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171 1941 god, vol. 2, doc. 570; Sekrety Gitlera, doc. 72.
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172 1941 god, vol. 2, doc. 581.
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173 Erickson, Road to Stalingrad, p. 93; Whaley, pp. 99—103; Read and Fisher, p. 609.
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174 1941 god, vol. 2, doc. 590.
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175 Medvedev and Medvedev, p. 239.
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176 Sekrety Gitlera, docs. 73—77.
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177 Molotov Remembers, p. 31. For the Tass communiqué, see Whaley, pp. 207—208.
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178 Roberts, Unholy Alliance, p. 218.
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179 Gorodetsky, p. 289.
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180 Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War, pp. 109—111; Hinsley, ‘British Intelligence and Barbarossa’, pp. 69—70; Erickson, Road to Stalingrad,p. 93; Whaley, pp. 230—234.
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181 Gorodetsky, pp. 301—303.
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182 1941 god, vol. 2, doc. 599.
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183 Besymenski, p. 421.
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184 Quoted in Besymenski, p. 409.
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185 Zhukov, vol. 1, pp. 277—278, 280 (quotation p. 277); Khrushchev Remembers,p. 167; Mikoyan, p. 388; Medvedev and Medvedev, p. 240; Glantz, Barbarossa,p. 31 and (for the text of the directive) p. 242; Glantz, Stumbling Colossus,pp. 252—254; Murphy, pp. 213—215.
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186 The preceding account is based on Zhukov, vol. 1, pp. 281—282; Volkogonov,pp. 402—404; Montefiore, pp. 321—324; Radzinsky, pp. 458—459; Gorodetsky,pp. 311—313; Service, pp. 437—438; Tucker, p. 625; Ulam, pp. 538—539; Read and Fisher, pp. 5—6, 635—637, 639—642; Watson, p. 189; and Overy, Russia’s War, pp. 73—74.
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187 Montefiore, p. 324.
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188 Volkogonov, p. 407; text of the directive in Glantz, Barbarossa, p. 242 and Amnon Sella, ‘“Barbarossa”. Surprise Attack and Communication’, Journal of Contemporary History, 13 (1978), p. 571. 参见 Zhukov，vol. 1，第 282 页，“它（这项命令）被证明是不现实的，因此从未实施过”。
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189 Mawdsley, ‘Crossing the Rubicon’, p. 863; text of the directive in Glantz, Barbarossa, pp. 242—243. 另见 Sella，第 559—573 页，谈到了苏军对突袭的困惑、不知所措与缺乏协调的表现。
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190 Mikoyan, p. 388.
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191 Quoted in Watson, pp. 189—190.
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192 Quoted in Radzinsky, p. 462. For the response to the radio address, see Sella, p. 575.
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193 ‘Iz vospominanii upravliyushchego delami sovnarkoma SSSR Ya. E. Chadaev’ (‘From the Memoirs of the Head of Sovnarkom USSR–Yakov Ermolaevich Chadaev’), Otechestvennaya Istoriya, 2 (2005), pp. 8—10; also Zhukov, vol. 1,pp. 305, 309.
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194 Volkogonov, pp. 421—422; Bonwetsch, p. 196.
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195 Mikoyan, pp. 390—392; Stepan A. Mikoyan, ‘Barbarossa and the Soviet Leadership’, in Erickson and Dilks, pp. 127—128; Volkogonov, pp. 409—412; Montefiore, pp. 329—334; Radzinsky, pp. 468—472; Medvedev and Medvedev,pp. 241—245; Service, pp. 441—443. Jonathan Lewis and Phillip Whitehead，Stalin：A Time for Judgement（London, 1991），第 89 页，说“苏联有整整 10 天时间没有领袖”。然而斯大林临时的消失只持续了 2 天时间，他的满满的日程安排证明，事情绝不像刘易斯书中说的那样。
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