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85 Gorodetsky, pp. 116—117; Sapir, pp. 210—211; Glantz, Military Strategy, pp. 65—66.
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86 John Erickson, ‘Threat Identification and Strategic Appraisal by the Soviet Union 1930—1941’, in E. R. May (ed.), Knowing One’s Enemies. Intelligence Assessment between the Two World Wars, Princeton, 1983, pp. 416—418; Whaley, pp. 175, 181, 199, 223, 228, 242; Roberts, Unholy Alliance, pp. 187, 213; Glantz, Military Strategy, pp. 61—62. 红军总参谋部一直假定德军需要 10 到 15 天才能完成动员和部署，因此排除了突然袭击的可能性（Glantz，Stumbling Colossus，第 96 页）。
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87 Gorodetsky, p. 126. The continuity of strategic thinking, also under Zhukov, is also stressed by Glantz, Military Strategy, pp. 87—88. 朱可夫后来（Zhukov，vol. 1，第 245 页）说：“军事战略主要是建立在只有发起进攻才能打败侵略者的正确观念基础上。”
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88 Besymenski, pp. 355—363. See also Glantz, Military Strategy, pp. 70—75; and Glantz, Stumbling Colossus, pp. 90—92.
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89 Quoted in Glantz, Stumbling Colossus, p. 93 and Besymenski, p. 364. Zhukov，vol. 1，第 250 页，朱可夫回忆斯大林说过：“没有这些重要资源，纳粹德国就不可能打一场持久的大仗。”
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90 Besymenski, pp. 364—365; 1941 god, vol. 1, docs. 95, 134; Evan Mawdsley, ‘Crossing the Rubicon. Soviet Plans for Offensive War in 1940—1941’, International History Review, 25 (2003), pp. 821—823; Gorodetsky, pp. 122—124; Jacob Kipp, ‘Soviet War Planning’, in Glanz, Initial Period of War, pp. 46—47; Glantz, Military Strategy, pp. 78—81.
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91 Gorodetsky, p. 127. For the proceedings of the conference, see Erickson, Road to Stalingrad, pp. 40—46.
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92 Gorodetsky, pp. 128—129; Mawdsley, ‘Crossing the Rubicon’, pp. 825—827; Erickson, Road to Stalingrad, pp. 50—55; Glantz, Military Strategy, pp. 81—86; Zhukov, vol. 1, pp. 221—225.
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93 Mawdsley, ‘Crossing the Rubicon’, pp. 827—832; 1941 god, vol. 1, doc. 315; extracts in Besymenski, pp. 365—367; Zhukov, vol. 1, p. 250.
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94 Mawdsley,‘Crossing the Rubicon’, pp. 827—829; Besymenski, p. 368; Glantz, Stumbling Colossus, pp. 100—102, 108. 确实已经部署到位的部队缺乏武器装备和弹药，没有运输手段，受限于糟糕的通讯条件，见 Catherine Merridale，Ivan’s War：The Red Army 1939—1945（London，2005），第 87—90 页。
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95 Besymenski, pp. 368—370.
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96 Richard Overy, Russia’s War, London, 1997, pp. 64—65. 另见 Rotundo，第 282 页；Glantz，Military Strategy，第 75 页，第 79 页；Glantz，Stumbling Colossus，第 88 页，“因为缺少资源，虽然我们对给予了沿着新边界构筑防御体系最高的优先级别，但到 1941 年 6 月为止，两条防线都没有准备就绪，也没有驻军”。See also Zhukov, vol. 1, pp. 251—253.
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97 Mikoyan, p. 377.
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98 Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War, vol. 4: The Hinge of Fate, London, 1951, p. 443.
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99 Gorodetsky, pp. 113—114; Roberts, Unholy Alliance, p. 205.
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100 Quoted in Gorodetsky, p. 174.
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101 Gorodetsky，第 173 页，第 176 页（及第 8 章）；Zhukov，vol. 1，第 268 页，不过此处的用词与前者引用的俄语版朱可夫回忆录略有不同；Whaley，第 62—63 页。Mikoyan，第 377 页，斯大林表达了类似的观点：“如果我们参战，这对英国大大有利，但对我们来说，再多旁观一会儿是有利的。”
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102 Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War, vol. 3: The Grand Alliance, London, 1950, pp. 316, 322—323.
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103 关于苏联的情报机构，参见 Whaley，第 192—200 页，最近关于这个问题的详细研究，参见 Murphy，第 62—116 页。
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104 Gorodetsky, p. 130.
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105 Khrushchev Remembers, p. 340.
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106 Gorodetsky, p. 54. 参见 Glantz，Stumbling Colossus，第 233—257 页，斯大林不信任军事或者民事情报机构的情报；送给他的报告的语气也会增强这种不信任，但却常常向斯大林强调德国人的假情报。
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107 See Whaley, pp. 170—177, 180—181; Read and Fisher, pp. 594—601; Glantz, Barbarossa, p. 31.
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108 Whaley, p. 242.
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109 1941 god, vol. 1, doc. 204; and see Gorodetsky, p. 124.
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