1700080850 15.In the minutes of the meeting of 15 May（Eidgenössische Abschrifte，2：593）there is stated only “and fifty men dead.”The same minutes, however, state that 1，500 or 1，600 slain Burgundians were found, and that the duke had 60，000 actual mounted men and still more of the other troops. Consequently, it is not very trustworthy. The men of Schwyz had seventy wounded and seven killed（Knebel states that they lost eighty men all together）. On the basis of the accounts for the care of the wounded, the total of wounded can be assumed to be about 700，and the figure for those killed may then be something between fifty and seventy.

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1700080852 Bernoulli, Baseler Neujahrsblatt，1899，p. 23，and Feldmann, Schlacht bei Granson, p.56，assume the losses to be only fifty dead and between 300 and 400 wounded.

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1700080854 16.Dändliker, in his Geschichte der Schweiz，2：224，explains the failure to exploit the victory at Grandson as completely due to the lack of military understanding on the part of the Confederation. He writes: “In their joy over the uplifting success at Grandson, the men of the Confederation were initially no longer concerned about Duke Charles. They considered their mission as accomplished. When Bern, which was not inclined to such a carefree and self-deceptive attitude and took the situation seriously, wanted to continue the war, the majority of the Confederation decided for the return home.”Such experienced warriors as the troops of Zurich, with their burgomaster Waldmann, and the other members of the Confederation are not supposed to have been capable of understanding the situation when Bern explained to them that they could best protect themselves against a renewed attack by a pursuit of the defeated army? We see here to what point a false basic concept finally leads. Dändliker is not willing to concede that the Swiss were the aggressors in this war, but he would like to explain the war as a kind of emergency defense, because the Swiss felt themselves threatened by the duke of Burgundy. If it were not absolutely clear from the original sources, then the conduct of the Swiss after the victory of Grandson would show how extremely far from the minds of the Swiss was the thought of feeling threatened by the Burgundian force.

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1700080856 17.My estimate of the strength of the Burgundians at Murten（20，000 men at most）has, of course, been disputed widely by the Swiss, but nothing tangible has been brought up to oppose my viewpoint. Dierauer, p.211，would like to go up to a number between 23，000 and 25，000 men, but only on the basis of reported reinforcements in the last days before the battle, reinforcements that have not been proven. In my estimate, the only correction to be made is the note in Perser-und Burgunderkriege, p.153，where, according to the latest critical edition of Comines by Mandrot，1：363，the number “18，000” means, after all，“18，000 dead，” that is, all together, whereas, according to him, of those “prenant gages”—that is, warriors—8，000 are supposed to have fallen.

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1700080858 18.Panigarola，10 June. Gingins，2：242.

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1700080860 19.Panigarola，13 June. Gingins，2：258. Panigarola’s statements that Charles had his camp fortified are confirmed and clarified by the illustrations in Schilling’s Chronik（one of which is reproduced in Ochsenbein’s Urkundenbuch and in the treatment by Colonel Meister）and by the battle song by Zoller（printed in Ochsenbein, p.494）. There it reads as follows:

1700080861

1700080862 He inclosed his army all around

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1700080864 As he desired, from lake to higher ground.

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1700080866 A stream he dammed to make it swell.

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1700080868 The work continued night and day，

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1700080870 And soon Count Romont’s camp completed lay.

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1700080872 Great trees he caused his men to fell.

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1700080874 Who has ever seen works so fine

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1700080876 Accomplished in but two weeks’time?

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1700080878 20.Panigarola，12 June，13 June.

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1700080880 21.On 16 June the duke had the following report written to the municipal council of Dijon:

1700080881

1700080882 Last night we were awake and on foot with the intention of marching with our whole army out toward our enemies, who are at a distance from us of two short leagues and who, as had been reported to us, had joined forces and assembled in order to move closer to us and fight, and we await them from hour to hour.

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1700080884 （Ochsenbein, p. 280）.

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1700080886 Wattelet, p. 29 ff.and notes 88 and 89，relates that to an idea of moving out against the Swiss. But it is apparent that only the idea of accepting battle on the Grünhag is meant. Wattelet has inadvertently interpreted the same report twice, on the sixteenth and the nineteenth. And his interpretation in Note 85，of Panigarola’s report of the eighteenth, to the effect that Charles intended to attack the Swiss near Gümmenen on the nineteenth, I consider to be incorrect. The words “dar la bataglia”（to give battle）refer to a planned attack on Murten, as Gingins has already interpreted it in his translation.

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1700080888 22.A number of scholars, especially Wattelet（see below），have disputed the fact that the Swiss formed the usual three units of foot soldiers at Murten. Schilling’s positive statement on the point, however, cannot possibly be invalidated by the fact that a few sources speak only of two units, and least of all because Panigarola saw only two units or because only two units are mentioned in Schilling’s later account of the battle. The third unit did not enter the fight itself but simply stormed into the camp on the heels of the other two, and there the formations broke up. Even if we did not have Schilling’s testimony, it would be completely incomprehensible that the Swiss should have abandoned the normal formation in three units precisely here, with such a large army. They could not know in advance whether the entire Burgundian army was not in position at the palisade and whether there would develop a flanking counterattack from one side or another, defending against which would then have been the mission of the rear guard.

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1700080890 23.Herter’s command position is definitely proven by the two mutually independent statements of Knebel and Etterlin. Schilling’s silence on this point, as it occurred, may not be considered as counterproof. Of itself, it is not particularly important, since the top commander in such an army was not necessarily the general charged with the mission and the responsibility of strategic direction. In this case, the entire war council was the final authority; Herter had only to take care of the technical execution. This situation needs to be noted only because of the analogy to the mutual relationships of the Greek cantons in the Persian wars: in both cases, the great work succeeds only through constant surmounting of the strongest internal tensions, the reflection of which can also be detected throughout the sources.

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1700080892 Along with Dändliker，3d ed.，p.842，1，too, prefer to accept as certain that Waldmann was the leader of the main body.

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1700080894 24.Report of 8 July. Gingins，2：345.

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1700080896 25.Edlibach, p.157.

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1700080898 26.Baseler Chroniken，3：26.

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