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2.Minetaki and Motohashi, “Subcontracting Structure.”
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3.Arora, Branstetter, and Drev, “Going Soft.”
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4.Baba, Takai, and Mizuta, “User-Driven Evolution.”
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5.U.S.Congress, O.ce of Technology Assessment, “The Big Picture: HDTV and High Resolution Systems,” OTA-BP-CIT-64 (Washington, DC: U.S.Government Printing O.ce, June 1990); Charles P.Lecht, “Tsunami,” Computerworld, February 13, 1978.
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6.Bob Johnstone,“Japan Tackles Its Software Crisis,” New Scientist, January 30, 1986, pp..60–62.
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7.Baba et al., “User-Driven Evolution.” See also Minetaki and Motohashi, “Subcontracting Structure,” table 2, with 136 of 439 firms listed as independent.
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8.Ussfilman, “Unbundling IBM.”
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9.With personal computers, it might have been possible to adopt U.S.standards (MSDOS, Wintel).The dominant firms, however, had an interest in maintaining proprietary versions of their operating systems even when they imported MSDOS.Microsoft’s software needed to be adapted to the Japanese language, and this work was done differently by different vendors.Additionally, Japan did not have strong copyright enforcement until 1986, making foreign software vendors reluctant to export.Of course, copyright posed no obstacle to computer vendors who bundled proprietary software with their hardware.
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10.Cottrell, “Standards and the Arrested Development.”
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11.Chesbrough, “Organizational Impact”; Lynskey, “Determinants.”
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12.Eichengreen, Park, and Shin, “Growth Slowdowns Redux.”
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13.David, “Learning by Doing”; Bils, “Tariff Protection”; Temin, Iron and Steel, pp..173–174 and.209–213.
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14.Chandler, Scale and Scope.
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15.Freeman, Technology Policy.
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16.Mowery, “U.S.National Innovation System”; Chesbrough, “Organizational Impact.”
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17.There is some dispute about how much these firms would have unbundled on their own without antitrust enforcement.Regardless of the motivation, the U.S.outcome was very different from that in other countries.See Ussfilman, “Unbundling IBM.”
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18.For example, the vice president for electronic component development at Western Electric, which licensed out AT&T’s semiconductor technology, explained, “We realized that if this thing [the transistor] was as big as we thought, we couldn’t keep it to ourselves and we couldn’t make all the technical contributions.It was to our interest to spread it around.If you cast your bread on the water, sometimes it comes back angel food cake.” Tilton, International Diffusion, pp..75–76.
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19.Appleyard, “How Does Knowledge Flow?”
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20.Khan, Democratization of Invention.
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21.The U.S.auto industry long made “knowledge work” the sole domain of professional engineers.Engineers designed the cars, and factory workers made them.Many engineers never set foot on the factory floor; factory workers rarely had meaningful opportunity to correct design errors that made the cars harder to assemble and more prone to defects or reliability problems.In contrast, the Japanese auto industry, especially Toyota, recognized that ordinary factory workers acquired significant knowledge about design and manufacturability on the job.Assembly-line workers participate on Japanese design teams.Moreover, when an assembly worker defects a problem, the worker can stop the assembly line until it is solved; that sort of power was unheard of in Detroit.Japanese automotive engineers begin their employment working on the factory floor and subsequently spend one month a year rotating into alternative jobs.In this way they gain an understanding of the entire process of producing a car.Needless to say, this cultivation of knowledge learned through experience in production allowed the Japanese auto makers to design cars faster with fewer engineering hours, to produce them with less labor, and to make them of higher quality, all at the same time.See Womack, Jones, and Roos, Machine That Changed the World.
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22.Mike Masnick, “Hacking Society: It’s Time to Measure the Unmeasurable,” Techdirt (blog), April 27, 2012.
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23.This bias features prominently in the argument by Michele Boldrin and David K.Levine, “Case against Patents.”
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24.Litman, “Revising Copyright Law”; Litman, Digital Copyright.
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25.Buchanan and Tullock, Calculus of Consent; Olson, Logic of Collective Action.
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26.Paul Krugman,“Barons of Broadband.” New York Times, February 16, 2014.http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/17/opinion/krugmanbaronsofbroadband.html?hp&rref=opinion&_r=1.
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