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[1] 参与者1可能会考虑威胁要引爆手雷的对手不是个疯子。这种怀疑在模型中我们表示为不完全信息——参与者1对参与者2的收益函数并不确定。参见第3章。
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[2] 参与者2的可选择行动空间A2，可以允许依赖于参与者1的行动a1。这种依赖性可以表示为A2（a1），或者可以合并到参与者2的收益函数中，对那些给定a1时不可行的a2，令u1（a1，a2）=-∞。有时参与者1的某些行动甚至可以结束整个博弈，不给参与者2行动的机会，对这样的a1值，可行的行动空间A2（a1）中只有一个元素，令参与者2别无选择。
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[3] 回想我们在重复剔除严格劣战略的讨论时（在第1.1.B节），参与者是理性的是共同知识，如果所有参与者都是理性的，并且所有参与者都知道所有参与者都是理性的，并且所有参与者都知道所有参与者都知道所有参与者都是理性的，如此等等，以至无穷。
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