1704623090
1704623091
［9］M. Lang, K. Lins, and D. Miller, “ADRs, Analysts, and Accuracy: Does Cross Listing in the U.S. Improve a Firm’s Information Environment and Increase Market Value?” University of Utah, working paper, 2002.
1704623092
1704623093
［10］R. Morck, B. Yeung, and W. Yu, “The Information Content of Stock Markets: Why Do Emerging Markets Have Synchronous Stock Price Movements?” Journal of Financial Economics 58 (2000): 215-260.
1704623094
1704623095
［11］Jeffrey Wurgler, “Financial Markets and the Allocation of Capital,” Journal of Financial Economics 58 (2000): 187-214.
1704623096
1704623097
［12］参见“Market Says No to UniCredito-Commerz. Alliance,”选自II Corriere della Sera（意大利文）, Corriere della Sera, September 4, 2001. “UniCredito Concerned over Share Price Fall,” Financial Times (London), September 10, 2001, 24。
1704623098
1704623099
［13］“Borsa: UniCredito (+5.9%) strappa dopo rottura trattative Commerzbank,” AFX News Limited, September 11, 2001.
1704623100
1704623101
［14］Mark L. Mitchell and Kenneth Lehn, “Do Bad Bidders Become Good Targets?” Journal of Political Economy 98 (1990): 372-398.
1704623102
1704623103
［15］这被称为格罗斯曼—斯蒂格利茨悖论（Grossman-Stiglitz paradox），参见Sanford Grossman and Joseph Stiglitz, “On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets,” American Economic Review 80, no. 3 (1980): 393.
1704623104
1704623105
［16］B. Black, “Does Corporate Governance Matter? A Crude Test Using Russian Data,” Stanford Law School, working paper, 2000.
1704623106
1704623107
［17］同上。
1704623108
1704623109
［18］Alexander Dyck and Luigi Zingales, “Private Benefits of Control: An International Comparison,” NBER working paper no. 8211, 2002.
1704623110
1704623111
［19］参见R. La Porta, F. Lopez-de-Silanes, and A. Shleifer, “Corporate Ownership around the World,” Journal of Finance 54, no. 2 (1999): 471-517。通过跨国比较研究，他们首先证明了制度基础的不发达会导致所有权的集中。
1704623112
1704623113
［20］对该领域的早期研究，参见Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopz de Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W. Vishny, “Law and Finance,” Journal of Political Economy 106 (1998): 1113。有关私有收益和法律保护之间的相关性研究，参见Dyck and Zingales, “Private Benefits of Control.”
1704623114
1704623115
［21］Dyck and Zingales, “Private Benefits of Control.”
1704623116
1704623117
［22］Leora Klapper and Inessa Love, “Corporate Governance, Investor Protection, and Performance in Emerging Markets,” World Bank, working paper, 2002.
1704623118
1704623119
［23］Michael C. Jensen, “Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance and Takeovers,” American Economic Review 76 (1986): 323-339.
1704623120
1704623121
［24］G. Zachary, “His Way,” Wall Street Journal, June 2, 1994.
1704623122
1704623123
［25］以下材料主要来源于G. Baker, “Beatrice: A Study in the Creation and Destruction of Value,” Journal of Finance 47, no. 3 (1992): 1081-1120。
1704623124
1704623125
［26］同上，第1096页。
1704623126
1704623127
［27］O. J. Blanchard, F. Lopez-de-Silanes, and A. Shleifer, “What Do Firms Do with Cash Windfalls?” Journal of Financial Economics 36 (1994): 337-360.
1704623128
1704623129
［28］同上，第358页。
1704623130
1704623131
［29］同上。
1704623132
1704623133
［30］Darin Clay, “ The Role of Institutional Investors” (University of Chicago, Ph.D. diss., 2001).
1704623134
1704623135
［31］同上。
1704623136
1704623137
［32］我们对该问题的研究与MIT的Stewart Myers合作完成。
1704623138
1704623139
［33］Steven Kaplan and Per Stromberg, “ How Do Venture Capitalists Choose and Monitor Investments?” University of Chicago, WP, 2000.
[
上一页 ]
[ :1.70462309e+09 ]
[
下一页 ]