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西南联大英文课（英汉双语版） [:1705033833]
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22 教育的目的
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传统的中国教育在有些方面与鼎盛时期的雅典教育非常相似。雅典的学子必须通篇背诵荷马的著述，而中国的学子也要熟读儒家的经典。雅典人被教导在礼仪举止中必须表现出对众神的尊敬，但是并不阻碍自由的思想中出现的怀疑。同样地，中国人要学习与供奉祖先相关的礼仪，但并不表示他们必须信奉这些礼仪的含义。受过教育的成年人理应自由且恰当地有所怀疑；任何事情都值得讨论，而只有凡夫俗子才会妄下定论。各种真知灼见应该是餐桌上愉快的谈资，而不是面红耳赤争取来的东西。卡莱尔认为柏拉图是“高贵的雅典绅士，在理想国悠然自得”。从中国的圣贤身上，同样能看到这种“在理想国悠然自得”的品格。而这份悠然自得往往是基督教文明的圣人所不具备的，除非他们像歌德那样深得希腊精神的精髓。雅典人和中国人一样希望享受生活，而且他们对于享受生活的理解中还融入了一份精致的审美品位。
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但是，在这两种文明之间也有着巨大的差异。从广义上说，这些差异源自这样一个事实：希腊人精力旺盛，中国人懒散。希腊人把精力倾注在艺术、科学和战争上——在所有这些方面他们都取得了空前的成就。政治与爱国精神给希腊人提供了宣泄的实用途径：被罢黜的政客会带着一队流放者发起反攻。而在中国的官员遭到罢免之后，则会归隐山林，吟诗作赋，从田园生活中寻找乐趣。相应地，希腊文化自我摧毁，而中国文明只可能被外部力量所破坏。但是这些差异似乎并不全然是因为教育，因为在日本，儒家教育就没有带来中国文人身上那种慵懒得成了气候的怀疑主义。只有京都是个例外，在那里形成了类似巴黎圣日尔曼法布街的贵族圈子。
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中国的教育带来了稳定和艺术，却不能产生进步或科学。也许这正是怀疑论的必然结果。激进的观念带来的要么是进步，要么是灾难，但绝不是稳定。科学在对传统观念进行攻击时，拥有的是科学的信念。而在怀疑论的文化氛围中，这种信念是难有一席之地的。在一个借助现代发明才得以统一的充满争斗的世界上，国家要自我保护就必须充满活力。没有科学就没有民主：中国的文明局限于一小部分文人，而希腊文明的基础是奴隶制。正是因为这些原因，中国的传统教育难以适应现代世界，也为中国人自身所摒弃。十八世纪的绅士们在某些方面跟中国文人很是相似，现在也同样难以为继了。
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在所有主要国家中，现代日本最清晰地表明了这样一种趋势——教育的终极目标是为了强国。日本教育的目的是通过调动热情培养国民为国献身的意识，并通过他们掌握的知识为国家效力。这种一石二鸟的高超技巧当得起任何称赞。自佩里舰长率领舰队远征以来，日本人一直处境艰难，危在旦夕；而如今他们取得的成功证明那些方法是行之有效的，除非我们认为寻求自保本身应当受到谴责。然而，日本的教育方法只有在濒临绝境时才是正当的，任何一个国家如果没有陷入同样的境地，便难逃指摘。神道教的内容连大学教授也不可置疑，但是里面包含的历史就像《创世记》一样未必可信；跟日本的神学统治相比，美国的代顿审判案都不免相形见绌。伦理道德上的统治也是如此；民族主义、孝道、天皇崇拜等等通通不允许讨论。因此，日本在许多方面难以取得进步。僵化的统治制度可能导致一种巨大的危险，就是一旦要取得进步，就会引起革命。尽管还没有到一触即发的地步，但是这种危险是真实存在的，并且主要是由教育体系引发的。
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当代日本的缺陷跟古代中国恰好相对。中国文人疑虑重重，而且懒散，而日本人接受教育以后，变得太过教条和精力过剩。恪守怀疑或者恪守教条都不应当是教育所追求的成果。教育应当造就的是一种信念，那就是尽管需要克服一些困难，但知识是可以设法获得的；在某个时间点，许多冒充知识的东西可能或多或少带来误解，但这些错误可以通过细心和勤奋得到纠正。基于信念来采取行动时，在小错可能带来大祸的地方，我们就要小心翼翼；但无论如何，一切行动都应当以信念作为基础。这样的心态很难达到：既要有较高程度的智识，又要保持热情不会消退。尽管困难重重，仍是可以实现的；事实上这就是科学的心态。知识正如其他美好的事物一样，虽难求，却并非不可得。教条主义者忘记了困难，而怀疑论者否认了实现的可能。二者都有误解，一旦这些误解大规模扩散，社会就会遭殃。
