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137 这个观点在 9 月底斯塔克海军上将关于是否推动修改中立法案的备忘录里得到明确表述。但是，斯塔克一直在敦促美国直接参战，他认为美国应该尽快对德作战，就算同时不得不和日本开战也在所不惜（引自 Sherwood，White House Papers，vol. 1，第 381 页)。但是我们看到，罗斯福不准备这样做。
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138 Quoted in Dallek, p. 289; and Reynolds, Anglo-American Alliance, p. 353 n. 114.
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139 Reynolds, Anglo-American Alliance, pp. 219—220.
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140 Langer and Gleason, The Undeclared War, p. 923; Kennedy, pp. 487—488.
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141 Kennedy, p. 487.
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142 Quoted in Sherwood, White House Papers, vol. 1, p. 415.
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143 在 1941 年秋天，罗斯福似乎还认为，如果苏联能坚持住，他可以不用派部队前往欧洲作战，他把向苏联提供援助视为代替美国地面部队的一种方式。但是，陆军认为如果不部署美军，苏联和英国无法击败德国。所以援助英苏的目标是帮助他们坚持抵抗，直到美国完成军备重整，能够投入战争为止。因为租借法案给苏联运去了能够装备 101 个陆军师的武器装备，美军在欧洲部署的规模比胜利计划预见的要小（Stoler，第 55—58 页，第 285 页注释 64）。
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144 Quoted in Sherwood, White House Papers, vol. 1, p. 419.
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命运攸关的抉择：1940-1941年间改变世界的十个决策 第八章 东京，1941 年 8 月
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1 Nobutaka Ike (ed.), Japan’s Decision for War. Records of the 1941 Policy Conferences, Stanford, Calif., 1967, p. 72.
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2 关于日本对北进计划的讨论，参见 Hosoya Chihiro，“Northern Defence”，in James William Morley（ed.），The Fateful Choice：Japan’s Advance into Southeast Asia, 1939—1941（New York，1980），第 94—112 页。关于海军在南进计划中的立场，参见 Tsunoda Jun，“The Navy’s Role in the Southern Strategy”，第 287—295 页。
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3 Figures in Herbert P. Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, London, 2001, p. 400.
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4 Akira Iriye, The Origins of the Second World War in Asia and the Pacific, London/New York, 1987, p. 148; James William Morley (ed.), The Final Confrontation. Japan’s Negotiations with the United States, 1941, Columbia, NY, 1994 (translated essays of Tsunoda Jun, based upon Japanese documentation), p. 159.
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5 David Reynolds, The Creation of the Anglo-American Alliance 1937—1941. A Study in Competitive Co-operation, Chapel Hill, NC, 1982, pp. 234—236; William Carr, Poland to Pearl Harbor. The Making of the Second World War, London, 1985,p. 153; Iriye, Origins, pp. 149—150.
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6 Iriye, Origins, p. 147.
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7 Iriye, Origins, pp. 148—149.
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8 Bix, p. 401.
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9 Sheffield University Library, Wolfson Microfilm 431, Diary of Marquis Kido Koichi, doc. no. 1632W (63) 31.7.41, (63) 2.8.41, (66) 7.8.41; Carr, pp. 154—155.
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10 Herbert Feis, The Road to Pearl Harbor. The Coming of the War between the United States and Japan, Princeton, 1950. 上面这本书评论说（第 244 页）：“从此以后，油表和钟表并排摆在一起，每一次指针的跳动都把决定的时刻又拉近了一步。”后面他用类似的比喻（第 270 页）说：“时间成为两国政府战略的计量仪，但是，一国对时间的流逝无所谓，另一个国家对每分每秒的流逝都感到抓狂。”
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11 Morley, The Final Confrontation, p. 157; Foreign Relations of the United States. Japan 1931—41, vol. 2 [= Japan II], Washington, 1943, pp. 549—50.
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12 Sheffield University Library, Wolfson Microfilm 437, copied from National Archives, Washington, Record Group 243: Records of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey, File 1d (10), Memoirs of Prince Konoye [Konoe] [=Konoe Memoirs] March 1942, fols. 29—30.
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13 Quoted in Morley, The Final Confrontation, p. 179.
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14 Yoshitake Oka, Konoe Fumimaro. A Political Biography, Tokyo, 1983, pp. 139—140.
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15 John Toland, The Rising Sun. The Decline and Fall of the Japanese Empire, 1936—1945, New York, 1970, Modern Library edn., 2003, p. 100; Ike, p. 151 and n. 35; Feis, p. 282.
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