1700080490

1700080491 1.For a while it was even believed that the Mongols had to be credited for an outstanding role in the history of the art of war, particularly since there exist theoretical concepts that supposedly stem from Tamer lane. But in the final analysis their accomplishments were no different from those of other nomads, and Tamerlane’s principles were without real content. For a summary of these points and applicable references, see Jähns, Handbuch, p.698 ff. The battle of Liegnitz，1242，in view of the legendary nature of the source, gives us nothing new, as far as I can see, on the history of the art of war.

1700080492

1700080493 2.P.A. von Tischendorf, The Feudal System in the Moslem Nations, especially in the Ottoman Empire. With the Book of Laws of the Fiefs under Sultan Ahmed I（Das Lehnswesen in den moslimischen Staaten insbesondere im osmanischen Reiche. Mit dent Gesetzbuch der Lehen unter Sultan Ahmed I.），Leipzig，1872.

1700080494

1700080495 3.Heinrich Schurtz，“The Janissaries”（“Die Janitscharen”），Preussische Jahrbücher, Vol.112（1903）. Leopold von Schlözer, Origin and Development of the Ancient Turkish Army（Ursprung und Entwickelung des alttürkischen Heeres），1900. Ranke, The Ottomans and the Spanish Monarchy（Die Osmanen und die spanische Monarchie），Werke, Vol.35.

1700080496

1700080497 4.The Segban were supposedly formed from the sultan’s hunting retinue. The report that this body was 7，000 men strong was, of course, a great exaggeration. And with this point there also collapses the idea that an oda numbered more than 200 men and the resulting ideas concerning the file and the tent group. Schurtz, p.459. Under Selim I，1512-1520，the janissaries are supposed to have been only 3，000 men strong, but in 1550 they were supposedly 16，000. Schurtz, p.454. In that case, the “3，000” would no doubt refer only to the original 66 oda. On p.459，Schurtz states that under Mohammed II the janissaries numbered 12，000.

1700080498

1700080499 5.The standard special study is the Berlin dissertation “The Battle of Nikopol”（“Die Schlacht bei Nikopolis”），by Gustav Kling. Published by Georg Nauck，1906.

1700080500

1700080501 6.Kling estimates the Turkish strength between 16，000 and 20，000 men. That would then be more than twice the strength of the Christians. Based on the numbers given by Schurtz, discussed in Note 4，above, he assumes a strength of only 3，000 men for the janissaries but believes that dismounted irregulars were also present, for whom the janissaries had formed the nucleus. I would prefer to eliminate completely these “dismounted irregulars”—Beyazid would hardly have brought along any troops other than quality warriors—but I would assume a greater strength for the janissaries.

1700080502

1700080503 7.Characteristic of the loose manner in which chroniclers treated army strengths is the fact that Königshofen gave the strength of the Christian army as 100，000 men but stated its losses as 200，000.

1700080504

1700080505 5　胡斯派

1700080506

1700080507 1.Handbuch, p.943.

1700080508

1700080509 2.Geschichte Böhmens（History of Bohemia），3：2：67.

1700080510

1700080511 3.“The Hussite Wagon Fort”（“Die hussitische Wagenburg”）by Max von Wulf, Berlin dissertation，1889.“Hussite Military System”（“Hussitisches Kriegswesen”），by Max von Wulf, Preussische Jahrbücher，69：673. May 1892.

1700080512

1700080513 4.Preussische Jahrbücher，69：674. Dissertation, p.21.

1700080514

1700080515 5.See Vol.I, pp.162，211，218，241.

1700080516

1700080517 6.Jähns, Kriegswissenschaften, p.943.

1700080518

1700080519 7.Loserth, p.489.

1700080520

1700080521 8.Palacky, Geschichte Böhmens，3：2：361.

1700080522

1700080523 9.That the Hussites had already won a great victory over the Germans on 14 June 1420 at the Witkoberg（Ziska Mountain），east of Prague, is but a fable. See Bezold, King Sigismund and the Wars of the Empire against the Hussites（König Sigmund und die Reichskriege gegen die Hussiten），1：41 ff. Loserth, History of the Later Middle Ages（Geschichte des späteren Mittelalters），p.490. This battle may very well be compared with the engagement at Valmy in 1792. They only repulsed an attack by the enemy. But that very success was sufficient and aroused belief in the future. Likewise the victory at Wischerad on 1 November 1420 does not yet show anything of the special Hussite combat methods. Since the German princes had returned home, Sigismund had only his own forces at hand, consisting principally of Moravians. He planned to relieve Wischerad, near Prague, and was definitely counting on a sortie by the garrison. But since the garrison had already agreed to an armistice, it could not act. We may therefore assume that the army of Prague, with its reinforcements from lords and other cities, had a large numerical superiority. Only a small mounted contingent of the Taborites was present.

1700080524

1700080525 10.The Mitteilungen des Vereins für Geschichte der Deutschen in Böhmen，31（1893）: 297，contains the description of the illustration of a Hussite battlewagon in a Munich manuscript by A. Wiedemann. Despite the very definite caption “This is the Hussite wagon fort on which the Hussites fight. It is good and straight，” the illustration does not seem to me to be very reliable.

1700080526

1700080527 The regulation that the wagons were to move in four columns and the two outer columns were somewhat longer than the inner ones, in order to form the forward and rear sides of the camp with the additional wagons, is, after all, only theory, or it refers only to the last formation before the deployment. Entire marches in the prescribed four columns could be carried out in only a very few places on this earth. See Wulf, pp.27，29.he two inner columns formed a small rectangle in the interior, with entry passages.

1700080528

1700080529 According to Wulf’s dissertation, p. 43，in Hungary in 1423 Ziska made a bastion in front of the forward and rear gates of his wagon fort, surrounded them with a trench, and placed muskets in them.

1700080530

1700080531 11.Historia Bohemorum, Chap.40，as cited in Wulf, Dissertation, p.16.

1700080532

1700080533 12.Wulf, Dissertation, p.43；according to Köhler，3：1：303 ff.

1700080534

1700080535 13.As an example of how far an oral legend that is correct in itself can lead astray an author who no longer understands it, let us observe what Ludwig von Eyb has to say about the formation on a ridge. Eyb was a Brandenburg captain and wrote his Kriegsbuch around 1500. In the chapter on the wagon forts, he, too, points out the requirement that they were to deploy on a ridge, but as the reason for this he says that it was to prevent the possibility of their being placed under water.

1700080536

1700080537 14.Wulf, Dissertation, p.53.

1700080538

1700080539 15.Wulf, Preussische Jahrbücher, p.680.

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