1701503023
(273) Massumi, “Introduction”, xxxi，原文强调。关于马苏米对感情和情感的区分：“对于马苏米来说，情感是基本的、无意识的、非主观的或前主观的、非所指的、不受限制的和密集的；而感情是衍生的、有意识的、受限制的、有意义的，是一种可以归于一个已经构成的主体的‘内容’……或一种可以驯服并与该主体相称的‘内容’。主体被感情压倒，但他们拥有 自己的情感。”见Steven Shaviro, Post-Cinematic Affect (Winchester: Zero Books, 2009), 3，原文强调。
1701503024
1701503025
(274) Connolly, World of Becoming , 23.
1701503026
1701503027
(275) Connolly, World of Becoming , 24，原文强调。
1701503028
1701503029
(276) Connolly, World of Becoming , 26.
1701503030
1701503031
(277) 生机论者，或者更确切来说是新唯物主义的神经政治思想家简· 班纳特（Jane Bennett）思考了事物的能动性并得出了主要是政治学和生态学的结论，见Jane Bennett, Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010)；也见Andrew Barry,“ Materialist Politics: Metallurgy”, in Bruce Braun and Sarah J. Whatmore (eds.), Political Matter: Technoscience, Democracy, and Public Life (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010), 89—117; Gay Hawkins,“ Plastic Materialities”, in Braun and Whatmore (eds.), Political Matter , 119—138。
1701503032
1701503033
(278) Connolly, World of Becoming , 54—55.
1701503034
1701503035
(279) Connolly, World of Becoming , 90.
1701503036
1701503037
(280) Connolly, World of Becoming , 145，原文强调。
1701503038
1701503039
(281) Connolly, World of Becoming ., 91.
1701503040
1701503041
(282) 其他的学科分支也回避了理性选择方法，因为它们缺乏情感—身体维度，见Gerd Gigerenzer Colin F. Camerer and Ernst Fehr, “When Does ‘Economic Man’ Dominate Social Behavior?”, Science , 311/5757 (2006), 47—52; G. Gigerenzer and R. Selten (eds.), Bounded Rationality: The Adaptive Toolbox (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001); Gerd Gigerenzer, Gut Feelings: The Intelligence of the Unconscious (New York: Viking, 2007)。从类似的角度探讨经济组织的社会学，见Helena Flam, Soziologie der Emotionen: Eine Einführung (Konstanz: UTB, 2002), 178, 187—188。
1701503042
1701503043
(283) 在本杰明· 利贝特（Benjamin Libet）的实验中，实验对象被要求做一个小的身体动作，例如弯曲手指，并记录他们决定做这个身体动作的时间。同时用脑电图测量大脑活动。结果表明，负责运动的皮层区域（运动皮层）在做出有意识的决定和执行运动之前会“自我准备”；因此存在一个前意识的脑—体回路。这个实验被用来质疑自由意志理论和其他理论。对利贝特实验的批评见Daniel C. Dennett, Freedom Evolves (New York: Viking, 2003); Christine Zunke, Kritik der Hirnforschung: Neurophysiologie und Willensfreiheit (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2007), 110—128。
1701503044
1701503045
(284) 见Leys, “The Turn to Affect”。
1701503046
1701503047
(285) William E. Connolly, “Critical Response I: The Complexity of Intention”, Critical Inquiry , 37/4 (2011), 791—798; Ruth Leys, “Critical Response II: Affect and Intention: A Reply to William E. Connolly”, Critical Inquiry , 37/4 (2011), 799—805.
1701503048
1701503049
(286) William E. Connolly, “Materialities of Experience”, in Diana H. Coole and Samantha Frost (eds.), New Materialisms: Ontology, Agency, and Politics (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010), 198 n. 6.
1701503050
1701503051
(287) 人们也不能像约翰· 普罗特维那样，从严格的哲学角度为躯体标记假说辩护；“肖恩· 加拉格尔（Shaun Gallagher）会说，达马西奥假设的细节‘要么以一种现象学上站不住脚的方式将身体夸大到思想的层面，要么将其简化为神经元过程’。但是如果我们考虑到科隆贝蒂（Colombetti）和汤普森（Thompson）的提醒，模拟身体回路需要持续不断的体细胞更新，因此并不仅仅是神经中枢的表现，我们可以保留‘躯体标记’假说”，见Protevi, Political Affect , 198 n. 35。
1701503052
1701503053
(288) Slavoj Žižek, “Have Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri Rewritten the Communist Manifesto for the Twenty-First Century?”, Rethinking Marxism , 13/3—4 (2001), 190—198.
1701503054
1701503055
(289) Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Multitude: War And Democracy in the Age of Empire (New York: Penguin Books, 2005), 109，原文强调。也见Michael Hardt, “Affective Labor”,Boundary 2 , 26/2 (1999), 89—100; Michael Hardt, “Foreword: What Affects Are Good For”,in Patricia Ticineto Clough and Jean Halley (eds.), The Affective Turn: Theorizing the Social (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2007), ix—xiii。也见Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000)。
1701503056
1701503057
(290) Hardt and Negri, Multitude , 108.
1701503058
1701503059
(291) 斯宾诺莎、德勒兹、马苏米，见Hardt, “Foreword”, xiii n. 2;达马西奥，见Hardt and Negri, Multitude , 374 n. 9。
1701503060
1701503061
(292) Hardt, “Foreword”, x.
1701503062
1701503063
(293) Hardt, “Foreword”, xii.
1701503064
1701503065
(294) Hardt, “Affective Labor”, 100.
1701503066
1701503067
(295) Adrian Johnston, “The Misfeeling of What Happens: Slavoj Žižek, Antonio Damasio and a Materialist Account of Affects”, Subjectivity , 3/1 (2010), 76—100; Slavoj Žižek, “Some Concluding Notes on Violence, Ideology and Communist Culture”, Subjectivity , 3/1 (2010), 101—116.
1701503068
1701503069
(296) Walter Benn Michaels, The Shape of the Signifier: 1967 to the End of History (Princeton
:Princeton University Press, 2004), 9—10.
1701503070
1701503071
(297) Michaels, The Shape of the Signifier , 180—181，原文强调。
1701503072
[
上一页 ]
[ :1.701503023e+09 ]
[
下一页 ]