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[6]Robert M. Solow,“A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth,”QuarterlyJournalofEconomics70, no. 1（1956）:65 -94.
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[7]Robert J. Barro and Xavier Sala-i-Martin,EconomicGrowth（New York: Mc GrawHill, 1995）.
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[8]Robert Lucas,“Why Doesn’t Capital Flow from Rich to Poor Countries?”AmericanEconomicReview80, no. 2（1990）:92 -96.
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[9]保罗·罗默研究了1870年以来有数据可查的11个经合组织国家的情况。See Paul M. Romer,“Increasing Returns and Long-Run Growth,”JournalofPoliticalEconomy94, no. 5（1986）:1002 -1037.
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[10]David Coe and Elhanan Helpman,“International R&D Spillovers,”EuropeanEconomicReview39, no. 5（1995）:859 -887.
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[11]Philippe Aghion, Antonin Bergeaud, Timothee Gigout, Matthieu Lequien, and Marc Melitz,“Spreading Knowledge Across the World: Innovation Spillover through Trade Expansion,” unpublished manuscript, March 2019, https: //scholar. harvard. edu/ files/ aghion/ files/ spreading_knowledge_across_the_world. pdf.
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[12]Daron Acemoglu, Philippe Aghion, and Fabrizio Zilibotti,“Distance to Frontier,Selection, and Economic Growth,”Journal of the European Economic Association4, no. 1（2006）:37 -74.
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[13]Jerome Vandenbussche, Philippe Aghion, and Costas Meghir,“Growth, Distance to Frontier and Composition of Human Capital,”JournalofEconomicGrowth11,no. 2（2006）:97 -127.
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[14]Philippe Aghion, Matthias Dewatripont, Caroline Hoxby, Andreu Mas-Colell, and André Sapir,“The Governance and Performance of Universities: Evidence from Europe and the US,”EconomicPolicy25, no. 61（2010）:7 -59.
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[15]前沿企业是靠近技术前沿的企业，其生产率接近所在产业的领先水平。
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[16]Fabrizio Zilibotti,“Growing and Slowing Down Like China,”JournaloftheEuropean Economic Association15, no. 5（2017）:943 -988.
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[17]See Zilibotti,“Growing and Slowing Down Like China.”
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[18]Boubacar Diallo and Wilfried Koch,“Bank Concentration and Schumpeterian Growth: Theory and International Evidence,”ReviewofEconomicsandStatistics100, no. 3（2018）:489 -501.
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[19]Verluise, Cyril and Antonin Bergeaud（2019）,“The International Diffusion of Technology: a New Approach and Some Facts,” mimeo, College de France, 2019。自动专利图景方法可参阅: Abood, Aron and Dave Feltenberger（2018）,“Automated patent landscaping,”ArtificialIntelligenceandLaw, 26（2）, pp.103 -125。
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[20]Chang T. Hsieh and Pete Klenow,“Misallocation and Manufacturing TFP in China and India,”QuarterlyJournalofEconomics124, no. 4（2009）:1403 -1448.
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[21]Chang T. Hsieh and Pete Klenow,“The Life Cycle of Plants in India and Mexico,”QuarterlyJournalofEconomics129, no. 3（2014）:1035 -1084.
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[22]Ufuk Akcigit, Harun Alp, and Michael Peters,“Lack of Selection and Limits to Delegation: Firm Dynamics in Developing Countries” （NBER Working Paper No. 21905, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA, January 2016）.
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[23]本节内容基于以下研究: Philippe Aghion, Sergei Guriev, and Kangchul Jo,“Chaebols and Firm Dynamics in Korea,” CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP13825, Center for Economic Policy Research, London, June 2019.
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[24]Aghion, Guriev, and Jo,“Chaebols and Firm Dynamics in Korea”，该研究截至2003年，因为有数据可查的期间为1992—2003年。韩国的全要素生产率增速在2003年后放缓，这与其他发达国家的趋势（见第6章）基本同步。另外，或许是因为财阀企业后来重新掌握了权力。
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创造性破坏的力量 [:1704513572]
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创造性破坏的力量 第8章 能否绕开工业化？
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过去两个世纪中，全球的经济、领土与社会版图经历了激烈变化。如本书第2章所述，经济增长的起飞伴随着英国、法国和美国相继从农业经济体向工业经济体成功转型。但更近期以来，制造业又被服务业取代。在拿破仑统治时期，法国有2 /3的劳动力从事农业生产；到2018年，则有超过2 /3的人在服务业工作。大产业层面发生的这一创造性破坏过程被称为结构变革。经济学家西蒙·库兹涅茨在1971年的诺贝尔奖获奖演讲中对此解释说：“经济结构转型的速率很快，结构变革的主要方面包括从农业向非农业活动转移，以及近期以来从工业向服务业转移。”[1]
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图8.1显示了美国的农业、制造业和服务业就业占比在1840—2000年的变化。我们看到，农业部门的相对规模在1840年后持续下降，制造业的份额在1950年之前上升，然后下跌，服务业的份额则持续提升，并且在1950年之后开始加速。在经济发展过程中，各产业部门出现的这种结构性变革被称为“库兹涅茨事实”（Kuznets facts）。
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