1700088866
1700088867
5 海达斯佩斯河会战
1700088868
1700088869
1.Curtius’figures are worthless. At no place in the Anabasis does Arrian give an overall number, but mentions only in the Indica, Chapter 19，that the King, when he started his withdrawal, was followed by 120，000 combatants（“fit for battle”*），including many barbarians. Huge levies of Indian princes, more or less fictitious, may have been included in the count. Even putting that point aside, it is not known what the origin of this number is and whether it is reliable. We may rely on the numbers Arrian gives in the Anabasis concerning the Macedonian army, since he is depending here significantly on Ptolemy, but what we find in the Indica may have been taken from almost any unclear source. Plutarch, Chapter 66，even puts the army that makes the march through Gadrosia at 120，000 men on foot and 150，000 horsemen.
1700088870
1700088871
The computation by Rüstow and Köchly（p.298）is not sufficiently supported; they claim to estimate the strength of the army concentrated on the Hydaspes at 69，000 men and 10，000 horses. The authors themselves characterize the advance guard force as the one “that really fights the battles.”And that is the way it actually is; and here I ask, Why should a commander like Alexander have complicated the conduct of the war by dragging along with him other large masses of troops for which there never appears any need throughout the course of the war?
1700088872
1700088873
2. The rest of the army—according to the positive statement of Arrian, which we have no reason to doubt—did not cross over\the Hydaspes until the battle was decided and therefore may not be counted as participating in the actual combat.
1700088874
1700088875
3.Cramer, Contributions to the History of Alexander the Great（Beiträge zur Geschichte Alexanders des Grossen），Marburg dissertation，1893.
1700088876
1700088877
4.In any event Rüstow and Köchly’s idea that this Indian prince, Abisares, moved up to Porus on the right bank of the Hydaspes, is false. There he would have run directly into the hands of the Macedonians and would have been intercepted without being able to receive help from Porus or himself helping Porus. Curtius（8.47）also says expressly that Porus expected the reinforcements on the left bank.
1700088878
1700088879
5.In his essay “The Use of the Elephant for Military Purposes in Antiquity”（“Die Verwendung des Elefanten zu kriegerischen Zwecken im Altertum”），Jahrbücher fur die deutsche Armee and Marine, Vol.49，December 1883，Major Ohlendorf states the belief that the infantry had the mission of preventing the elephants from turning around.It is difficult to know how the infantry was supposed to go about that. The concept is apparently founded on a translation error.
1700088880
1700088881
6.Alexander had also taken along to the crossing point two taxis of pezetairoi. Nevertheless, they do not appear in the battle formation; only hypaspists and light infantry were involved. The number, too—a total of 6，000 men on foot—eliminates them. Rüstow and Köchly（p.229）have assumed that they were left behind at the crossing point in order to oppose Abisares in case of need. That would have been an error, even if Abisares was expected here; primarily, it was a question of striking Porus with a combination of all one’s forces and of avoiding a fight with Abisares until that was accomplished. An isolated force of light infantry could easily have fallen a victim to him. The reason the pezetairoi were not in the battle is probably simply that they had not completed their crossing.To cross a broad river with inflated skins and just a few boats requires a great deal of time.
1700088882
1700088883
6 作为统帅的亚历山大
1700088884
1700088885
1.Against Philip*（Philippics）3.123.para.49.
1700088886
1700088887
2.H.Droysen, in Studies（Untersuchungen），p.66，assembled the accounts of Alexander’s forced marches. I would, however, prefer not to repeat the detailed figures concerning time and space. The estimate of distances is very arbitrary, and it is also quite doubtful whether the time is always reported accurately. Schwarz, in his very worthwhile study Alexander’s Campaigns in Turkestan（Alexanders Feldzüge in Turkestan），1893，which is based on his personal knowledge of the land and the people, has established, probably correctly, that the march that, according to Arrian 4.6，Alexander made within three days was from Chodschent to Samarkand. Arrian estimates the distance at 1，500 stadia, which means 275 kilometers or 170 miles, and the latest measurements actually give 278 kilometers. Such a march in three days, however, exceeds the capabilities of even the best unit.
1700088888
1700088889
In 3. 15，Arrian recounts that Alexander reached the Lycus（Zab）on the same evening as the battle of Gaugamela, and Arbela on the following day, which is situated 600 stadia—i.e.，68 miles—from the battlefield. We may say with reasonable certainty that the distance was about half that great, but even that is still a tremendous performance.
