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5 第一次布匿战争
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1.Unger, Rheinisches Museum 34：102.von Scala, Römische Studien（a complimentary greeting from Innsbruck to the 42d Assembly of German Philologues，1893），showed that it was probable that Naevius, too, who did not write until he had reached an advanced age, had already used Philinus.
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2.Very enlightening on this point is W. Soltau in Neues Jahrbuch für Philologie 154（1896）：164.
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第五篇 第二次布匿战争
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1 第二次布匿战争的研究方法
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1.This opinion has, moreover, already been expressed by another writer, Unger in Rheinisches Museum 34：97.
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2 坎尼会战
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1. The average depth was naturally considerably smaller, since the intervals, which had become irregular during the approach march, had to be filled up before the impact with the enemy by having rearward troops spring forward. In earlier editions I still admitted the possibility of a doubled length with correspondingly lesser depth. But I have now become convinced that a front of nearly 2 kilometers would no longer have been capable of forward movement in orderly fashion. One can grasp this more clearly by imagining a street like “Unter den Linden” in Berlin, which is almost 1 kilometer long and about 90 paces wide. The Roman infantry front at Cannae would therefore have reached about from the monument of Frederick the Great to the Wilhelmstrasse and would have overflowed to some extent in its depth the width of this street.
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2.Polybius says that the Iberian and Gallic cavalry were on the left flank, the Numidians on the right, and he later characterizes the fighting of the latter as simple skirmishing.In the battle on the Trebia he makes a distinction between the heavy cavalry and the Numidians. By that account, then, the Iberian cavalry were the heavy units—a fact that does not necessarily eliminate the possibility of Hannibal’s also having had African cuirassiers, only a potiori may the light cavalry have been called the Numidian.
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3 第二次布匿战争的基本战略问题
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1.Polybius 3.89.9.
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2.I am not adding any for the fleet, since at this time they would have left very few Roman citizens aboard ship. Since there was no real sea war taking place, they were able to provide the crews from allies and slaves（except for the one fleet legion）.
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3.Livy 34.50.
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4.Livy，37.60.
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5.I do not see fit to agree with the idea that fear of the wild Gauls, who formed such a large percentage of the Punic army, caused the Italians to adhere to Rome; for the defections increased continuously in the years 210 and 211 B.C.，although that fear, to whatever extent it existed, must have been getting stronger and stronger.
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6. The numerous victories that the Romans are supposed to have won from Hannibal from 216 to 203 B.C. according to Livy, were, as is so excellently explained by W. Streit in On the History of the Second Punic War in Italy after the Battle of Cannae（Zur Geschichte des zweiten punischen Krieges in Italien nach der Schlacht bei Canna, Berlin，1887），patriotic Roman fantasies—frankly, pure lies. Very nicely was Streit able to add up that Hannibal is supposed to have lost 120，000 killed in all these battles from Cannae on. Where it was a question of larger battles, as at Herdoniae and Numistro, victory still went to the Carthaginians. The alleged victories of Marcellus at Nola turn out to be very insignificant engagements.
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7.It is precisely this way that Polybius describes the situation（9.3-4）.
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4 战前战略态势回顾
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1. The Second Punic War and its Historical Sources, Polybius and Livy, Explained from Strategic-Tactical Viewpoints. The years 219 and 218 B.C, exclusive of the Crossing of the Alps. An Essay by Joseph Fuchs, Imperial and Royal Professor in Wiener-Neustadt.（Der zweite punische Krieg und seine Quellen Polybius und Livius nach strategisch-taktischen Gesichtspunkten beleuchtet. Die Jahre 219 und 218，mit Aus-schluss des Alpenüberganges. Ein Versuch von Joseph Fuchs, k.k. Professor in Wiener-Neustadt.）Wiener-Neustadt，1894. In Rom-mission bei: Carl Blumrich, Wiener-Neustadt; M. Perles, Wien; T. Thomas, Leipzig.
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Hannibal’s Crossing of the Alps. Conclusions from Research and Travel, by Joseph Fuchs, Imperial and Royal Professor in Wiener-Neustadt. With two maps and one illustration.（Hannibal’s Alpenübergang. Ein Studien-und Reiseergebnis von Joseph Fuchs, k.k. Professor in Wiener-Neustadt. Mit zwei Karten und einer Abbil-dung.）Vienna, Carl Konegen，1897.
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The question of which pass Hannibal used for his crossing of the Alps does not belong in the framework of this book, since no important strategic or tactical conclusions result from the variety of routes. Fuchs has decided on the Mont Genevre Pass. Konrad Lehmann in The Attacks of the Three Barcas Against Italy（Die Angriffe der drei Barkiden auf Italien），1905，has once again, with a very thorough argument, pointed to the Little Saint Bernard. Subsequently, French Captain of Engineers Colin, too, has appeared in this arena with a work entitled Hannibal in Gaul（Annibal en Gaule），1904. To date, none of the various theories has been able to win general acceptance.
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5 罗马占据上风
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1.Raimund Oehler, The Last Campaign of Hasdrubal Barca and the Battle on the Metaurus. An historical-topographical Study.（Der letzte Feldzug des Barkiden Hasdrubal und die Schlacht am Metaurus.Eine historisch-topographische Studie.）1897. The significant aspects of its conclusions were rejected by Konrad Lehmann, Deutsche Literaturzeitung，1897，No.23，Column 902.
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Lehmann himself later treated the battle in detail in his book The Attacks of the three Boreas（Die Angriffe der drei Barkiden），1905，and sought to reconstruct the battle, but the result remains subject to serious doubts. I doubt that, in view of the sources available, it will ever be possible to gain a positive insight into the battle. Even the army strengths are very uncertain. Lehmann estimates that Hannibal still had 15，000 men and Hasdrubal 12，000，whereas there were 150，000 Romans under arms in Italy. With numbers such as these, the Romans’conduct would be incomprehensible. See also the critique of Kromayer, Göttingische gelehrte Anzeigen，169，No.2（June 1907）：458. Beversdorff gives Hasdrubal 15，000 men on the Metaurus, whereas Kromayer estimates some 30，000.
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2.Mommsen, Political Law（Staatsrecht），Vol.2，Part 1，p.652.
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