良性的马基雅维里主义的另一个例子,见Walter Moyle,An Essay upon the Constitution of the Roman Government (c.1699),in C. Robbins,ed.,Two English Republican Tracts (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1969),pp.253—254。 另见Isaac Kramnick,Bolingbroke and His Circle (Cambridge,MA:Harvard University Press,1968),pp.236—260。
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[353]指《纽约报》(New York Journal)中的“卡托”,见Herbert J. Storing,ed.,The Complete Anti-Federalist,7 vols. (Chicago:University of Chicago Press,1981),2.6.37。
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[354]Farrand,Records I.66;它得到了本杰明·富兰克林(I.83)和威廉·帕特森(I.287)的同意;被威尔逊否定(I.66)。见McDonald,Novus Ordo,pp.201—203。
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[355]Storing,ed.,The Complete Anti-Federalist,2.4.86.
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[356]Storing,ed.,The Complete Anti-Federalist,2.6.31,5.11.6;另见“一个老辉格党人”,3.3.31;“无党派的评判者”,5.14.40;“科尼利乌斯”,4.10.21;“乡下人”,6.6.28。Gordon S. Wood,Creation of the American Republic,pp.521,561.
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[357]Storing,ed.,The Complete Anti-Federalist,5.10.4.
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[358]同上,2.8.178. 参见斯多林在注102的评论,以及他为Thach,Creation of the Presidency一书所作的序(pp.ix—x)。斯多林指出,在需要皇室的威严这一点上,布莱克斯通也有类似的语言;Blackstone,Commentaries on the Law of England,4 vols.,5th ed. (Oxford:Clarendon Press,1773),I.241。 但是,布莱克斯通不同于“联邦派的农场主”,他不是共和主义者。布莱克斯通的立场后来又见于Jean De Lolme,The Constitution of England (1775),Bk II,ch.2。
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[359]托马斯·潘恩在《论人权》(1792)第二部分同时持这两种观点。他说,“我要让那些廷臣去解释,把君权称为执行权是什么意思。”但几页之后,他又对美国宪法中的总统制表示赞同。Thomas Paine,Rights of Man (Baltimore,MD:Penguin Books,1969),pp.221,226。
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