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［31］Dani Rodrik, “Democracies Pay Higher Wages,” NBER working paper 6364, 1998.
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第2章
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［1］有关自由化对收益率的影响，参见 Anusha Chari and Peter Henry, “Does Diversification Drive Stock Price Revaluation?” Stanford research paper no. 1677, 2001; 有关自由化对投资的影响，参见Peter Henry, “Stock Market Liberalization, Economic Reform and Emerging Market Equity Price,” Journal of Finance 55 (2000): 529-564。
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［2］从技术上讲，衍生工具是一些合同，其价值取决于（衍生于）另外一种普通证券的价值。例如，对微软公司股票的买入期权就是一种衍生工具，该期权的持有人有权利（而不是义务）在预先规定的时间里（比如3个月里），以规定的价格（比如50美元）买入微软公司的股票。假如在3个月里，微软公司的股票价格都低于50美元，那持有人就不需要行使该期权。但是假如价格高于50美元，那持有人就要行使期权，并获得行使时实际价格高于50美元的那部分收益。
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［3］这个案例的材料主要来自Peter Tufano，“How Financial Engineering Can Advance Corporate Strategy,” Harvard Business Review 79 (1996), and on Donald Collat and Peter Tufano, “The Privatization of Rhone-Poulenc,” Harvard Business School Case 9-295-049。
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［4］Kenneth Froot, “The Market for Catastrophic Risk: A Clinical Examination,” NBER working paper 8110.
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［5］数据来源于Dun and Bradstreet网站。
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［6］M. Petersen and R. Rajan, “Does Distance Still Matter? The Information Revolution in Small Business Lending,” Journal of Finance, forthcoming (2002).
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［7］Clayton Christensen, The Innovators’ Dilemma: When New Technologies Cause Great Firms to Fail (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1997).
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［8］最近的一项研究对比了34个国家在1985～1998年的公司财务报表，发现总体来说美国的会计报表透明度最高。参见Utpal Bhattacharya, Hazem Daouk, Michael Welker, “The World Price of Earnings Opacity,” Indiana University working paper, 2002。
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［9］M. Lang, K. Lins, and D. Miller, “ADRs, Analysts, and Accuracy: Does Cross Listing in the U.S. Improve a Firm’s Information Environment and Increase Market Value?” University of Utah, working paper, 2002.
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［10］R. Morck, B. Yeung, and W. Yu, “The Information Content of Stock Markets: Why Do Emerging Markets Have Synchronous Stock Price Movements?” Journal of Financial Economics 58 (2000): 215-260.
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［11］Jeffrey Wurgler, “Financial Markets and the Allocation of Capital,” Journal of Financial Economics 58 (2000): 187-214.
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［12］参见“Market Says No to UniCredito-Commerz. Alliance,”选自II Corriere della Sera（意大利文）, Corriere della Sera, September 4, 2001. “UniCredito Concerned over Share Price Fall,” Financial Times (London), September 10, 2001, 24。
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［13］“Borsa: UniCredito (+5.9%) strappa dopo rottura trattative Commerzbank,” AFX News Limited, September 11, 2001.
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［14］Mark L. Mitchell and Kenneth Lehn, “Do Bad Bidders Become Good Targets?” Journal of Political Economy 98 (1990): 372-398.
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［15］这被称为格罗斯曼—斯蒂格利茨悖论（Grossman-Stiglitz paradox），参见Sanford Grossman and Joseph Stiglitz, “On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets,” American Economic Review 80, no. 3 (1980): 393.
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［16］B. Black, “Does Corporate Governance Matter? A Crude Test Using Russian Data,” Stanford Law School, working paper, 2000.
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［17］同上。
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［18］Alexander Dyck and Luigi Zingales, “Private Benefits of Control: An International Comparison,” NBER working paper no. 8211, 2002.
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［19］参见R. La Porta, F. Lopez-de-Silanes, and A. Shleifer, “Corporate Ownership around the World,” Journal of Finance 54, no. 2 (1999): 471-517。通过跨国比较研究，他们首先证明了制度基础的不发达会导致所有权的集中。
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［20］对该领域的早期研究，参见Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopz de Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W. Vishny, “Law and Finance,” Journal of Political Economy 106 (1998): 1113。有关私有收益和法律保护之间的相关性研究，参见Dyck and Zingales, “Private Benefits of Control.”
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［21］Dyck and Zingales, “Private Benefits of Control.”
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［22］Leora Klapper and Inessa Love, “Corporate Governance, Investor Protection, and Performance in Emerging Markets,” World Bank, working paper, 2002.
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［23］Michael C. Jensen, “Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance and Takeovers,” American Economic Review 76 (1986): 323-339.
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