1700088890
1700088891
3.Of course, it is not a completely new idea that a pursuit magnifies and completes a victory. After Plataea the Mantineans wished to pursue the Persians as far as Thessaly, according to Herodotus 9.77. After the victory at Delium the Boeotian cavalry and light infantry pursued the Athenians until darkness intervened（Thucydides 4.96）. Likewise Alcibiades pursued the beaten Persians with cavalry and hoplites（Hellenica 1.2.16）. Derdas pursued the defeated Olynthians a distance of 90 stadia（Hellenica 5.3.2）. See also other passages in Liers, p.184. These are nevertheless only exceptional cases and are not to be compared with Alexander’s pursuits. In theory, Xenophon, too, in the Cyropaedia（5.3，conclusion），had already recommended pursuit, with the addition that not all the troops should be committed to it but that some should always be kept at hand in good order.
1700088892
1700088893
7 继业者
1700088894
1700088895
1.H.Droysen Studies（Untersuchungen），p.155. Droysen incorrectly concludes, precisely from the fact of the energetic drilling, that there was a worsening of the soldier material.Rather, one may draw from the energy of the military training the opposite conclusion—i.e.，that a strong military spirit existed. The conclusion on p.132，too, that with the increasing size of the armies the material must have gotten continuously worse, is inadmissible. In the huge area of all the Diadochi empires the militarily qualified material was hardly exhausted even with a few hundred thousand men, and “pirates” can become very excellent soldiers.
1700088896
1700088897
2.Athenaeus reports（5.35.202-203）about a procession in Alexandria in about 275 or 274 B.C.in which 57，600 dismounted men and 23，210 mounted men had formed the rear units.
1700088898
1700088899
Appian reports in Preface, Chapter 10，that Ptolemy II had possessed, toward the end of his reign, an army of 200，000 dismounted men，40，000 cavalry，300 elephants，2，000 war chariots，1，500 warships and 2，000 transport ships.
1700088900
1700088901
Paul M. Meyer, in The Military System of the Ptolemies and the Romans in Egypt（Das Heerwesen der Ptolemäer und Römer in Aegypten），p.8，accepts these figures. Nevertheless, it is not hard to recognize that they are greatly exaggerated. One need only imagine what a parade of 57，600 dismounted men and 23，210 mounted men through the streets of a city means. Egypt may at that time have had 3 to 4 million inhabitants（Beloch, Population[Bevölkerung]，p.258）; or 7 million, as it was reported and apparently accepted by Ulrich Wilcken, Greek Potsherds from Egypt and Nubia（Griechische Os-traka aus Aegypten and Nubien），p.490. This would have made a standing army of 240，000 men amount to 3½ to 7 percent of the population. A fifth of the reported figures would still be quite a large number.
1700088902
1700088903
第四篇 古罗马
1700088904
1700088905
1 骑士与方阵
1700088906
1700088907
1.In spite of the contradiction that Eduard Meyer brought up in his History of Antiquity（Geschichte des Altertums），Vol.2，para.499，I still feel permitted and obliged to hold to this concept of “the continuity of the development of Rome in its constitutional history.”For it is completely clear that the basic principle of the Roman constitutional law, the official power of the magistrature, dates back to a very early time and was gradually divided up and weakened. It is completely impossible that such a strict concept of the power of the official position might not have been formed until the formal sovereign power was already in the hands of the general people’s assembly; it is astonishing enough that that strong concept was able to assert itself for so long within the framework of the sovereignty of the people.
1700088908
1700088909
Furthermore, it is fully clear that the voting organization of the historical period originally had a purely military and no political basis; consequently, this institution, too, goes back to the period of a very strong monarchy.
1700088910
1700088911
One may therefore truly speak of the “continuity of the development of Roman constitutional history，” without, of course, taking for more than they actually were the historical changes of outer form—against which, after all, really only the voice of Meyer has apparently been raised.
1700088912
1700088913
I can leave aside here all the doubt over the authenticity of the chronology and the historical account in detail. The material in which I am interested for this work is not affected by it.
1700088914
1700088915
2.See particularly Vol.III, Book III, Chapters I and II, especially p.251[of the German 2d ed.，1923].
[
上一页 ]
[ :1.700088866e+09 ]
[
下一页 ]