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至今英国公立学校实行的仍是阿诺德博士的教育体系，但这一体系却有着另一种缺陷：它是贵族式的。其目的是为大英帝国本土或是遥远的海外领地培养有权有势的官员。贵族阶级如果想延续下来，必须拥有美德；而这些美德是在学校传授的。学校对人的培养目标是精力充沛、坚忍克制、体魄强健、具有某些坚定不移的信念、刚正不阿，并且坚信自己在这个世界上担负着重要的使命。让人惊讶的是，上述目标都得到了实现。但为此却抛弃了思辨，因为思辨产生怀疑；抛弃了同情，因为同情心会干扰对“劣等”民族或阶级的统治；抛弃了善良，选择了铁石心肠；抛弃了想象力，选择了一意孤行。
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假使世界一成不变，具备斯巴达人优缺点的贵族或许能得以代代相传。但是贵族已经落后于时代，即使是最富智慧、最具美德的统治者也无法让黎民百姓俯首听命了。于是统治者采取了暴力统治，而暴行进一步引发了起义。现代世界的复杂越来越需要智慧，而阿诺德博士却为所谓的“美德”牺牲了智慧。在伊顿公学的操场上，滑铁卢战役或许能够打赢，但是大英帝国却将一败涂地。现代世界需要一种新的人才，需要更多富于想象力的同情心，更善于思辨的随机应变，少一些对凶狠蛮力的迷信，多一些对技术知识的信心。未来的管理者应当成为自由公民的仆人，而不是大众称颂的明君。英国高等教育中的贵族化传统埋下了祸根。或许这种传统可以逐渐消除；或许古老的教育机构无法适应新的形势。对此我不敢妄加评论。
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美国的公立学校进行了一项前所未有的大规模创举，并大获成功：将不同种族的人转变为一个民族。这一创举完成得十分巧妙，而且整体上非常有益，那些成就创举的人实在值得称颂。但是美国跟日本一样，处境非常特殊，在特殊处境下合理正当的事业未必适用于每时每地。美国拥有特定的优势，也面临特别的困难。其优势包括：相对富足；免于战败的危险；相对免于中世纪遗留传统的束缚。移民们眼中的美国弥漫着民主的氛围和相对发达的工业技术水平，我认为这是几乎所有移民逐渐推崇美国甚于祖国的两个主要原因。但是一般而言，真正的移民保有双重的爱国主义：在欧战期间，他们总是旗帜鲜明地站在祖国一边。他们的孩子则不再忠于父母的祖国，而是彻底地成了美国人。父母的态度要归因于美国的优势；而孩子的态度则很大程度上由学校教育决定。我们所关心的正是学校发挥的作用。
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若学校教育可以取材于美国确实具备的优点，此时当然没有必要传授那些错误的标准，来干扰美国爱国主义的灌输。但是在讲到欧洲旧世界比美国新世界优越之处时，就非得装作对真正的卓越漫不经心的样子。西欧的知识水平和东欧的艺术造诣整体上都比美国高出一筹。除了西班牙和葡萄牙，整个西欧也不像美国那么迷信。在几乎所有的欧洲国家中，个人都不像美国人那样容易盲从：即使政治自由少于美国，但是内心却更加自由。在这些方面，美国公立学校的做法是有害的。这种害处决定了传授的内容是排他性的美国爱国主义。同日本学校一样，这种错误根源在于将学生当作实现目的的工具，而非目的本身。教师应当热爱学生甚于热爱国家，否则就不是理想的教师。
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（郑文博 译）
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西南联大英文课（英汉双语版） [:1705033834]
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23 THE STRENGTH OF DEMOCRACY
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By Walter Lippmann
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THE STRENGTH Of DEMOCRACY, by Walter Lippmann, in To-day and To-morrow , March 30,1933, as reprinted in Lippmann and Nevins’s A Modern Reader , Boston, D. C. Heath and Company, 1936, pp. 73, 74.
