1700080873

1700080874 Who has ever seen works so fine

1700080875

1700080876 Accomplished in but two weeks’time?

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1700080878 20.Panigarola，12 June，13 June.

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1700080880 21.On 16 June the duke had the following report written to the municipal council of Dijon:

1700080881

1700080882 Last night we were awake and on foot with the intention of marching with our whole army out toward our enemies, who are at a distance from us of two short leagues and who, as had been reported to us, had joined forces and assembled in order to move closer to us and fight, and we await them from hour to hour.

1700080883

1700080884 （Ochsenbein, p. 280）.

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1700080886 Wattelet, p. 29 ff.and notes 88 and 89，relates that to an idea of moving out against the Swiss. But it is apparent that only the idea of accepting battle on the Grünhag is meant. Wattelet has inadvertently interpreted the same report twice, on the sixteenth and the nineteenth. And his interpretation in Note 85，of Panigarola’s report of the eighteenth, to the effect that Charles intended to attack the Swiss near Gümmenen on the nineteenth, I consider to be incorrect. The words “dar la bataglia”（to give battle）refer to a planned attack on Murten, as Gingins has already interpreted it in his translation.

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1700080888 22.A number of scholars, especially Wattelet（see below），have disputed the fact that the Swiss formed the usual three units of foot soldiers at Murten. Schilling’s positive statement on the point, however, cannot possibly be invalidated by the fact that a few sources speak only of two units, and least of all because Panigarola saw only two units or because only two units are mentioned in Schilling’s later account of the battle. The third unit did not enter the fight itself but simply stormed into the camp on the heels of the other two, and there the formations broke up. Even if we did not have Schilling’s testimony, it would be completely incomprehensible that the Swiss should have abandoned the normal formation in three units precisely here, with such a large army. They could not know in advance whether the entire Burgundian army was not in position at the palisade and whether there would develop a flanking counterattack from one side or another, defending against which would then have been the mission of the rear guard.

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1700080890 23.Herter’s command position is definitely proven by the two mutually independent statements of Knebel and Etterlin. Schilling’s silence on this point, as it occurred, may not be considered as counterproof. Of itself, it is not particularly important, since the top commander in such an army was not necessarily the general charged with the mission and the responsibility of strategic direction. In this case, the entire war council was the final authority; Herter had only to take care of the technical execution. This situation needs to be noted only because of the analogy to the mutual relationships of the Greek cantons in the Persian wars: in both cases, the great work succeeds only through constant surmounting of the strongest internal tensions, the reflection of which can also be detected throughout the sources.

1700080891

1700080892 Along with Dändliker，3d ed.，p.842，1，too, prefer to accept as certain that Waldmann was the leader of the main body.

1700080893

1700080894 24.Report of 8 July. Gingins，2：345.

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1700080896 25.Edlibach, p.157.

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1700080898 26.Baseler Chroniken，3：26.

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1700080900 27.Schilling wrote that, after the Grünhag was taken，“and all the formations were broken from that moment on.”The editors believe that this statement is unlikely，“or is it supposed to be the same maneuver that is indicated in the Lurlebatlied（one of the songs composed about this battle and recorded by Schilling）as’the point which spread out’”?Such is no doubt the case, except that it is not a question of a “maneuver，” but of the natural breaking up of a closed formation in the course of and following such an assault.

1700080901

1700080902 28.The reports in the Jahrzeitbuch von Schwyz in the Anzeiger für Schweizerische Geschichte，1895，p.160，are probably worthless.

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1700080904 29.In Ochsenbein, Urkunden, pp.339，341.

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1700080906 30.Two special studies have been devoted to the battle of Nancy: one by Robert Schoeber（Erlangen dissertation，1891）and one by Max Laux（Rostock dissertation，1895，Süssenguth Press, Berlin）. Laux’s work has a useful plan of the battle, a comprehensive basis in the sources, and corrects a number of the errors of his predecessors, but it is not without its own errors and oversights.

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1700080908 31.Laux, p.20，estimates Charles’s strength at the end of July as 4，000 to 5，000 men, which he believes was not increased by significant reinforcements. Consequently, he believes that, for the battle, the scouting report that was made to the Confederation to the effect that the duke had only a small column, some 6，000 men, is the figure closest to the truth. But there were probably more than that; for when Laux bases his estimate on the fact that Panigarola reports nothing about reinforcements, it can be said in rebuttal that Panigarola had already left the duke when they marched into Lorraine, and his last report was dated 19 October. From then until January, the duke could have drawn many reinforcements from the Netherlands. Schoeber estimates a strength between 7，000 and 8，000，but without any real computation.

1700080909

1700080910 The sources with a Burgundian bias go as low as 2，000 or even 1，200（Rodt，2：392）. Rodt has assumed 14，000，of whom 4，000 guarded the camp against a possible sortie from Nancy, while 10，000 participated in the battle. But his estimate is based on statements by the duke himself, which can be proven to have been intentionally exaggerated. See Laux, p.20.Mémoires de Comines, ed. Mandrot，1：386.

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1700080912 Let us mention here Olivier de la Marche as an example of how little credence can be given to the figures of authors, even those who appear to have had the most reliable information at their disposal. He was majordomo of the duke of Burgundy and was taken prisoner at Nancy by the duke of Lorraine, buying his freedom for a high ransom. He was thus able to learn of the situation on both sides. His memoirs are printed in the Collection Petitot, Vols.IX and X. He states: “a good 12，000 combatants”（instead of almost 20，000），“and the duke of Burgundy went before them; and I swear that he did not have 2，000 combatants”（instead of 8，000 to 10，000）.

1700080913

1700080914 32.According to Comines’s account（cited by Mandrot, p.386），he was, of course, supposedly directly informed of René’s great numerical superiority, but such later accounts have but little credibility.

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1700080916 33.Dispatches of the Milanese Ambassadors（Déþêches des ambassadeurs Milanais），ed.by Gingins，2：349.

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1700080918 34.von Rodt, Wars of Charles the Bold（Kriege Karls des Kühnen），2：315.

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1700080920 35.There is nothing of importance in the small variations in the interpretation of this passage. See Schoeber, p.33，note; Jähns, Manual of Military History（Handbuch der Geschichte des Kriegswesens），p.1009-See also pp.511 and 514，above.

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1700080922 36.The passage reads verbatim:

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