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[11]Alexis de Tocqueville,DemocracyinAmerica, ed. and trans. Harvey C. Mansfield and Delba Winthrop（1835; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000）.
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[12]Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, Federalist No. 70（1788）,inTheFederalistPapers, ed. Clinton Rossiter（New York: New American Library, 1961）.
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[13]每个国家都有宪法，即便没有以之作为名称的文件。例如，英国从正式文件的角度看可以说没有宪法，但从实质来看，却有规范政治制度运转的成文和不成文规则。英国还有作为宪法基础的若干文件，包括古代的（如Magna Carta of 1215, Bill of Rights of 1688）和现代的（如Parliament Acts of 1911,1949）。
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[14]Aghion and Bolton,“Incomplete Social Contracts.”
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[15]See Aghion, Alesina, and Trebbi,“Endogenous Political Institutions”;之前关于既得利益集团的政治经济学文章，可参见: Per Krusel and Jose Victor Rios-Rull,“On the Size of U. S. Government: Political Economy in the Neoclassical Growth Model,”AmericanEconomicReview89, no. 5（1999）
:1156 -1181.
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[16]Hayek,The Constitution of Liberty.
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[17]Rafael La Porta, Florencio López-de-Silanes, Christian Pop-Eleches, and Andrei Shleifer,“Judicial Checks and Balances,”JournalofPoliticalEconomy112, no. 2（2004）
:445 -470.
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[18]La Porta et al.,“Judicial Checks and Balances.”
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[19]Daniel R. Pinello,“Linking Party to Judicial Ideology in American Courts: A Meta-Analysis,”JusticeSystemJournal20, no. 3（1999）
:219 -254.
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[20]Arnaud Philippe and Aurélie Ouss,“‘No Hatred or Malice, Fear or Affection’
:Media and Sentencing,”JournalofPoliticalEconomy126, no. 5（2018）
:2134 -2178.
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[21]Ioana Marinescu,“Are Judges Sensitive to Economic Conditions? Evidence from UK Employment Tribunals,”Industrial and Labour Relations Review64, no. 4（2011）
:673 -698.
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[22]Daniel L. Chen, Tobias J. Moskowitz, and Kelly Shue,“Decision Making under the Gambler’s Fallacy: Evidence from Asylum Judges, Loan Officers, and Baseball Umpires,”QuarterlyJournalofEconomics131, no. 3（2016）
:1181 -1242.
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[23]Daniel L. Chen and Jess Eagel,“Can Machine Learning Help Predict the Outcome of Asylum Adjudications?”Proceedings of the Sixteenth InternationalConferenceon Artificial Intelligence and Law（2017）
:237 -240; Daniel L. Chen,“AI and Rule of Law: Machine Learning, Causal Inference, and Judicial Analytics,” course at the Toulouse School of Economics, 2019.
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[24]Ozkan Eren and Naci Mocan,“Emotional Judges and Unlucky Juveniles,”American Economic Journal
:Applied Economics10, no. 3（2018）
:171 -205;Daniel L. Chen and Arnaud Philippe,“Clash of Norms: Judicial Leniency on Defendant Birthdays,” unpublished manuscript, February 2020, https: //papers. ssrn. com/ sol3 / papers. cfm? abstract_id = 3203624.
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[25]Jon Kleinberg, Himabindu Lakkaraju, Jure Leskovec, Jens Ludwig, and Sendhil Mullainathan,“Human Decisions and Machine Predictions,”QuarterlyJournalofEconomics133, no. 1（2018）
:237 -293.
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[26]计算机或者说算法也可能有偏向性，这方面的研究文献日益增多。依靠机器学习的算法包含了人类法官的偏向性，他们的决策是机器学习行为的基础。可参见Cathy O’Neil,WeaponsofMathDestruction（New York: Broadway Books, 2016）。
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[27]Samuel Bowles and Wendy Carlin,“Shrinking Capitalism,”AEAPapersandProceedings110（2020）
:372 -377.
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[29]关于政府与民间社会的必要的互补性，参见Monique Canto-Sperber,LaFin des libertés. Ou comment refonder le libéralisme（Paris: Robert Laffont, 2019）.
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[30]阿西莫格鲁与罗宾逊的TheNarrowCorridor用“缺位利维坦”来描述无政府社会。他们以尼日利亚的Tiv社群为例，描述民间社会取消政府的情形。该社群建立了一套社会习俗和惩罚体系，以防止任何人将其意指强加于他人。
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[31]Aghion和Bolton利用不完备合同的概念，发展出了基于借款人和贷款人的控制权及其分配的公司债务融资理论。参见Philippe Aghion and Patrick Bolton,“An Incomplete Contracts Approach to Financial Contracting,”ReviewofEconomicStudies59, no. 3（1992）
:473 -494.
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[32]Samuel Bowles and Wendy Carlin,“The Coming Battle for the COVID-19 Narrative,”VOXeu, April 10,2020.
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[33]政府可以用竞争政策来改变竞争力度，用教育和宣传政策来影响社会价值观，从而鼓励这种机制的作用。
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[34]Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson,“Why Did the West Extend the Franchise? Democracy, Inequality, and Growth in Historical Perspective,”Quarterly Journal of Economics115, no. 4（2000）
:1167 -1199.
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[35]组织理论中已经采用过把转移控制权作为承诺信号工具的思想，可参见Philippe Aghion and Jean Tirole,“Formal and Real Authority in Organizations,”Journal of Political Economy105, no. 1（1997）:1 -29.
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