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3.Livy 29.19.
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4.Livy 30.1.10.
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5.Livy 24.18.
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6.Livy 27.7.
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7. The Locrians made such a complaint on this score that the Senate conducted an investigation. Livy 29.8-22.
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6 扎马-那拉加拉会战：梯队战术
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1.Livy 27.49.
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2.Why he did not go directly to Carthage is not reported. Perhaps he simply did not want to arrive in the capital with the few survivors of the battle and may have had in Hadrumet some troop reinforcements and supplies of weapons, which, if brought along with him, would still give him a position and the city a possibility to defend itself.
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3.Livy 29.22.
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4.See also p.276，above.
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7 汉尼拔与西庇阿
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1.In the speech that Livy has the elderly Quintus Fabius Max-imus and Scipio himself make in the Senate concerning the planned expedition, this motive does not appear with correct emphasis.If he pointed this out, Scipio would have been placing too much stress on the difficulty of the whole undertaking, whereas his speech was based, and necessarily so, on emphasizing the concept of the offensive with unconditional confidence.
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2.We can assume that Hannibal returned to Africa in the fall of 203 B.C. and that the battle of Naraggara took place in about August of 202 B.C. Lehmann, p.555.
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3.Proved by Konrad Lehmann in Jahrbücher fur klassische Philologie 153：573.
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第六篇 作为世界征服者的罗马军队
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1 罗马军队与马其顿军队
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1.Polybius 18.28.
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2.It was already understood in this way by Johann von Nassau and Montecucoli. Jähns I：573. Montecucoli, Writings（Schriften）2：225.
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3.See also in this connection Livy 33.18.
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4.Polybius 18.28.
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5.In the second volume of his Antike Schlachtfelder, Kromayer has placed the battle somewhat differently than was earlier the case; nothing new has resulted from this change insofar as the actual events are concerned. Whether his account of the strategic relationships of the entire war, which are treated very thoroughly on the basis of specialized topographical research, is to the point, I have not verified in detail.
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2 职业军队：大队战术
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1.J.J.Müller, in Philologus 34（1876）：125，has already observed that the four regular legions could not possibly have absorbed the entire mass of service-obligated young men. He believes therefore that, depending on need, the youngest year-groups—e.g.，ten—were inducted. But even that would give much too large a number.
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2.Fröhlich, in Caesar’s Method of Waging War（Kriegswesen Cäsars）pp.13-14，effectively raises doubts whether the definitive introduction of the cohort tactics should really be ascribed to Marius. Mad-wig believed that it did not occur until the War with the Allies. On the other hand, it is perhaps possible to prove its existence as early as the Jugurthine War.It is my opinion, however, that every probability points to the fact that Marius was the reformer. The cohorts that are referred to in the Jugurthine War（Sallust 51.3；100.4）need not be considered as tactical units but merely as parts of the legion, and if, according to a Sisenna fragment, there was still on one occasion in the War with the Allies a battle by maniples, there is little to be concluded from that, since, after all, there were maniples in existence both before and after that event.
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3.Nitzsch, in History of the Roman Republic（Geschichte der römischen Republik）（published by Thouret），1：181，has already drawn attention to the fact that if, after Cannae, legions appeared formed up one behind the other, that was related to the fact that in the newly formed legions the differences of age did not play the same role as in earlier days.
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