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Walter Lippmann, formerly associate editor of the New Republic and editor of the New York World , was then on the staff of the New York Herald Tribune , writing articles （“To-day and To-morrow”） which are syndicated nationally in America. He has written a number of books, of which A Preface to Morals is perhaps the most widely read.
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The triumph of Hitler has reduced still further the domain of popular government in the world, and it is but natural that men should wonder whether it can hope to survive anywhere. Yet this impression that autocracy is sweeping the world is something of an optical illusion. The fact is that thus far at least the old democracies have withstood the impact of war and revolution and deep financial disorder. Wide as is the extension of autocracy to-day, except in one important country, it is no more widely extended than it was before the war. The exception is Italy, and Italy happens to be the one Great Power which had most recently achieved its national unity and had had the shortest experience in the conduct of representative government. For the rest it may be said that the Fascist and Communistic victories of the last fifteen years have been won only where democracy had not yet been established.
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Thus in Russia the dictatorship of Lenin and Stalin was founded on the collapse of czarism. Japan, of course, has never had more than a faint imitation of popular government. The dictatorships of Central Europe and of the Balkan peoples had never known even one generation of political liberty and political responsibility. Hitler has overthrown a republic which was half strangled from the hour of its birth. But the old democracies of Scandinavia, of Switzerland, and of France, of Britain and of the Dominions, and of the United States, are still in being: the peoples which knew democracy in the nineteenth century, the peoples who have lived under the heritage of liberalism, have not fallen into disorder and have not surrendered to dictators.
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A wise man once remarked that revolutions do not overthrow governments; governments collapse and revolutions ensue. The history of the last fifteen years offers impressive proof of this generalization. Kerensky did not overthrow the Czar. Kerensky attempted to organize a government on the ruins of the czarist regime. He failed and Lenin organized a government.
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The German republicans did not overthrow the Hohenzollerns. The Kaiser had fled and his government was demoralized. The Weimar system failed to provide a government. In a half-dozen inconclusive elections the German people proved to themselves that they had not yet learned to make representative government effective. Only then did Hitler come into power.
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The crises of the last few years have revealed the essential differences between the democracies which have a capacity to endure and the democracies which have not had it. The ineffective democracies disintegrate in a storm. Solid democracies are capable of uniting their forces, of concentrating power in an emergency, and then of relaxing when the crisis has been surmounted. The first great democracy to demonstrate this capacity was France in 1926. Confronted with what appeared to be an uncontrollable inflation, political power was concentrated in the hands of Poincaré, and order was restored. The second democracy to prove its strength was the British. In 1931, confronted with what might easily have become a catastrophe, the British people concentrated authority and mastered the danger. The third democracy to vindicate itself is our own during the last few weeks.
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It is entirely misleading to look upon the concentration of national authority which took place in France in 1926, in Great Britain in 1931, and in the United States in 1933, as part of the tide of autocracy which has been sweeping over Asia and over Europe. What has happened in these three nations is the exact opposite of what has happened where there has been a collapse in dictatorship. The French, the British, and ourselves have been able to fortify democracy because popular government was inherently strong. Fascism has been overthrowing democracy where it is inherently weak.
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Thus we are entitled to believe that democracy, once it is solidly founded in the traditions of a people, may be the toughest and most enduring of all forms of government. The generation through which we have lived seems to have given substantial proof that while popular government is difficult to establish, and must be learned by living with it, once established it will stand through very foul weather indeed.
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Notes