1707347993
105 Examples in Toland, The Rising Sun, pp. 132—135. 第 133 页的注释显示，这并不是故意的错误解读。另见 Butow，第 335 页与注释 38，显示这些错误解读并没有歪曲日本的真实意图。
1707347994
1707347995
106 Hull, vol. 2, pp. 1056—1057, 1060.
1707347996
1707347997
107 关于美国国务院对日本的态度与格鲁对日本的态度之间的差别，见 Grew，第 468—469 页（3.11.41）；Morley，The Final Confrontation，第 310—311 页。
1707347998
1707347999
108 Langer and Gleason, The Undeclared War, pp. 855—866; Japan II, pp. 729—737; Hull, vol. 2, pp. 1058—1062; Feis, pp. 303—305.
1707348000
1707348001
109 Feis, pp. 307—308; Langer and Gleason, The Undeclared War, pp. 863—864; Ike,p. 251 (Togo’s report to the Liaison Conference of 20.11.41); Hull, vol. 2,pp. 1063—1064; Morley, The Final Confrontation, pp. 301—305.
1707348002
1707348003
110 Hull, vol. 2, pp. 1069—1071 (quotation p. 1070); and Butow, pp. 336—338. Langer and Gleason，The Undeclared War，第 880 页，都“对赫尔对待日本所提出的建议的愤怒持批评态度，因为日本的建议和国务院本身的建议有很多相似之处”。Spotswood，第 450—451 页，为赫尔的判断辩护，主要是因为日军在印度支那的数量不减反增。
1707348004
1707348005
111 FRUS, 1941, pp. 635—636 (final draft pp. 661—664); Langer and Gleason, The Undeclared War, pp. 881—882.
1707348006
1707348007
112 Langer and Gleason, The Undeclared War, p. 872.
1707348008
1707348009
113 Hull, vol. 2, pp. 1072—1073.
1707348010
1707348011
114 FRUS, 1941, pp. 640, 650—651, 655—656, 659—661, 666; Heinrichs, Threshold of War, pp. 209—211.
1707348012
1707348013
115 The ‘MAGIC’ Background of Pearl Harbor, vol. 4, Washington, 1978, appendix, p. A89. 总统在 11 月 25 日告诉他的亲信助手们：“我们可能在下周一（12 月 1 日）遭到日本进攻，因为日本人出了名的喜欢搞突然袭击，问题是我们应该怎么办。”困难在于“我们怎样能让日本人先开第一枪，可是又不能让我们自己面临太多危险”（Yale University Library，Henry L. Stimson Diaries 1909—1945，Reel 7，entry for 25.11.41）。
1707348014
1707348015
116 FRUS, 1941, pp. 660—661; Stimson Diaries, Reel 7, entry for 26.11.41.
1707348016
1707348017
117 FRUS, 1941, p. 665.
1707348018
1707348019
118 Hull, vol. 2, p. 1081.
1707348020
1707348021
119 Hull, vol. 2, pp. 1074—1076, 1082; Toland, The Rising Sun, pp. 140—143; Morley, The Final Confrontation, pp. 305—307, 309; Carr, p. 163; Heinrichs, Threshold of War, pp. 208—212; Stimson Diaries, Reel 7, entry for 27.11.41.
1707348022
1707348023
120 Japan II, pp. 766—770; text also in Langer and Gleason, The Undeclared War,pp. 896—897; and Political Strategy Prior to the Outbreak of War (Part III), Japanese Monographs, 147, appendix 9 (http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/monos/147/147app09.html). 这些比 6 个月以前 6 月 21 日的建议要苛刻多了，见Japan II，第 483—485 页，而那份建议本身已经被描述为“只是对国务卿赫尔经常重复的国际关系原则的毫不妥协的重复”（Langer and Gleason，The Undeclared War，第 632 页）。
1707348024
1707348025
121 Morley, The Final Confrontation, pp. 313—315, 317—318; Langer and Gleason, The Undeclared War, pp. 893, 898; Hull, vol. 2, pp. 1081—1084; Carr, pp. 163—164; Bix, p. 428.
1707348026
1707348027
122 Quoted in Toland, The Rising Sun, p. 143.
1707348028
1707348029
123 Quoted in Morley, The Final Confrontation, p. 313.
1707348030
1707348031
124 见东条英机战后在远东国际军事法庭上的证词，他说，当时美国的建议被看做是一份最后通牒，“所有人都被它的苛刻惊呆了”，见Political Strategy Prior to the Outbreak of War（Part IV），Japanese Monographs，150，appendix 3（http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/monos/150/150app03.html）。东乡茂德在 11 月 28 日给野村和来栖的电报中说，它是 “侮辱性的”，“非常出乎预料和极为令人遗憾”（The “MAGIC” Background of Pearl Harbor，vol. 4，第 84—86 页，附录第 A118 页）。野村两天前也说，当赫尔把十点要求送到他和来栖面前的时候，他们都被惊呆了（vol. 4，附录第 A102—A103 页）。
1707348032
1707348033
125 Toland, The Rising Sun, p. 145.
1707348034
1707348035
126 Morley, The Final Confrontation, pp. 315—317; Ike, pp. 256—257.
1707348036
1707348037
127 Quoted in Morley, The Final Confrontation, p. 320.
1707348038
1707348039
128 Bix, p. 430; Toland, The Rising Sun, pp. 176—179; Morley, The Final Confrontation, pp. 324—326.
1707348040
1707348041
129 Political Strategy Prior to the Outbreak of War (Part IV), Japanese Monographs, 150, appendix 4 (http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/monos/150/150app04.html).
1707348042
[
上一页 ]
[ :1.707347993e+09 ]
[
下一页 ]