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[9]同上。
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[10]John Geanakoplos,“Solving the Present Crisis and Managing the Leverage Cycle,” FRBNY Economic Policy Review 16,no.1 (August 2010).
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[11]Christopher Mayer,Edward Morrison,and Tomasz Piskorski,“A New Proposal for Loan Modifications,” Yale Journal on Regulation 26,no.2 (2009).
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[12]Sumit Agarwal,Gene Amromin,Itzhak BenDavid,Souphala Chomsisengphet,Tomasz Piskorski,and Amit Seru,“Policy Intervention in Debt Renegotiation
:Evidence from the Home Affordable Modification Program” (working paper,University of Chicago Booth School of Business,2012).
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[13]Tomasz Piskorski,Amit Seru,and Vikrant Vig,“Securitization and Distressed Loan Renegotiation
:Evidence from the Subprime Mortgage Crisis,” Journal of Financial Economics 97 (2010)
:369-97.
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[14]Sumit Agarwal,Gene Amromin,Itzhak BenDavid,Souphala Chomsisengphet,and Douglas Evanoff ,“MarketBased Loss Mitigation Practices for Troubled Mortgages Following the Financial Crisis,” (working paper,SSRN,October 2010).
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[15]研究由Christopher Mayer、Edward Morrison、Tomasz Piskorski和Arpit Gupta完成,“Mortgage Modification and Strategic Behavior
:Evidence from a Legal Settlement with Countrywide” (working paper no.17065,NBER,May 2011),本文支持了对这些策略性违约的担忧。
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[16]See Jesse Eisenger,“Fannie and Freddie
:Slashing Mortgages Is Good Business,”ProPublica,March 23,2012,http://www.propublica.org/article/fannieandfreddieslashingmortgagesisgoodbusiness.
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[17]See Ben Hallman,“Ed DeMarco,Top Housing Official,Defied White House;Geithner Fires Back,” Huffington Post,July 31,2012,http://www.huffi ngtonpost.com/2012/07/31/eddemarcoprincipalreduction_n_1724880.html.
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[18]Annie Lowrey,“White House Urged to Fire a Housing Regulator,” New York Times,March 17,2013.
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[19]参见与《下一轮新政》的作者Mike Konczal的访谈:http://www.nextnewdeal.net/rortybomb/postdebateinterviewglennhubbardhousingpolicy。
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[20]人们通常认为当出现名义黏性时,由于总需求的外部性,金融市场的结果可能是无效率的。参见Emmanuel Farhi and Ivan Werning,“On the Inefficiency of Financial Market Equilibria in Macroeconomic Models with Nominal Rigidities” (working paper,Harvard University,2013)。正如该文所示,我们所建议的转移支付就是有意义的。
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[21]例如,一种常见的反驳观点认为:有7500亿美元资不抵债的住房抵押贷款债务。即使给了负债家庭7500亿美元,他们也可能每1美元只花0.1美元,总支出仅有750亿美元,这相对于GDP总量来说很小。然而,这种测算完全忽略了止赎对房价的连锁影响,以及对就业的连锁影响,就像我们在第5章所解释的,这些影响是非常大的。
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[22]Martin Feldstein,“How to Stop the Drop in Home Values,” New York Times,October 12,2011.
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[23]Goldfarb,“Why Housing Is Still Hindering the Recovery.”
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[24]Craig Torres,“Household Debt Restructuring in U.S.Would Stimulate Growth,Reinhart Says,” Bloomberg,August 5,2011.
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[25]Murray N.Rothbard,The Panic of 1819
:Reactions and Policies (New York
:Columbia University Press,1962),7.
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[26]Patrick Bolton and Howard Rosenthal,“Political Intervention in Debt Contracts,”Journal of Political Economy 110 (2002)
:1103-34.
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[27]Rothbard,Panic of 1819,24.
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[28]Bolton and Rosenthal,“Political Intervention.”
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[29]Rothbard,Panic of 1819.
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[30]同上。
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[31]同上,第28页。
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[32]Price Fishback,Jonathan Rose,and Kenneth Snowden,Well Worth Saving
:How the New Deal Safeguarded Home Ownership (Chicago
:University of Chicago Press,2013).
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[33]同上。
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