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235 Langer and Gleason, The Undeclared War, pp. 221—222; Heinrichs, Threshold of War, p. 38.
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236 Sherwood, White House Papers, vol. 1, pp. 271—273; Langer and Gleason, The Undeclared War, pp. 285—289; Reynolds, Anglo-American Alliance, pp. 182—185; Reynolds, From Munich to Pearl Harbor, pp. 117—118; Kennedy, pp. 479—482.
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237 Sherwood, White House Papers, vol. 1, p. 270; quotation from Langer and Gleason, The Undeclared War, p. 289.
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238 Quoted in Kimball, Forged in War, p. 84. See also Heinrichs, Threshold of War,p. 81; and Freidel, p. 368 for Churchill’s disappointment in Roosevelt around this time.
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239 Freidel, p. 368.
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240 Blum, p. 251.
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241 See Heinrichs, Threshold of War, p. 85 for the rising support for escorting in April and May.
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242 罗斯福在 5 月份敦促采取行动占领亚速尔群岛和佛得角群岛，来应对他想象中“随时”可能发生的德军进驻西班牙和葡萄牙的情况。他要求在一个月以内集结一支 5 万人的部队，但是别人告诉他在这么短的时间里无法找到行动所需的运输船只，他于是“放弃了这个打算”（Sheffield University Library，Wolfson Microfilm 575，The Presidential Diaries of Henry Morgenthau 1938—1945 [Microform]，Frame 0931，22.5.41）。
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243 Freidel, pp. 369—370; Reynolds, From Munich to Pearl Harbor, pp. 125—127; Reynolds, Anglo-American Alliance, p. 198; Heinrichs, Threshold of War, p. 46. 另见 Ickes，第 466 页，报道说罗斯福讲过，“很快会发生大事，德国将犯下大错”，这让伊克斯猜测总统预料会发生某个事件促使美国参战，或者至少开始武装护航。罗斯福在 1941 年上半年暗示过大概 7 次，美国欢迎德国在大西洋的报复行动，这样将让他有借口采取更好战的举措（Casey，第 14—15 页）。
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244 See Barron, pp. 91—94.
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245 For the President, p. 512.
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246 Lash, pp. 309—310.
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247 Churchill and Roosevelt, C84x, p. 182; Reynolds, Anglo-American Alliance, p. 199.
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248 Ickes, pp. 512—513; Sherwood, White House Papers, vol. 1, p. 293.
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249 Quoted in Blum, p. 253; and see Langer and Gleason, The Undeclared War,pp. 455—456.
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250 Quoted in Larrabee, p. 55. 摩根索在 5 月 17 日的日记中说：“我感觉罗斯福想被形势逼着投入战争，不想领导国家主动开战。”（Morgenthau Diaries，Frame 0929，17.5.41。）See also Dallek, p. 265; and Divine, Roosevelt and World War II, p. 42.
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251 Sherwood, White House Papers, vol. 1, p. 298; Larrabee, p. 56; Burns, pp. 99—101; Reynolds, Anglo-American Alliance, pp. 202—203. 史汀生肯定赫尔把讲话的调子给降低了。他说，总统“听上去疲惫而无精打采，所以我对讲话挺失望的，不过他本人倒是觉得这是篇好的讲话”（Stimson Diaries，Reel 6，entries for 27—28.5.41）。
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252 FDR’s Fireside Chats, pp. 184, 187; Sherwood, White House Papers, vol. 1,pp. 296—298.
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253 Langer and Gleason, The Undeclared War, p. 463; Larrabee, p. 60; Burns, p. 101.
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254 Langer and Gleason, The Undeclared War, pp. 457, 463; Ickes, pp. 526—527; Sherwood, White House Papers, vol. 1, p. 299.
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255 Larrabee, p. 62.
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256 Barron, p. 98, citing an interview with Benjamin V. Cohen.
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257 Langer and Gleason, The Undeclared War, pp. 337, 342; Welles, Time for Decision, pp. 135—136.
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258 Langer and Gleason, The Undeclared War, p. 528; Reynolds, From Munich to Pearl Harbor, p. 132; Dallek, p. 268. 史汀生的日记显示，当时很多人仍然错误地相信，德国会在开战前发出最后通牒：“最大的新闻就是德俄谈判已经快走到了战争边缘，德国人以战争相威胁，对俄国人施加了强大的压力，想从俄国人那里获得让步。而且从所有情报看来，俄国人是战是降很难说。当然，我认为俄国人很可能投降。”（Stimson Diaries，Reel 6，17.6.41。）
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259 Sherwood, White House Papers, vol. 1, p. 299; Ickes, p. 552; Freidel, p. 372; Lash, p. 339; Dallek, pp. 267—268; Thomas A. Bailey and Paul B. Ryan, Hitler vs. Roosevelt. The Undeclared Naval War, New York, 1979, pp. 138—143.
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