1700091937

1700091938 7.Brunner, Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte 1：39；（2d edition, p.58）.

1700091939

1700091940 8.This point is correctly observed by Dahn in Procop von Cäsarea, p.391.

1700091941

1700091942 9.Ammianus 12.12.61.

1700091943

1700091944 10.Lavisse, Histoire de la France 1：2. Les Origines, la Gaule indépendant et la Gaule Romaine, by G. Bloch, Paris.1901，p.299 f. Ad. Blanchet, in The Roman Walls of Gaul（Les enceintes Romaines de la Gaule），1907，rejects, on the basis of the broadest research, the theories that would place the construction of these fortifications as late as Diocletian’s period, in the fourth century or even later.

1700091945

1700091946 11.According to the citation by Dahn, in Könige der Germanen 5：26.

1700091947

1700091948 12.Mommsen, Ostgotische Studien, Neues Archiv für ältere deutsche Geschichte 14：460. L. Schmidt, Geschichte der Vandalen，1901，pp.65，72，122.

1700091949

1700091950 13.The study on the battle at the Milvian Bridge by F. Trebelmann in the Abhandlung der Heidelberger Akademie，1915，is very valuable topographically, but from the military history viewpoint it misses the mark just as much as Seeck’s account does. Both authors are still entangled in the concept of massive armies. They even believe the sources to the effect that Maxentius had superior forces—and even several times as many—to those of Constantine. Since it is naturally impossible to construct any reasonable account with such preconceptions, Seeck grasps the expedient of having both commanders lead their armies by dreams and portents rather than strategic considerations. I do not see why both Constantine and Maxentius should not have been capable of interpreting their dreams and signs in the same way as had previously been done by Themistocles. Pausanias, and Mardonius. The account by Landmann in Dölgner’s Constantine the Great and His Times（Konstantin der Grosse und seine Zeit），1913，is reasonable, but in view of the lack of sources, it is without any conclusion of importance to military history.

1700091951

1700091952 2　斯特拉斯堡会战　无

1700091953

1700091954 3　阿德里安堡会战

1700091955

1700091956 1.It is curious that the West Roman troops were fighting in the Dobrudscha and when they were returning to Illyricum, they encountered the Taefalae. Is it possible that they had previously left the Taefalae behind them? These bands probably did not cross the Danube until the Roman troops had already moved farther eastward. Perhaps the East Goths under Alatheus and Safrax also did not come across the Danube until now, although Ammianus recounts this earlier. In any case, the reinforcements that moved to join the Germans must have been very significant.

1700091957

1700091958 2.Here I believe it is permissible to combine the accounts by Eunapius and Zosimus with that of Ammianus. See Excursus.

1700091959

1700091960 3.Constantine Joseph Jirecek. The Military Road from Belgrade to Constantinople（Die Heerstrasse von Belgrad nach Konstantinopel），1877，p.145.

1700091961

1700091962 4.In addition to the Generalkarte of the Balkans, published by Artaria in Vienna in 1897，there is now available a still better Bulgarian map（1：420，000），which I have used. It is based on surveys made by Russian officers during the war of 1877-1878. The map of European Turkey published by the Turkish general staff, although it bears the title “Drawn up by the General Staff of His Majesty, through Allah’s Grace all-powerful and all-protecting，” is only a scarcely changed reproduction of the Austrian Generalkarte, according to Hardt von Hartenthurm in the Mitteilungen des königlich-kaiserlichen militärischen geographischen Instituts, Vol.18. See Austria-Hungary and the Balkan Countries（Oesterreich-Ungarn und die Balkanländer），by L.v. Thalloczy, Budapest，1901.

1700091963

1700091964 5.Socrates 4.38.

1700091965

1700091966 6.Theodoret 4.33.

1700091967

1700091968 7.Sozomenos 6.40.

1700091969

1700091970 8.Socrates 4.38.

1700091971

1700091972 4　军队兵力

1700091973

1700091974 1.G.Kaufmann, Deutsche Geschichte 1：89.

1700091975

1700091976 2.I cannot understand how Schmidt, in Geschichte der Vandalen, p.130，can interpret the remark by Procopius 2.7，that Belisarius with 5，000 horsemen defeated the enemy, as meaning that the Guard was 5，000 men strong and these are to be added to the 15，000 men that Procopius 1.11 gives as the army strength.

1700091977

1700091978 3.Panegyriki 9 praises Constantine for having accomplished more with fewer troops than did Alexander, who had supposedly had 40.000.

1700091979

1700091980 Panegyriki 8. 3.3.says he defeated Maxentius “vix enim quarta parte exercitus contra centum milia hostium”（“with scarcely a quarter of his army against 100，000 of the enemy”）.

1700091981

1700091982 In 313 against Licinius, he is also said by Anon. Bales.to have had 25，000 men.

1700091983

1700091984 4.A very energetic addition to the analysis of the figures reported by Procopius is given by H. Eckhardt in the Königsberg Program（1864），“On Agathias and Procopius as Sources for the War with the Goths”（“Ueber Agathias und Procop als Quellenschriftsteller für den Gotenkrieg”）. In the final analysis, however, he still holds that, everything considered, a figure of 200，000 men for the East Goths is quite believable（page 11）.

1700091985

1700091986 5.The number of Cimbrian warriors who crossed the Brenner Pass in 101 and descended into Italy is given by the Romans as 200.000. Judging from the length and the type of route they took, I have felt justified in estimating that they were at most 10，000 strong. See Vol. I, page 513. Preussische Jahrbücher 147（1912）：199.

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