打字猴:1.70462373e+09
1704623730
1704623731 [40]M. Aoki, H. Patrick, and P. Sheard, “The Japanese Main Bank System: An Overview,” in The Japanese Main Bank System, ed. M. Aoki and H. Patrick (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), and T. Hoshi and A. Kashyap, Corporate Finance and Government in Japan (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2001), 59, table 3.2.
1704623732
1704623733 [41]J. M. Ramseyer and F. M. Rosenbluth, The Politics of Oligarchy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 104.
1704623734
1704623735 [42]引自 Hoshi and Kashyap, Corporate Finance and Government in Japan, 29。
1704623736
1704623737 [43]同上,第58页。
1704623738
1704623739 [44]Aoki, Patrick, and Sheard, “The Japanese Main Bank System,” 44.
1704623740
1704623741 [45]数据来自J. Teranishi, “Loan Syndication in War-Time Japan,” in The Japanese Main Bank System, ed. M. Aoki and H. Patrick (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 57, table 2.2。
1704623742
1704623743 [46]这是一个卡特尔组织,根据T.Hoshi and A.Kashyap的研究,没有参加1931年协定的证券公司依然在承销业务上展开激烈竞争,并继续承销无担保债券。因此,无担保债券的灾难并不是市场本身造成的,而是由于卡特尔组织的束缚。参见 Hoshi and Kashyap, Corporate Finance and Government in Japan, 31。
1704623744
1704623745 [47]Tetsuji Okazaki (1991), 382,cited in Hoshi and Kashyap, Corporate Finance and Government in Japan, 61.
1704623746
1704623747 [48]Hoshi and Kashyap, Corporate Finance and Government in Japan, 80.
1704623748
1704623749 [49]Lucian Bebchuk and Mark J. Roe, “A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate Ownership and Governance,” Stanford Law Review 52 (1999): 127-170,发展了关于管制导致这些结果的理论。
1704623750
1704623751 [50]Mark. J. Roe, Strong Managers, Weak Owners: The Political Roots of American Corporate Finance (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994).
1704623752
1704623753 [51]G. Benston, “The Origins and Justification for the Glass-Steagall Act,” in Universal Banking in the United States: What Could We Gain? What Could We Lose? ed. A Saunders and I. Walter (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994).
1704623754
1704623755 [52]Paul G. Mahony, “The Political Economy of the Securities Act of 1933,” working paper no. 00-11, Social Science Research Network, 2000, 8.
1704623756
1704623757 [53]R. Kroszner and R. Rajan, “Organization on Structure and Credibility: Evidence from the Commercial Bank Securities Activities before the Glass-Steagall Act,” Journal of Monetary Economics 39 (1997): 475-516.
1704623758
1704623759 [54]Mahony, “The Political Economy of the Securities Act of 1933.”
1704623760
1704623761 [55]一般的论证参见George J. Benston, The Separation of Commercial and Investment Banking: The Glass-Steagall Act Revised and Reconsidered (New York: OPU, 1990),系统性的论证参见R. Kroszner and R. Rajan, “Is the Glass-Steagall Act Justified? A Study of the U.S. Experience with Universal Banking before 1933,” American Economic Review 84 (September 1994): 810-832。
1704623762
1704623763 [56]Kroszner and Rajan, “Organization on Structure and Credibility.”
1704623764
1704623765 [57]Roe, Strong Managers, Weak Owners.
1704623766
1704623767 [58]Benston, “Origins and Justification for the Glass-Steagall Act,” 38.
1704623768
1704623769 [59]Mahony, “The Political Economy of the Securities Act of 1933.”
1704623770
1704623771 第10章
1704623772
1704623773 [1]Standard and Poor’s, “U.S. Steel Tariffs: Who Gains, Who Loses, and at What Price?,” March 14, 2002.
1704623774
1704623775 [2]AISI, “The New Steel Industry,” www.steel.org/facts/newsindus.htm.
1704623776
1704623777 [3]雇佣人数的数据来自Bureau of Labor Statistics, National Current Employment Statistics, www.bls.gov/webapps/legarcy/cesbtabl.htm。生产的数据来自American Iron and Steel Industry, 1997 Annual Statistical Report。
1704623778
1704623779 [4]Alan Greenspan, chairman, Federal Reserve Board, before the Senate Banking Committee, July 28, 1999.
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